Press coverage of the enlargement of the European Union and public opinion in the United Kingdom and France : a cross-national comparative study of the first- and second-level agenda-setting and priming effects by Dursun, Oya
















The Dissertation Committee for Oya Dursun certifies that this is the approved 
version of the following dissertation: 
 
 
Press Coverage of the Enlargement of the European Union and Public 
Opinion in the United Kingdom and France: A Cross-National 







Terri E. Givens, Supervisor 
Maxwell E. McCombs, Co-Supervisor 
Gary P. Freeman 
Tse-Min Lin 
Benjamin G. Gregg 
 
Press Coverage of the Enlargement of the European Union and Public 
Opinion in the United Kingdom and France: A Cross-National 








Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of  
The University of Texas at Austin 
in Partial Fulfillment  
of the Requirements 
for the Degree of  
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 






To Mom and Dad.
 v
Acknowledgements 
I am grateful for the support of my colleagues, family, and friends. In writing this 
dissertation, I have been the beneficiary of invaluable insight, guidance, encouragement, 
and kinship from dozens, people to whom I am forever indebted. 
My Co-Supervisors, Terri E. Givens and Maxwell E. McCombs, deserve special 
thanks. I am forever grateful for their guidance. I have benefited most from their 
commitment to seeing their students develop and succeed professionally.  
Beyond serving as an intellectual catalyst, Terri Givens has been generous with 
her time, offering comments on my papers when I have asked and providing career 
advice. This dissertation would be less articulate, less insightful, and less compelling 
without her. 
Maxwell McCombs’s ideas have spurred a number of my research ideas, here and 
elsewhere. I am forever indebted to him for his mentorship and careful attention to 
details. Whatever small amount of success I have achieved would not have come without 
my supervisors’ steadfast encouragement and support. I can only hope to do as much for 
my future students as they have done for me.  
The other members of my dissertation committee also deserve recognition. Gary 
Freeman has always generously provided feedback, reading paper after paper, for which I 
am always grateful. I have also learned much from watching him dealing with his 
students. From Tse-Min Lin, I have learned the value of conscientiousness as both a 
scholar and teacher. He has been a source of sage advice. I am truly grateful to Benjamin 
Gregg for his support. It was an honor working with such a distinguished committee.  
 vi
I am also indebted to many others – fellow graduate students, faculty members, 
and other scholars who have taken the time to read my work. Deniz Gokalp, in particular, 
deserves special mention. Since the day we entered graduate school together in the fall of 
2000, she has been my family throughout our seven years in Austin. Among the other 
friends and colleagues who have helped in this journey are Sally Dickson, Mijeong Baek, 
Danny Hayes, Natasha Sugiyama, Jihyang Jang, Eugene Kuan, Oksan Bayulgen, Mark 
McKenzie, Brian Arbour, Utku Yildirim, Odysseas Christou, Nihan Yamacoguz, Scott 
Garrison, and Fred Cady.  
I should also mention a number of faculty at the University of Texas who helped 
by reading papers, offering advice, or attending job talks: Zoltan Barany, John Higley, 
Wendy Hunter, Elspeth Rostow, Roderick P. Hart, and Sharon Jarvis.  
I would be remiss if I did not acknowledge the financial support in finishing this 
project. Department of Government fellowships – a Malcolm Macdonald Dissertation 
Fellowship – helped twice pay the bills along the way. I want to thank my coders – Yves-
Heng Lim, François Beve, Timothy Sheffield, and Jack de Glanville – for their tireless 
assistance in coding the newspaper content. I also would like to thank the University of 
Cologne’s Central Archive for Empirical Social Research Data Service (ZA) for 
providing me with the Flash Eurobarometer survey data on public attitudes towards the 
Eastern EU enlargement. 
Last but certainly not least, I owe much to my family and friends outside of grad 
school, who really deserve honorary doctorates for having put up with me over the last 
seven years. My husband Kemal Ozkanca has been an endless supporter of this project. I 
certainly would not have been able to finish writing this dissertation without his love, 
 vii
encouragement, and patience. Since the time I was 5 years old, my friend Canan Turan 
has been like a real sister to me. My parents, Gonul Oya Dursun and Yunus Dursun, are 
the sort that a child wishes for – loving, caring, and ceaselessly supportive. Conversations 
with my parents about politics have been very influential in my choice of pursuing a 
career in Political Science, and even in choosing the topic of this research. They continue 
to inspire me to become a better person. I would like to dedicate this dissertation to them. 
My siblings Eda and Can, were always there for me and offered me psychological 
support whenever I needed. To them, I owe more than I can express. Finally, I am so 
blessed to have my German grandfather, Udo Renger. He has always been my guardian 
angel during these challenging years. 
I have been unquestionably blessed to be surrounded by so many terrific people 
while I worked on this project. I will continue cherish these relationships. 
 viii
Press Coverage of the Enlargement of the European Union and Public 
Opinion in the United Kingdom and France: A Cross-National 






Oya Dursun, Ph.D. 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2007 
 
Co-Supervisors:  Terri E. Givens and Maxwell E. McCombs 
 
While the relationship between public opinion, mass media, and political elites in the 
United States is well documented, less is known about this topic in Europe. I argue that 
the way the media covers a European Union (EU) affair is more prevalent and relevant 
than often considered and demonstrate how it has consequences for European public 
opinion and policymaking. Expanding the traditional focus of political communication 
theories to the European context, I show that the media effects are pertinent in this 
geography as well.   
In doing so, I conduct four empirical investigations. First, I ask if the press 
coverage affects how people perceive the importance of the Eastern enlargement of the 
 ix
EU which occurred in May 2004. I find that the media’s coverage of EU enlargement 
fluctuates across the course of the time frame of this research along with the public 
salience of the issue. Second, I ask what role the media play in shaping public 
perceptions and evaluations of EU enlargement. I find that the aspects of the issues that 
are emphasized more frequently by the media attract more attention from the European 
public. My findings further suggest that with the increasing exposure to enlargement-
related coverage in the press, more people form negative opinion about EU enlargement. 
Third, through an individual-level analysis, I test if the effects of print media content on 
the people are contingent on other factors such as the socioeconomic status, political 
sophistication, issue interest, media exposure, or expectations of various consequences of 
EU enlargement. Ultimately, I place the EU enlargement debate in political context to 
provide an in-depth examination of the relationship between the people, the media and 
official policies of Britain and France on EU enlargement.  
The result of this dissertation is a clearer understanding of the role of the news 
media in shaping the public agenda on EU affairs. In addition, the findings broaden our 
understanding of the flow of information and the critical linkages between the media, 
political elites and the masses, the center of the democratic process. 
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 Chapter 1: Introduction  
Although the relationship between media coverage, public opinion, and policy has 
been investigated extensively in the US context, to date, it remains a relatively 
overlooked area in the European context. This dissertation seeks to provide a reliable 
conceptualization of the relationship between media coverage, public opinion, and 
policymaking. 
Expanding the traditional focus of political communication theories to the 
European context, I show that the media effects are pertinent in this geography as well. I 
argue that the way the media covers an EU event is more prevalent and relevant than 
often considered and demonstrate how it has consequences for European public opinion, 
media outlets, and policymakers.  
The existing knowledge about how the media covers European political affairs 
and how citizens in different EU Member States react to news about European affairs and 
processes of integration is very limited. Moreover, there is a lack of integrating 
theoretical frameworks in studies on the visibility of European issues in the media 
(Semetko et al. 2000). Furthermore, what scholarship exists has focused primarily on the 
determinants of public support for EU membership and European integration, leaving 
aside the support for EU enlargement. Consequently, relatively little scholarly attention 
has been paid to the determinants of public support for EU enlargement.  
While the European integration (deepening) is the most frequently studied issue 
regarding the EU, enlargement (widening) is far from irrelevant. What makes the current 
project unique is its innovative focus on the policymaking, media coverage, and public 
2 
support for EU enlargement, which is central to the success or failure of the European 
project. Hence, the present study explores the relationship between policy, public 
opinion, and the media in Britain and France on the issue of the “Big Bang” – the fifth 
and largest round of European Union (EU) enlargement, which occurred in May 2004. 
This round of enlargement represents a historic achievement by the EU, since it led to the 
reunification of the European continent that was divided throughout the Cold War. 
For the vast majority of citizens, information regarding politics comes from the 
media (Graber 2002). Studying EU enlargement-related media coverage is relevant to 
understanding public attitudes towards this topic. Since ordinary people have little 
motivation to seek out information about European affairs on their own, they are 
essentially captive to the media’s portrayal of these issues. If the media ignores political 
issues, they are unlikely to reach a large audience. As such, the success of European elites 
in promoting an issue agenda depends on the way the media cover those issues. In other 
words, if European elites want to shape the public’s perspective on a European issue, they 
must rely on the media to pass this issue along. French and Dutch rejections of the 
European Constitution referenda in 2005 are the latest illustrations of the significance of 
studying the effects of the news media in persuading the European citizens on EU-related 
issues. 
Although there were no direct referenda held in EU15 countries for the latest 
round of EU enlargement, this is not to mean that the public opinion on EU enlargement 
is not worthy of attention. Popular attitudes within existing Member States are significant 
for the success of EU enlargement (e.g., Jones and van der Bijl 2004). In the end, the 
quality of democratic decision-making within the EU rests on the quality of information 
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flowing to European citizens from the media, which makes it imperative that scholars 
understand the factors that shape the content of European affairs, as well as its effects. 
This project seeks to promote that endeavor.  
When studying the media effects, single-country studies run the risk of generating 
findings that are idiosyncratic to a context or country (Blumler et al. 1992). A cross-
national comparative perspective, on the other hand, provides an opportunity to escape 
from the ethnocentrism and premature generalizations common in most political 
communication research (see Prezworski and Teune 1970; Blumler and Gurevitch 1995; 
Swanson and Mancini 1996; Semetko and Mandelli 1997). It enables one to examine how 
those involved in the political communication process – publics, political parties, and 
media – act when operating under different institutional constraints (see Semetko and 
Borquez 1991).  
As such, following the methodological principles of cross-nationally comparative 
analysis of political communication systems and behaviors formulated by Blumler 
(1983), this dissertation examines the political communication processes on EU 
enlargement “in the round.” In other words, it treats the process of communication on 
Eastern enlargement of the EU as a system of interconnected elements, including its 
origins in the policies of media and politicians, its actual message features, as well as its 
corresponding public opinion impact. 
As suggested by Semetko et al. (2000), theories concerning media agenda-setting, 
priming and framing provide a basis for theory-building research on media and European 
integration. Since this project attempts to investigate the link between the media, public 
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opinion and policymakers in the European context, it makes use of these influential 
political communication theories. 
Consequently, this dissertation contributes to the political communication 
literature through an examination of the agenda-setting and priming functions of the print 
media in Britain and France on the issue of the biggest round of EU enlargement in May 
2004. It describes how the newspapers in Britain and France presented the issue of EU 
enlargement and its subtopics to their readers, and analyzes how these presentations 
affected public opinion. In other words, the current project asks: What kinds of messages 
did major newspapers in Britain and France produce about EU enlargement? Who 
received them, and how did they respond? What were their main effects – on what people 
learned about enlargement, on their awareness of the consequences of enlargement, and 
on their readiness to support the latest round of EU enlargement?  
 
THE PUZZLE: THE GAP BETWEEN EUROPEAN ELITES AND MASSES 
Studying the media effects on public opinion towards EU enlargement is relevant 
to understanding the gap between European elites and masses. While the French 
government has taken an ambivalent attitude on the Eastern enlargement of the EU, the 
British government has generally been in favor of it. However, the majority of both the 
British and French publics were against the fifth round of EU enlargement. As the 
legitimacy of elite actions depends upon the level of public support for European 
integration processes (see Rohrschneider 2000; Meyer 1999), it is important to study the 
formation and change of public opinion on these issues.  
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I argue that the explanation for the gap between public opinion and official policy 
regarding the Eastern enlargement of the EU largely lies in the way the media covered 
the topic in these countries. Cross-national comparative methodology employed in this 
project enables us to test for the effect of the media in France and Britain in urging 
similar impulses to a major policy debate in the EU.  
The Eastern round of EU enlargement has been one of the most ambitious 
projects that the EU has undertaken: internal reorganization of the Union through 
accession of ten new Member States stirred discussion and caused distress in European 
publics about its repercussions on their everyday lives. While the opponents of 
enlargement feared the arrival of cheap labor from the new Member States or that 
enlargement would increase drug trafficking and organized crime in their countries, the 
proponents of enlargement argued that an enlarged EU would be better off economically 
and would play a stronger political role on the international scene. Since the funding of 
this initiative was mostly dependent upon the former EU15 Member States, informing 
public opinion about enlargement and gaining public support in these countries was 
essential. 
The media is the principal means by which the majority of people receive 
information about policy issues in general, and EU affairs in particular (see 
Eurobarometer 61; Page and Shapiro 1992; Graber 2002; De Vreese 2002). According to 
Eurobarometer 61, 50% of the British people and 51.6% of the French people prefer to 
get information about the EU from daily newspapers as compared to television, radio and 
other sources.  
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Not only do people acquire factual information about public affairs from the news 
media, readers and viewers also learn how much importance to attach to a topic on the 
basis of the emphasis placed on it in the news (McCombs 2004; Dalton 1996; Norris 
2000). Since much of the public’s knowledge and information about public affairs is 
mediated rather than received directly, people’s opinions about political issues may be 
substantially shaped by the selection and presentation of information (see McCombs and 
Shaw 1972; Iyengar and Kinder 1987).  
Although EU topics generally receive low attention in the news in many European 
countries (Gleissner and De Vreese 2005; De Vreese 2002; Gavin 2000; Meyer 1999, 
2005; Norris 2000), the Eastern round of enlargement in May 2004 has been one of the 
most highly visible issues concerning the Union throughout different media outlets across 
Europe. Since it has generated substantial press coverage in the EU Member States, this 
historic event provides an excellent opportunity for a case study of the media effects on 
public opinion in Europe. 
Furthermore, EU enlargement, especially in the beginning of the time frame of 
this study, was an “unobtrusive issue,” in the sense that personal experience on 
enlargement was greatly limited, if not non-existent. For such issues, the need for 
orientation is largely satisfied through the use of the mass media and the degree of media 
influence increases with greater exposure (McCombs 2005, 64).  
The relatively limited presence of EU-related topics in the media and the fact that 
most citizens rely on the news media for cues about the EU make it important to assess 
how the Eastern enlargement of the EU is portrayed in the media. In addition, the EU is 
generally presented in a negative tone in the European media (Norris 2000). This 
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coverage tone might be said to have contributed to the gap between European elites and 
citizens.  
Regarding the gap between the elites and mass public, Jones and Baumgartner 
(2004, 1) ask the following question: “Do the policy priorities of the public and the 
government correspond?” and suggest that attention allocation is a direct indicator of 
priorities. Consequently, this dissertation primarily looks in the way major British and 
French newspapers treat the issue of EU enlargement in order to explain the gap between 
British and French public opinion and official policies of these key European countries 
on the issue.  
Research in the current project is primarily contextualized in agenda setting 
theory. As Semetko and Mandelli (1997, 206) succinctly state, “agenda setting and the 
related concepts of priming and framing are important bases for more coordinated cross-
national research efforts.” They advise that studies in this realm should explore: first, 
how the media agenda is formed and the relative contributions of politicians and 
journalists to the process; and second, how the media agendas influence public opinions 
about the salience of issues, urgency of problems and the responsibility for solving them. 
This study follows their advice.  
Because of the prevalence and relevance of enlargement-related press coverage, 
and the relative paucity of scholarship on the topic, this dissertation seeks to make 
theoretical and empirical headway in understanding certain features of the media’s 
coverage of EU enlargement and their role in influencing public attitudes. The design of 
this dissertation allows for a test of the validity of agenda-setting and priming hypotheses 
in a non-US context.  
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Put more specifically, this dissertation examines both the first- and second-level 
agenda-setting effects as well as the priming functions of the media in Britain and France 
through exclusive focus on the news coverage of enlargement in The Times, The 
Guardian and The Daily Mail, Le Monde, Le Figaro, and Libération from January 1, 
2002 to May 1, 2004. The goal is to examine if these political communication theories 
provide overarching explanations that are valid across different national contexts. 
Understanding the way this important EU event has been covered in the major European 
countries could provide further insight into the actual and potential cohesiveness of the 
EU.  
By attending to how an issue is covered, this research considers the political 
context in which issues exist and the struggle over how issues are constructed by the 
media and conveyed to the public. Accordingly, while examining the press coverage on 
EU enlargement, this dissertation also places the Eastern enlargement debate in political 
context through case studies of British and French official positions on the issue.  
Greater insight into the effects of media on public opinion has significant 
implications for the ongoing “democratic deficit” and “communication deficit” debates in 
European circles. The findings of this research have profound implications for European 
policymakers regarding actions to be taken on both future referenda concerning the 
adoption of the European Constitution and on possible referenda on subsequent rounds of 




I begin in Chapter 2 with an overview of the existing literature on media and 
public opinion, discussing the predominant political communication theories of agenda 
setting, framing and priming. I show how the issue of the biggest round of EU 
enlargement provides a good test case for these theories. In addition, I discuss why there 
is reason to expect media effects on people’s opinions towards enlargement. I then briefly 
survey the political communication scholarship in the European context, as well as the 
“democratic deficit” and “communication deficit” arguments. Finally, the chapter 
concludes with a discussion of my research questions and hypotheses. 
In Chapter 3 I provide an overview of the various data sources and methods I use 
to examine the content and consequence of enlargement-related coverage in Britain and 
France. To examine the news, I rely on a large-scale quantitative content analysis of 
enlargement coverage in newspapers from 2002 to 2004. I explain in Chapter 3 a content 
analysis of enlargement-related newspaper articles. I also describe the data from the 
Eurobarometer surveys that will serve as the basis for my study of public opinion 
towards EU enlargement.  
I begin the empirical work in Chapter 4, which examines the extent to which 
public agenda reflects the media agenda. Chapter 4, in other words, conducts a first-level 
agenda-setting analysis in Britain and France. It asks to what extent the frequency of the 
print media coverage of enlargement influences how important people consider it to be. It 
further seeks to determine if an analysis of the media coverage in Britain and France on 
enlargement reveals some possible national differences in the way this key European 
event is covered in these major European powers. Conducting a systematic quantitative 
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content analysis on the British and French print media coverage on EU enlargement 
enables the testing of news effects and contents cross-nationally. I find temporal variation 
in the level of media-public agenda convergence. However, the patterns are consistent 
with the argument that the media coverage shapes the public agenda.  
My focus in Chapter 5 is on the second-level agenda-setting effects in these two 
major European countries. In other words, Chapter 5 extends the analysis to explore if the 
media coverage of enlargement tells people “how to think about” enlargement, besides 
telling them “what to think about.” After identifying the predominant attributes in the 
print media coverage of EU enlargement, I conduct a rank order correlation in order to 
see whether the attributes the media apply translate into attributes the British and French 
publics use to evaluate the latest round of EU enlargement. I find that the media analyzed 
in this project exert moderate second-level agenda-setting effects. The findings suggest a 
strong, positive, and statistically significant correlation between the media framings and 
the public framings on three general consequences of EU enlargement. 
I turn next to an investigation of consequences of agenda-setting and priming on 
public opinion regarding the EU enlargement in Chapter 6. Seeking to fill a gap in the 
existing literature on agenda setting, I conduct both bivariate and multivariate analyses 
using individual-level public opinion data to test for the effects of a number of possible 
independent variables on the public support for EU enlargement. Specifically, I attempt 
to examine attitudes towards European enlargement as a result of media exposure, 
political sophistication, political interest, attitudes on several different consequences of 
EU enlargement, and demographic variables. The results of these analyses provide a 
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better understanding of what other factors are involved in the process of formation of 
opinions towards EU enlargement. 
Chapter 7 incorporates a discussion of the political context in Britain and France 
during the time of the enlargement debates to illustrate the interaction between the media 
coverage, public opinion, and the political elites. It places the debate over EU Eastern 
expansion in political context through case studies of British and French governments’ 
positions on enlargement. It examines the specific positions the governments of France 
and Britain staked out with regards to Eastern enlargement during the period under focus. 
The analysis draws especially on the British and French official responses to the 
immigration and unemployment related consequences of EU enlargement.  
Finally, this dissertation concludes with an assessment of the influence of the 
media in shaping public agenda, framings, and attitudes, as well as official policymaking 
on EU enlargement. I summarize my findings in Chapter 8 and discuss avenues of future 
research suggested by the project. I further concentrate on the implications of my 
empirical results and draw lessons for European media outlets and policymakers.  
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 Chapter 2: Theoretical Background 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the Eastern round of enlargement in May 2004 has 
been one of the most highly visible issues concerning the Union throughout different 
media outlets across Europe. Since it has generated substantial press coverage in the EU 
Member States, this historic event provides an excellent opportunity for a case study of 
the media effects on public opinion in Europe. 
As such, this chapter starts by providing a succinct survey of the media effects 
literature. It pays special attention to the agenda setting, framing and priming literatures. 
It then offers an overview of the comparative political communication literature in the 
European context. Any analysis of an EU-related topic and European public opinion 
deserves a discussion of “democratic deficit” and “communication deficit” literatures. As 
such, this chapter combines the political communication research scholarship with the 
“democratic deficit” and “communication deficit” literatures. It concludes with a 
statement of research questions and hypotheses derived from the review of relevant 
scholarship. 
 
A BRIEF SURVEY OF MEDIA RESEARCH 
“Minimal Effects” Thesis 
Political communication scholars have long been interested in the role media play 
in the political process. The literature, however, is inconsistent on whether the 
relationship between media coverage and public opinion is negative, positive, or non-
existent.  
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Early research by political scientists investigated attitude change through sample 
surveys and controlled experiments; this research seemed to detect that mass 
communications had “minimal consequences” on voting and public opinion (e.g., 
Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet 1944; Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee 1954; Klapper 
1960; Campbell et al. 1960). The main justification for this minimal effects hypothesis, 
Zaller (1996, 17) notes, was the fact that scholars found it “impossible to measure and 
identify substantial persuasion effects that are the outcome of the mass media and the 
campaign.” In other words, voters were pictured as largely impervious to the influence of 
the media. Proponents of this “limited effects” or “minimal consequences” model of 
political communication maintained that people heard what they wanted to hear via 
processes of selective exposure and interpretation (see Klapper 1960).  
Nevertheless, as the subfield of political communication has developed, the 
“minimal effects” hypothesis started to lose its dominant position. Two robust findings 
emerged in the study of news media’s influence on political attitudes: agenda setting and 
priming (see McCombs and Shaw 1972; Iyengar, Peters, and Kinder 1982; Iyengar, 
Kinder, Peters, and Krosnick 1984; Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Krosnick and Kinder 1990; 
Page and Shapiro 1992; Miller and Krosnick 2000).  
 
First Level (Traditional) Agenda Setting Theory 
The idea of an agenda-setting role of the press has its origins in a seminal work – 
Walter Lippmann’s Public Opinion – which begins with a chapter titled “The World 
Outside and the Pictures in Our Heads.” Lippmann (1922) argues that the press is a major 
contributor to the pictures in our heads. The term “agenda setting” in relation to the 
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media was first coined by Maxwell McCombs and Donald Shaw to describe the 
correspondence between the ranking of major issues on the press and public agendas in 
their pioneering work. Studying the 1968 US presidential campaign, McCombs and Shaw 
(1972, 177) hypothesized that “the mass media set the agenda for political campaigns, 
influencing the salience of attitudes toward political issues.” They found that the media is 
enforcing upon people what news is “important” and what news is “non-important.” They 
showed a strong correlation between the degree of issue salience with voters and the 
extent to which the issue was covered by the mass media.  
In 1977, McCombs and Shaw published their study of the 1972 US presidential 
election campaign. By interviewing the respondents several times during the presidential 
campaigns, McCombs and Shaw (1977) demonstrated that the public agenda followed the 
media agenda. Since the 1970s, the agenda-setting influence of the media has been 
widely replicated. 
First level or traditional agenda setting theory emphasizes how mass media, elites, 
and the public interact and influence one another to affect issue salience (see McCombs 
and Shaw 1972; Shaw and McCombs 1977; Funkhouser 1973; Weaver, Graber, 
McCombs, and Eyal 1981; Iyengar, Peters, and Kinder 1982; Rogers, Dearing, and 
Bregman 1993; McCombs and Reynolds 2002). It focuses on the transmission of object 
salience from the media to the public, and hence, points to the visibility and perceived 
importance of a problem or an issue due to its visibility or salience in the media.  
As Bernard Cohen (1963, 13) notes in his seminal work The Press and Foreign 
Policy, the press “may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, 
but it is stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think about.” McCombs (2004, 
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2) argues that “Cues repeated day after day effectively communicate the importance of 
each topic.” The more coverage an issue receives, the more concern individuals have 
with the issue. In other words, individuals learn how concerned they should be through 
the amount of coverage the issue receives (Wanta 1997a and 1997b; McCombs 2004; 
Iyengar and Adam 1993). The first level of agenda setting theory emphasizes the news 
media’s role in generating awareness of issues that should concern the public.  
 
Second Level (Attribute) Agenda Setting Theory 
Agenda-setting effects are not only limited to affecting issue salience (i.e. first-
level agenda-setting effects). As McCombs (2004) puts it, the agenda setting effects 
operate at two sequential levels in the communication process: attention and 
comprehension. The second level agenda setting deals with the “transmission of attribute 
salience” (McCombs and Estrada 1997, 240) and holds that the prominence of an issue’s 
attributes in the “pictures in our heads” is influenced by the pattern of attributes in the 
press coverage for that issue.  
When the media talk about an “object” (the thing on which the attention of the 
media and the public are focused), some “attributes” (characteristics and traits that 
describe the object) are emphasized, others are given less attention, and many receive no 
attention at all (McCombs 2004, 6). Second level or attribute agenda setting theory 
argues that media not only shape the salience of “objects” in public opinion (e.g., issues, 
candidates, etc.), but “attributes” of those objects as well (e.g., subissues, candidate traits, 
etc.). In short, agenda setting theory posits that elements that are prominent on the media 
agenda, both “objects” and their “attributes,” become prominent on the public agenda. 
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In that sense, second level of agenda setting theory expands the scope of the 
previous agenda-setting research by examining a much more complex digestion of media 
content. It examines how media organizations select and present certain characteristics 
and properties of an object and how that selection and presentation subsequently 
influence the public’s perception of an object and its attributes (Ghanem 1997; McCombs 
and Reynolds 2002).  
For instance, McCombs, Llamas, Lopez-Escobar, and Rey (1997) conducted a 
detailed attribute agenda-setting research in the Spanish regional and municipal elections. 
They analyzed the “substantive” and “affective” dimensions of voters’ image descriptions 
and concluded the existence of second-level agenda-setting effects. Benton and Frazier 
(1976) similarly found that agenda setting not only shapes the salience of broad issues but 
also the salience of proposed solutions to those issues and the rationales behind those 
solutions. A common way of dealing with the second level of agenda setting is by 
dividing the issues into their sub-issues (see Takeshita and Mikami 1995, for an 
illustration). At this point, a brief discussion of the relationship between the second level 
of agenda setting and framing is called for.  
 
The Connection between the Second Level of Agenda Setting and Framing 
When comparing framing and agenda setting, Patterson (1994, 70) suggested that 
framing “expands beyond what people talk or think about by examining how they think 
and talk.” This argument is fundamentally at odds with the views of others. For instance, 
according to McCombs (1997), framing constitutes a second-level agenda-setting effect. 
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It deals with story presentation and is the “ability of media reports to alter the kinds of 
considerations people use in forming their opinions” (Price and Tewksbury 1996, 121).  
Entman (1993, 52) defines framing as “select[ing] some aspects of a perceived 
reality and mak[ing] them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to 
promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation and/or 
treatment recommendation for the item described” (original emphasis). Agenda setting 
theory uses Entman’s definition of framing in identifying the kinds of attributes selected 
to describe a particular object, with emphasis serving as the primary determinant of 
framing power (Reese 2001).  
As Hsiang and McCombs (2004, 24) note, “thinking of frames as attributes of an 
object provides the theoretical link between agenda-setting and framing research.” 
McCombs (2005, 546) defines a frame as “an attribute of the object under consideration 
because it describes the object.” However, he also adds that not all attributes are frames. 
Regarding the difference between agenda setting and framing, Ghanem (1997, 6) 
states that the literature on the second level of agenda setting “examines the impact of 
news frames on the public agenda, whereas many framing studies have focused solely on 
the frames themselves.” According to the assumptions of the second level of agenda 
setting theory; depending on how an issue is presented in the media, the public is 
expected to think about that issue in a particular way. The link between attribute agenda 
setting and framing raises stimulating questions about the influence that various patterns 
of description have on how the public thinks about public affairs topics (McCombs 2005, 
547). 
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Consequently, how issues are framed in the media affects people’s decision 
making on the issue. Research suggests that if a situation is presented to a person in terms 
of losses, the decision is very different than if it is presented to that person in terms of 
gains (Elster 1990). Additionally, framing economic and foreign policy questions in 
terms of gains versus losses (Quattrone and Tversky 1988) or framing affirmative action 
in terms of unfair advantage versus just compensation (Kinder and Sanders 1990) can 
change the basis of political judgment. When the focus is on the effects of media 
coverage on political evaluations or judgments, priming thesis makes a very important 
theoretical contribution to the political communication literature. 
 
Priming  
As Willnat (1997, 51) maintains, “researchers often ignored effects the media 
might have on links between political cognition and attitude formation.” While several 
agenda setting studies have tried to include behavioral measures as dependent variables, 
little progress was made in terms of theoretical explanations of this process initially 
(Rogers and Dearing 1988).  
But, more recently, attitudinal consequences of agenda setting gained interest 
(Page et al. 1987; Ansolabehere et al. 1993; Bartels 1993; Zaller 1996; Dalton et al. 
1998; Kinder 1998; Schmitt-Beck 2004; Farrell and Schmitt-Beck 2002). By framing 
issues in certain ways, “the media influence the way people perceive a problem or issue 
and its consequences, possibly altering their final evaluation of the issue” (Jasperson et 
al. 1998, 206; see also Capella and Jamieson 1997; Graber 1988, 1993; Iyengar 1987, 
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1991; Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Iyengar and Adam 1993; Neuman et al. 1992; Norris 
1995; Patterson 1994).  
There are three distinct consequences of agenda setting for attitudes and opinions: 
“forming an opinion, priming opinions about public figures through an emphasis on 
particular issues and shaping an opinion through an emphasis on particular attributes” 
(McCombs 2005, 549). Priming is an extension of agenda setting. It addresses the impact 
of media coverage on the weight assigned to specific issues in making political 
judgments or evaluations. Priming effects can best be interpreted as the consequence of 
agenda setting.  
The priming thesis holds that “the more prominent an issue is in the information 
system, the greater its weight in political judgments of public” (Iyengar and Adam 1993, 
368). As Price and Tewksbury (1995, 5) succinctly summarize, priming is “the tendency 
of audience members to evaluate their political leaders on the basis of those particular 
events and issues given attention in recent news reports.” As such, agenda setting theory 
is an important precursor to priming effects (Miller and Krosnick 2000). 
The notion of priming is built on the assumption that people are most likely to 
retrieve information that has been recently activated. In other words, it assumes that a 
stimulus can activate previously learned cognitive structures, thereby influencing the 
judgment process (Fiske and Taylor 1984).  
According to Iyengar and Kinder (1987), priming is a psychological process 
whereby media emphasis on particular issues activates in people’s memories previously 
acquired information. Priming suggests that individuals use “shortcuts” or recall 
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information that comes to mind easily to make evaluations of issues and leaders (Iyengar 
and Kinder 1987).  
As Iyengar (1987) points out, individuals are not passive consumers of media 
messages, but they interpret, elaborate on, and evaluate information within an existing 
network of knowledge, attitudes, beliefs, and personal experiences. The priming 
phenomenon (weighting issues in accordance with their perceived salience) has been 
documented in a series of experimental and non-experimental studies (for reviews of 
priming research, see Krosnick and Kinder 1990; Miller and Krosnick 2000).  
Through a series of experiments, Iyengar and Kinder (1987) demonstrate that 
news coverage of an issue can prime viewers to give that issue more weight in their 
overall evaluations of public officials and political candidates. The experiments show, for 
example, that exposure to media coverage of national problems such as energy, defense, 
and inflation boosted the weight that Americans assigned to US President Jimmy Carter’s 
performance on these particular issues in forming their general evaluations of his 
performance.  
Iyengar and Kinder (1987) explain these effects by arguing that ordinary people, 
when facing complex political issues or events, do not base their judgments on all of the 
relevant knowledge stored in their memories. Instead, they adopt a shortcut strategy, 
making evaluations based on the pieces of information most easily retrieved from 
memory (see also Krosnick and Brannon 1993). Since people typically rely on the mass 
media for information about political events, the accessibility of such information is 
determined partly by which stories the media choose to cover (Iyengar and Kinder 1987; 
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Krosnick and Kinder 1990). This aspect provides the theoretical link between agenda 
setting and priming.  
After noting that “almost all media priming studies have analyzed the effects of 
television news,” Willnat (1997, 63) maintains that the analysis of print media priming 
effects has been an “underdeveloped area” in priming research. This project fills in this 
deficiency in the political communication literature by testing the priming hypothesis 
using newspaper articles on Eastern enlargement in selected British and French print 
media outlets.   
Consequently, this research project applies widely accepted political 
communication theories – agenda-setting and priming – for explaining the relationship 
between print media coverage and public opinion in Britain and France on the issue of 
Eastern enlargement of the EU. This chapter now turns to a review of the relatively 
underdeveloped political communication scholarship in the European context.  
 
POLITICAL COMMUNICATION RESEARCH IN THE EUROPEAN CONTEXT 
In Western democracies, political communication occurs primarily through the 
mass media. The media select, shape, and interpret political issues. The provision of 
information is the key ingredient of a political process of democratic debate and opinion 
formation. Accordingly, the media are becoming a political actor in their own right. 
Nevertheless, the existing knowledge about how the media covers European 
political affairs and how citizens in different EU Member States react to news about 
European affairs and processes of integration is very limited. Moreover, there is a lack of 
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integrating theoretical frameworks in studies on the visibility of European issues in the 
media (Semetko et al. 2000).  
Despite these deficiencies in the political communication literature, there are 
several studies conducted on the role of the media in the European context. For instance, 
Blumler (1983) discussed the influential role of television in covering the first direct 
European Parliamentary elections in 1979.  
Several studies pointed to the fact that European citizens’ knowledge of European 
level politics is limited when compared with their knowledge of national political affairs 
(Schoenbach 1983). They argued that “since many people are ill-informed about 
international affairs and slow to see their relevance for their own lives, it would require a 
communication effort of considerable scope and complexity to overcome electoral 
unfamiliarity with EEC institutions, candidates, and issues” (Blumler 1983, 4). 
Prior scholarship on EU-related news coverage identified several distinct features 
in the way the EU, its institutions and policies are presented by the media. In their 
analysis of the news media in Britain, Germany and the Netherlands, Gleissner and De 
Vreese (2005) noted that the overall tone of the media’s coverage of EU Constitution was 
negative and that the issue was reported from a European angle, rather than a domestic 
perspective. 
Many scholars attracted attention to the fact that EU topics generally receive low 
attention in the news in many European countries (Gleissner and De Vreese 2005; De 
Vreese 2002; Gavin 2000; Meyer 1999, 2005; Norris 2000). Meyer (1999) called this a 
“legitimacy deficit,” and argued that it is embedded in the EU’s inability to generate 
public support among European citizens due to the lack of media attention. He noted that 
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the role of political communication in legitimating governance is often disregarded in the 
democratic deficit literature.  
A number of studies concluded that media representations of Europe may affect 
public attitudes towards the EU and its policies (Geddes 2004; Franklin 1999; Anderson 
and Weymouth 1999; Curtice 1999). For instance, Thoveron and Sauerberg (1983) tested 
the agenda setting theory in the context of the first European Parliamentary elections in 
nine European countries; Britain, Denmark, France, Germany, Belgium, Ireland, Italy and 
Netherlands, and for the most part, found significant convergence between the agenda of 
the people and the TV coverage. 
Additionally, there were a number of studies that concentrated on the effects of 
media framing on public opinion on EU-related matters. They identified the “conflict 
frame” as a commonly occurring element of the EU-related media coverage (De Vreese 
2002; Norris 2000; Semetko and Valkenburg 2000). For instance, in a study of news 
frames in the coverage of the 1997 Amsterdam summit, the “conflict frame” was found to 
be the second most common frame in the Dutch news media (Semetko and Valkenburg 
2000). Similarly, using surveys and content analysis, Norris (2000) noted that the EU is 
generally presented in a negative tone in the European media.  
Since the media coverage has important implications on future European 
integration, there have been quite a few academic studies that concentrated on the 
emergence of a European public sphere (see, Schlesinger 1999; Koopmans 2007, for 
detailed review of these studies). The majority of these studies have concluded that the 
“Europeanization” of national spheres – most commonly measured as an increase in the 
reporting of EU topics – is still too early to be observed. They found out that journalists 
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reporting on EU issues tend to refer more often to their own country than to other EU 
member states or to the EU as an institution (see, for instance, McQuail and Bergsma 
1983).  
While it is an established fact in the literature that the degree of Europeanization 
of national public spheres rises steeply at the time of special occasions or events, even in 
the case of EU-wide events, it is still not possible to talk about a complete cross-national 
synchronization of European debates (Machill et al. 2006; Gramberger 1994, quoted in 
Meyer 1999).  
In his analysis of Brussels news correspondents, Morgan (1995, 338) put this 
observation more precisely by describing the way in which the British media cover EU 
decisions. He maintained that the EU news have been “nationalized and treated 
accordingly.” This finding illustrates that the news correspondents still cover EU affairs 
from a nationalized perspective rather than a European perspective.  
Similarly, the previous scholarship that focused on the coverage of European 
Parliament elections by the media of EU member states concluded that these elections 
were reported using the same reporting conventions that are used for national elections 
(Blumler 1983; Leroy and Siune 1994; Wober 1987). After having reviewed the media 
research in general, and the relatively limited political communication literature in 
Europe, this chapter proceeds with a discussion of the “democratic deficit” and 
“communication deficit” literatures.  
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“DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT” AND “COMMUNICATION DEFICIT” LITERATURE REVIEW 
This dissertation is primarily interested in diagnosing the relationship between the 
media, public opinion, and elites in the context of EU enlargement. For such an endeavor, 
it is crucial to identify the nature of the relationship between policymakers and European 
citizens. This brings the “democratic deficit” debate in the EU to the forefront.  
In democratic theory, the capacity of a political system to respond to the 
preferences of its citizens is considered to be vital. This project aims at studying the 
nature of the relationship between elite positions and public opinion on a rather 
understudied area of European affairs: the issue of Eastern enlargement. 
There are several competing arguments in the European integration literature 
regarding the relationship between European elites and people. Furthermore, there is little 
consensus among scholars and practitioners concerning what “democratic deficit” is and 
whether or not it exists in the EU policymaking.  
In the European context, “democratic deficit” implies that the EU and its 
institutions suffer from lack of democracy or legitimacy, and therefore, are perceived by 
ordinary EU citizens as inaccessible. Robert Dahl (1999), for instance, maintains that 
international organizations are inherently unable to support direct democratic deliberation 
and decision. The EU, as perceived by many journalists and academicians, is no 
exception.  
A significant number of scholars that study the EU have suggested that the 
“democratic deficit” is inherent in the EU’s policymaking processes and institutions (see 
Follesdal and Hix 2005 for a survey of democratic deficit arguments). They maintain that 
since the European project was founded as a result of the agreement between sovereign 
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states, represented by political elites, “democratic deficit is inherent in the EEC’s political 
arrangements since its inception” (Marquand 1979, 64). The underlying logic of this 
criticism is that the public “input” is not permitted in EU decision-making processes. In 
other words, these accounts suggest that EU policymaking is not responsive to public 
opinion. Before a discussion of the “democratic deficit” theory – a theory of non-
responsiveness – it is beneficial to summarize what the earlier scholarship concluded 
regarding the elite-public relationship in the European context.  
Early work on European public opinion noted emergence of a “permissive 
consensus” on European integration (Lindberg and Scheingold 1970; Inglehart 1970; 
Slater 1982) and a “post-materialist” value shift in attitudes toward a united Europe 
(Inglehart 1977). For Inglehart, post-materialists are more inclined to support European 
integration. “Post-materialists” give priority to things that are more directed to the 
fulfillment of a person’s intellectual needs (Inglehart 1977).   
The “permissive consensus” theory holds that an ill-informed and disinterested 
European public has been generally positively predisposed toward European integration 
and has allowed political elites a free hand or a blank check in deciding about the EU 
matters. In other words, this “permissive consensus” was due to both the technical nature 
of the EU topics and minimal consequences of European policies on people’s lives. It 
survived so long as European integration was widely perceived to be delivering the 
economic goods and peace to people and so long as the effects of integration remained 
limited (i.e. distant from the daily lives of the European citizens).  
Nevertheless, as recently illustrated by the results of the referenda on European 
Constitution in France and the Netherlands, the “permissive consensus” among the 
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European citizens cannot be taken for granted. This has very important implications for 
the nature of democracy in the EU.   
As the EU starts influencing the daily lives of the European citizens, European 
integration became increasingly conducive to opposition from public (Eichenberg and 
Dalton 2003; Marks and Steenbergen 2004). This led to the emergence of an opposing 
thesis called “constraining dissensus,” implying the potential constraining role of public 
opinion on European integration matters (Van der Eijk and Franklin 1996; Hix 1999).  
Another competing argument – “policy mood,” developed by Stimson (1991) – 
suggests that public disinterest is a sign that elites are “sticking close enough to public 
preference.” Stimson and his colleagues maintain that “politicians are keen to pick up the 
faintest signals in their political environment” (Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson 1995, 
559). The “policy mood” argument suggests the primacy of public opinion on 
policymakers and maintains that elites respond to electoral pressure. There are several 
other studies that conclude substantial policy responsiveness to public opinion (Page and 
Shapiro 1983; Jacobs 1993; Geer 1996).  
Alternatively, several analysts reject the idea that public opinion influences 
policymaking. The “cue-taking” argument developed by Carruba (2001) claims that 
political elites shape weakly held public preferences through their policy position. 
Carruba (2001) concludes that cues presented by political elites provide citizens with 
cognitive short-cuts that help them decide what is in their interest (for a discussion of the 
“cue-taking” and “policy mood” arguments in the European context, see Carrubba 2001).  
On the other hand, there are increasing concerns about a disconnection between 
the European elites and citizens. The gap between the European project and its citizens is 
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well documented in the literature. Many political scientists argue that the European elites 
make decisions on the EU independent of the popular feedback and that the EU suffers 
from a severe “democratic deficit” (Beetham and Lord 1998; Meyer 1999; Scharpf 1999; 
Hooghe 2003). They maintain that the EU decisions are not sufficiently responsive to 
public preferences and scrutiny.  
Proponents of the “democratic deficit” argument note that only one branch of the 
EU – the European Parliament (EP) – is directly elected by European citizens. They also 
contend that there is little public discussion of European issues, let alone an ideal 
transnational deliberation; the Council of Ministers meetings are conducted in secret, 
behind closed doors. To them, the link between the EU and its citizens is too tenuous and 
the mode of interaction within the EU is too diplomatic or technocratic. 
Even in the case of the EP, a number of scholars point to steadily declining 
turnout levels in EP elections. The voter turnout level has continuously fallen since direct 
elections began in 1979 (63% turnout level), reaching its lowest point in the latest EP 
elections in 2004 (46% turnout level).  
However, a number of scholars like the ones at the Centre for European Reform 
think thank maintain that the EU has a “delivery deficit”:  
 
The EU has a problem of legitimacy. The main cause is not a “democratic deficit” 
– there are plenty of checks and balances on the exercise of power within the EU 
system – but rather a delivery deficit. Too often there has been a gap between 
rhetoric and reality. EU leaders often promise great things … but fail to deliver 
(Barysch et al. 2006, 2). 
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Some, on the other hand, argue that the criticism of the EU as democratically 
illegitimate is unsupported by the existing empirical evidence (see Majone 2000; 
Moravcsik 2002, for a critique of the democratic deficit argument). This group of 
scholars argues that the EU decision-making is effective, transparent, and responsive to 
the public opinion. According to Majone (2000), for instance, the EU is not suffering 
from democratic deficit, but from a “credibility crisis.” He maintains that the EU should 
operate through “non-majoritarian” institutions rather than through popular democracy. 
Finally, several political communication scholars who study the EU noted that the 
“democratic deficit” literature has devoted trivial attention to the role of political 
communication in legitimating governance (Meyer 1999, 2005; Ward 2001, 2004). They 
maintain that there is too little public communication in Europe (Weiler 1999; Meyer 
1999, 2005; Ward 2001, 2004). Meyer (1999), among others, highlights the public 
communication deficiencies – “communicative weakness” – of the EU (see also Risse-
Kappen 1996; Ward 2001, 2004). 
After noting that the solutions to democratic deficit have been overwhelmingly 
framed in terms of an institutional reform of the EU (such as the empowerment of the EP, 
the creation of a directly elected and more accountable Commission), Ward (2001, 77) 
notes that the European elites also need “to engage with the imagination of its citizens.” 
He analyzes European Commission’s decisions on State aid and competition policy, in 
order to assess how EU media policy forms a comprehensive approach to media 
regulation. This clearly indicates the key role Ward (2001) assigns to political 
communication, in dealing with democratic deficit and the lack of public identification 
with the EU. 
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The “communication deficit” argument is also contested. Trenz (2004) analyzes 
news coverage of European governance and policy-making in 2000 through a content 
analysis of eleven daily newspapers from six EU member states. Testing the assumption 
that there is a “communication deficit” in Europe, Trenz (2004, 297) concludes that there 
is “a considerable degree of European political communication to be found in the quality 
press of the selected EU member states.” His findings contradict the expectations of the 
“communication deficit” argument and point to the emergence of a European public 
sphere.      
We are at a crossroads as regards the future formation of the EU, with the future 
of the European Constitution and further rounds of enlargement at stake. The results of 
the referenda in France and the Netherlands on European Constitution have brought the 
democratic deficit argument back into the agenda of the EU. 55% of the French and 
61.5% of the Dutch voted “no” in the referenda. Yet, it remains unclear how EU elites 
will go about the European Constitution ratification process.   
As illustrated by this literature review, scholars from different backgrounds are in 
disagreement with one another about the nature of the relationship between the elites and 
the public in general, and about whether there is a “democratic” or “communication 
deficit” in Europe, in particular. Accordingly, this research aims to shed light on this 
pertinent debate and grasp the dynamics of the media-public-policy relationship in the 
European political context.     
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RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
Following a review of literatures on agenda setting, framing, and priming 
theories, as well as on “democratic” and “communication deficit” arguments, this chapter 
continues with the statement of research questions and hypotheses derived from the 
relevant research literatures. For an explanation of the operationalization process, please 
refer to Chapter 3.   
 
First-Level Agenda-Setting Analysis 
An initial scanning of European public opinion data, as presented by Figure 2-1, 
attracts attention to an interesting phenomenon – i.e., the presence of substantially 
different levels of salience of Eastern enlargement topic among the British and French 
respondents.  
While, in France, the EU enlargement issue is more salient than in Britain, the 
percentage of people who have already heard of enlargement in Britain is well below the 
EU15 and French averages. One question that is warranted by this observation is: To 
what extent does this cross-national difference in public salience reflect different levels of 
salience of enlargement in French and British media? In other words, this research 
analyzes the public salience of EU enlargement as a result of the media salience of the 
issue.  
Agenda-setting studies have focused on how frequently an issue is mentioned in 
the media. To test for media’s first-level agenda-setting functions, this project poses the 
following research question: to what extent does the frequency of the press coverage of 
EU enlargement influence the significance people assign to this issue?  
 
Figure 2-1. British and French Public Attention to Eastern EU Enlargement, 2002-2003  
  

















Source: Flash Eurobarometer Surveys on Enlargement 132.1, 132.2, and 140 
 
Following the agenda setting theory’s expectations, I hypothesize that the higher 
the frequency of enlargement-related press coverage, the higher the perceived importance 
of this issue will be on the public agenda. Consequently, the following hypothesis is 
generated to test for the first-level agenda-setting effects of the print media: 
Hypothesis 1: Media salience of EU enlargement is positively correlated with its 




Second-Level Agenda-Setting Analysis 
De Vreese et al. (2001, 108) attract attention to an important deficiency in the 
political communication literature; and note that “little attention has been paid to framing 
in a cross-nationally comparative fashion.” This project studies frames or “attributes” in a 
cross-national comparative fashion.  
Regarding the second-level agenda-setting effects, this project investigates if the 
media coverage of Eastern enlargement tells British and French people “how to think 
about” enlargement, besides telling them “what to think about.” It deals with both the 
“substantive” and “affective” attributes of the enlargement topic. 
The main research questions at the second-level analysis are: To what extent do 
the print media frame EU enlargement topic in terms of its political, economic and social 
consequences? Do the frames the print media apply to EU enlargement translate into 
patterns the public uses to interpret this issue? Did the “substantive” and “affective” 
dimensions of press reporting on Eastern enlargement influence public opinion on the 
topic? 
An assessment of the second-level agenda-setting effects requires an 
identification of the predominant frames in the coverage of EU enlargement. In the 
political communication literature, there are two different types of frames – “issue-
specific” frames and “generic” frames (see De Vreese et al. 2001 for further discussion). 
Studies of frames have often been carried out in relation to a specific event (e.g. Entman 
1991; Mendelsohn 1993) or specific issue (e.g. Nelson et al. 1997; Norris 1995). Due to 
the nature of its research topic, this project employs “issue-specific” frames. 
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For a systematic study of attribute (or second-level) agenda-setting, Takeshita 
(1997, 25) suggests that “operationalization should be conducted in a way to be 
applicable both to analysis of the media content and to measurement of cognitions of the 
audience members,” so that we are able to compare the media data with the audience 
data. Following this advice, the current study constructs exhaustive and mutually 
exclusive categories of the enlargement issue based on the previously collected Flash 
Eurobarometer on Enlargement public opinion data and applies them to content analysis.  
Also, following a careful review of the literature on public support for the EU 
projects, this dissertation makes the assertion that the public support for enlargement is 
dependent on the perceived consequences of enlargement by people. In other words, this 
project expects the media to have a great potential in influencing public opinion on 
Eastern enlargement through manipulation of relative saliencies of various consequences 
of Eastern enlargement. Consequently, this research conducts a content analysis of 
“substantive attributes” of EU enlargement: the “political,” “economic,” and “socio-
cultural” consequences of enlargement.  
Besides analyzing the above-mentioned “substantive” attributes of the 
enlargement topic, this study also constructs “affective” attributes of the issue, following 
a review of previous research on second level of agenda setting (see McCombs 1992, for 
a discussion of “substantive” vs. “affective” attributes). Since the media coverage 
communicates much more than facts about issues, the “affective” attributes of the press 
coverage on Eastern enlargement are also analyzed.  
The “affective” dimension is interested in the public’s emotional response that 
could result from media coverage. It is only intuitive to hypothesize that the “affective” 
35 
tone of the print media coverage (positive, neutral, negative) on Eastern enlargement will 
have an effect on people’s attitudes towards the Eastern enlargement of the EU. As such, 
the affective tone of the press coverage – i.e. negative, somewhat negative, neutral, 
somewhat positive, or positive – is coded in the content analyses of the British and 
French newspapers. 
Consequently, the following hypotheses are developed in order to test for the 
second-level agenda-setting effects:  
Hypothesis 2: The more salient a substantive attribute (political, economic, and 
social consequences) is in the press coverage of EU enlargement, the more likely the 
people are to describe Eastern enlargement topic in terms of that substantive attribute 
(i.e., substantive attributes of EU enlargement emphasized by the media correlate with 
enlargement’s substantive attributes salient to public).  
Hypothesis 3: The more positive a substantive attribute of Eastern enlargement is 
presented in the press coverage, the more likely the people are to think of that attribute in 
a positive way (i.e. the affective tone of the media coverage on enlargement’s different 




As noted in the literature review section, priming deals with the consequences of 
agenda setting. Put more specifically, it addresses the impact of media coverage on the 
weight assigned to specific issues in making political judgments.  
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If a subtopic of an issue becomes more important in the news, citizens are primed 
to evaluate that issue on the basis of their attitudes toward that particular subtopic. This, 
in turn, has significant implications on how people evaluate certain public policy issues. 
Consequently, this study examines if the weight assigned by the press to a certain 
consequence of EU enlargement affects its weight in people’s minds when they make 
judgments about the EU enlargement issue.  
Research questions at this level of analysis are: Whether and to what extent does 
the predominance of various attributes of enlargement influence the overall evaluation of 
the enlargement of the EU by citizens? Which aspect of the issue do people assign the 
most significance to (i.e. political, economic, or social consequences) when they make 
judgments about EU enlargement?  
Hypothesis 4: If a certain consequence of EU enlargement is made more 
prominent in the press coverage on EU enlargement, the weight assigned to that 
particular consequence by people will be greater when they form their opinions on the 
EU enlargement issue.  
Following the formulation of hypotheses derived from a thorough review of the 
literature, the subsequent chapter focuses on various data and methods used in testing 
these hypotheses.  
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 Chapter 3: Data and Methods 
The current chapter explains the data and the methodological approaches utilized 
in this project for testing the hypotheses stated in the preceding chapter. It starts with 
providing the logic for using a cross-national comparative methodology and a selection of 
cases. It then continues with providing an overview of the various data sources and 
methods used to examine the content and consequence of enlargement-related coverage 
in Britain and France. 
 
RESEARCH DESIGN: CROSS-NATIONAL COMPARATIVE METHODOLOGY 
A great deal can be learned by comparisons of media effects across countries. 
Political communication cannot be properly examined without comparative research, 
since only comparative research can render the validity of the results (Meyer 2005). 
Comparing cases and explanations forces us to think in a rigorous way.  
As Swanson (2004, 59) notes, comparative political communication is an 
“essential supplement to the nationally focused studies on which most of our knowledge 
of the subject has been built.” It sheds light to transnational trends that otherwise would 
be difficult to notice (Swanson 2000; Dogan and Pelassy 1984).  
Furthermore, Hallin and Mancini (2004, 3) highlight the fact that comparative 
analysis forces scholars to clarify the “scope” and “applicability” of the concepts and 
theories employed. Similarly, Esser and Pfetsch (2004, 384) suggest that “comparative 
analysis can be used as a key to discern general findings from culture-specific ones by 
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rendering visible the specific identity of political communication arrangements within a 
given system”: 
 
Comparative research contributes to theory building in two important ways. First, 
it helps us to assess the general validity and geographic range of a theory (or 
hypothesis) by testing it in different social-cultural and systemic settings. Second, 
it helps us to contextualize middle-range theories by discerning those system 
factors in the presence of which a theory is mainly valid (Esser and Pfetsch 2004, 
385). 
 
Jay Blumler and Michael Gurevitch (1975) were among the first to note that 
comparative cross-national political communication research is a “field in its infancy” 
deserving serious theoretical and empirical attention. Research on media effects is often 
based on national studies, suffering somewhat from “naïve universalism” by offering 
general theoretical propositions based on single-country data (Gurevitch and Blumler 
1990, 308).  
In their more recent work, Gurevitch and Blumler (2004, 333) outlined several 
criteria for the “maturity” of comparative political communication research. One standard 
for “maturity” is proper explanation of the “purpose of going comparative.” The other 
sign of “maturity” is the placement of the research in a theoretical or conceptual 
perspective. Finally, a “mature” comparative political communication research, according 
to Gurevitch and Blumler (2004, 333), should state its “expectations about comparative 
similarities and differences in light of the results of the empirical research.” 
There are many obstacles to comparing countries that differ in language, size, 
culture, and organization. Comparative political communication literature suffers most 
from the lack of sufficient numbers of scholars that are proficient in conducting 
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comparative research in different languages. This study overcomes this obstacle through 
the recruitment of four research assistants that are native speakers of British English and 
French for coding the media content.   
One purpose of this research is to explain cross-national differences in media 
coverage and support for EU enlargement in Britain and France. To do that, this project 
utilizes a cross-national comparative political communication framework to asses the 
“scope” and “applicability” of the agenda setting and priming theories in the European 
context. The upcoming sections in this chapter concentrate on the satisfaction of the 
criteria for “maturity” of comparative political communication research developed by 
Gurevitch and Blumler (2004).  
 
CASE SELECTION 
Przeworski and Teune (1970) suggest two opposing approaches to select the 
countries or cultures in a systematic way: the “most similar systems design” and the 
“most different systems design.” While the former stresses cultural differences, the latter 
focuses on cultural similarities. The similarity of the objects compared is central to the 
analysis. 
Britain and France constitute ideal cases for a cross-national media effects study. 
This study employs “the most different systems design.” The choice of countries is 
motivated primarily by their importance in political decision-making and economic 
performance in the EU. France and the United Kingdom are both Western European 
states with a long tradition of consolidated democracy and with similar levels of 
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economic development. They are both considered as “liberal democracies” in which free 
debate of public issues are encouraged (Freeman 1995). The people represent the ultimate 
authority in democracies. As such, it is crucial to study public’s attitudes and opinions on 
political matters.  
Despite their similarities, however, France and the UK are two major actors 
within the EU with traditionally different approaches towards the processes of European 
integration. While the United Kingdom is renowned for its Euro-skepticism, France is 
famous for its Euro-enthusiasm. In other words, while France has traditionally been the 
most ardent supporter of further European integration, the United Kingdom has been the 
“awkward partner” of the EU (George 1994). When compared with France, in the British 
context, the debate about the future of Europe is received with remarkable unease.  
On the issue of Eastern enlargement, the French government has surprisingly 
taken an ambivalent attitude. French policy on Eastern enlargement has shifted several 
times, depending on the government’s projected calculation of national interest. The 
calculations of the tradeoff between further integration and expansion played a key role. 
Additionally, in the beginning of the enlargement process, the French government 
thought of enlargement as a way to strengthen the political influence of the EU vis-à-vis 
the US. However, later on, the debates regarding a possible intervention in Iraq made it 
clear that the Central and Eastern European countries would change the internal balance 
of power of the enlarged Union to the disadvantage of France.  
The British government, on the other hand, has generally been in favor of the 
Eastern enlargement. “Widening” was considered to be in Britain’s national interest. In 
other words, the British government regarded the expansion of the Union to include new 
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members as a way out from further “deepening.” In that sense, traditional Euro-
skepticism of UK official policy is absent on the issue of Eastern enlargement. In a way, 
Britain and France swapped their traditional positions on the issue of Eastern enlargement 
of the EU: while France was more reluctant, Britain was more enthusiastic about this 
particular EU initiative. A detailed discussion about the British and French positions on 
the Eastern enlargement of the EU can be found in Chapter 7. 
France and Britain fall under different “media system models” introduced by 
Hallin and Mancini (2004). While Britain is categorized as a “liberal media system 
model,” in which there is a relative dominance of market mechanisms and of commercial 
media; France is generally identified as a “democratic corporatist media system model,” 
where there is a historical coexistence of commercial media and media tied to organized 
social and political groups. The French model is characterized by a relatively active but 
legally limited role of the state.  
As Albert (1983) puts it: “French Journalism has always been more a journalism 
of expression than a journalism of observation: it gives precedence to the chronicle and 
the commentary over summary and reportage. As much as in the presentation of facts, it 
has always been interested in the exposition of ideas …” (quoted in Hallin and Mancini 
2004). In this, Hallin and Mancini (2004, 98) maintains, French journalism is 
fundamentally different from Anglo-Saxon journalism, for which news always has 
priority over commentary.  
Finally, these two countries differed from each other in terms of their newspaper 
readership. According to the World Association of Newspapers’ World Press Trends 
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data, in the year 2000, “in the UK, newspaper sales per 1,000 population is 408.5, 
whereas in France the number is 190” (Hallin and Mancini 2004, 23). 
Given these differences in media systems, French and British publics could be 
expected to have diverged in their attitudes towards the European enlargement project. 
However, both publics were thinking about the EU enlargement topic in a very similar 
way: the majority of both the British and French publics were against the upcoming EU 
enlargement to include ten new member states from the Central and Eastern Europe.  
In other words, the publics of these two major Western European countries shared 
similar negative attitudes (although with varying intensities) toward the fifth and the 
largest round of enlargement in EU history. To illustrate, Figure 3-1 demonstrates that in 
both countries, people perceived the EU enlargement as a very costly enterprise. Figure 
3-2 indicates that the majority of people in both countries thought that the enlargement 
would make it more difficult to take decisions in the EU.  
 
Figure 3-1. British and French Public Attitudes on the Cost of Enlargement, 2002-2003  















Source: Flash Eurobarometer Surveys on Enlargement – 132.1, 132.2, and 140 
 
Figure 3-2. British and French Public Attitudes on the Impact of Enlargement on the 
Complexity of EU Decision-making, 2002-2003  



















Consequently, this study is interested in explaining the similarities between the 
British and French public opinions toward Eastern EU enlargement, while, for the most 
part, their governments were in favor of this EU policy. It particularly deals with the role 




A 28-month period from January 2002 to the May 1 2004 is deemed appropriate 
as the time frame for this study. January 2002 is chosen to be the starting date of the time 
frame for analysis since on 14th and 15th December 2001, the Laeken European Council 
declared that the accession process was “irreversible” and stressed the EU’s 
determination to bring the negotiations with those countries ready to join to a close by the 
end of 2002.  
In October 2002, the Commission recommended concluding the accession 
negotiations with Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia by the end of 2002. The Copenhagen European 
Council, held on December 2002, concluded negotiations with the ten candidate countries 
listed above, and set May 1, 2004 as their accession date.  
On April 9, 2003, the European Parliament gave its assent to the accession of the 
ten acceding states. The Treaty of Accession was signed on April 16, 2003. May 1, 2004 
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marked a historic moment as Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia joined the EU. 
Besides its chronological importance, another rationale for selecting this time 
frame is the availability of more frequently conducted public opinion surveys by 
Eurobarometer (Standard, Special, and Flash EB Surveys on Enlargement). Please refer 
to Appendix C for the information on the dates of fieldwork of the Eurobarometer 
surveys used in this analysis. Under ideal circumstances, this study would also examine 
the period after the enlargement day, in order to measure the impact of increased media 
coverage of enlargement on public opinion. But the latest of a series of Eurobarometer 
surveys assessing European public opinion on Eastern enlargement were conducted on 
March 2004. Hence this limits the time frame of this study. 
During the period under study, ten public opinion surveys were conducted on 
enlargement. This enables a closer comparison of news coverage and survey results, and 
increases the validity of the results in this study. Having the polling data from surveys 
conducted frequently during the period of approximately two-and-a-half years is 
appropriate to account for changes in people’s attitudes towards enlargement in time.  
 
SOURCES OF DATA TO ASSESS MEDIA EFFECTS 
The framework used in this study is useful in avoiding a “common mistake” of 
many studies in the political communication literature identified by Jacobs and Shapiro 
(1996). The analyses on media information properties and public opinion have remained 
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on independent tracks (Jacobs and Shapiro 1996). This study integrates these two 
different areas.  
Put more specifically, following the traditional methodological scheme in agenda 
setting research, this analysis draws on two different sources of data in connection with 
each other: public opinion polls and media content analysis, to identify if a relationship 
exists between print media coverage and public opinion. The following section provides a 
detailed description of public opinion and media data utilized in this research.   
 
Public Opinion Data 
Comparative public opinion research is usually subject to a host of problems 
involving the measurement of citizen opinions: variations in question wording across 
independent studies; irregularity in the timing or frequency if surveys; or changes in 
sampling frame or survey procedures. The unparalleled resources of the Eurobarometer 
(EB) surveys enable this research to avoid these common problems.  
As such, this study utilizes several EB – both the Standard and Flash EB – survey 
data conducted between 2002 and 2004, to measure people’s attitudes towards the biggest 
round of EU enlargement. The Standard EB series conducts interviews across EU 
countries on a wide variety of communication-relevant topics as well. These surveys are 
usually conducted twice a year. All EB survey polls employed in this analysis used a 
probability sampling procedure and were based on face-to-face interviews with 
approximately 1,000 respondents in each country.  
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In testing the first-level agenda setting hypothesis, I relied on a number of survey 
items taken from the Standard EB surveys. In testing the second-level agenda setting 
hypotheses, I relied on a number of survey items taken from the Flash EB Surveys on EU 
Enlargement. Flash EB surveys usually provide more specialized questions on specific 
EU policies. The EU enlargement has been an issue tackled by three separate Flash EB 
surveys. Unlike the Standard EB surveys, Flash EB surveys are conducted over the 
phone. Flash EB surveys were also based on approximately 1,000 respondents in each 
country. 
 
Media Data: Newspaper Coverage Content Analysis, 2002-2004 
For a systematic analysis of the media data, this project conducts a quantitative 
content analysis on major print media outlets in Britain and France, focusing exclusively 
on the coverage of The Times, The Guardian, The Daily Mail, Le Monde, Le Figaro, and 
Libération on EU enlargement. In all content analysis projects, there are several 
important decision points. Selection of appropriate message units is one of them. 
To study the media data, this dissertation analyzes the newspaper articles on 
Eastern enlargement of the EU. It does not attempt to analyze television news coverage 
because of the unavailability of a systematic collection of TV news transcripts in Britain 
and France. Besides, for agenda-setting effects, “a rough rule of thumb is that about half 
the time, there is no discernible difference in the influence agenda-setting roles of 
newspapers and television news; for the other half of the time, newspapers have the edge 
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by a ratio of about 2 to 1” (McCombs 2004, 49; McClure and Patterson 1976; Tipton et 
al. 1975).  
Furthermore, memory research has found that brain activity is greater for reading 
than for watching television (Weinstein, Appel and Weinstein 1980). Accordingly, the 
processing of messages from television differs significantly from information processed 
through reading. Information derived from the print media might be encoded, stored, and 
retrieved more efficiently than visual information coming from television (Willnat 1997, 
63). When compared with the broadcast media, newspapers are a more permanent source 
of information and are readily available for use at any time of day (Wanta 1997a).  
Moreover, the print media coverage generally provides more information for each 
issue than television news and provides more complex coverage of news stories (Graber 
1993). Readers can stop and contemplate the significance of a story at their own pace 
(Wanta 1997a). Due to the greater “channel capacity,” newspapers perform an initiating 
role in the public opinion process and play an important role early in an issue’s life cycle 
because of their ability to begin tracking and reporting public issues earlier than 
television (McCombs 1977).  
Consequently, this project examines the computerized media contents of leading 
press outlets using the Lexis-Nexis database and compares the trends in EB public opinion 
polls to the ones in the Eastern enlargement-related news coverage in Britain and France 
in order to analyze print media effects.  
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DATA AND THE UNIT OF ANALYSIS FOR CONTENT ANALYSIS  
Exposure is an important variable in the agenda-setting process (Wanta 1997b). 
According to the Standard EB surveys analyzed in this study, daily newspapers comes 
second to the TV in being the most popular sources of information on the EU, chosen by 
50 % of the UK sample and 51,6 % of the French sample (Eurobarometer 61).  
Hallin and Mancini (2004, 303) point to a need for comparative data on media 
content that would show “differences or similarities in news selection criteria, 
conventions of presentation, and the representation of different social groups and 
interests.” Accordingly, the six newspapers analyzed in this research have the largest 
circulations of any newspapers in Britain and France. Furthermore, in the selection of the 
media content, I aimed for both elite newspapers and tabloid press, from both sides of the 
left-right divide, with high circulation rates and considerable influence on other types of 
media as well as on the political system.  
One purpose of this project is to test if the nature of the outlet has an effect on the 
way the EU enlargement topic is covered. In the original research design of this study, 
The Sun and France-Soir were also planned to be included in the content analysis to 
represent the tabloid outlets; however, due to unavailability of these tabloids at the Lexis-
Nexis database, other popular news outlets, The Daily Mail and Libération, were used as 
substitutes.  
There is a methodological issue that needs to be addressed here. There is no 
guarantee that the media coverage was actually seen and processed by the respondents to 
the EB polls. To help shed light on this phenomenon, I run descriptive analysis for the EB 
56 public opinion survey in Britain, which included questions about media consumption 
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habits of the respondents. Question 2b asked, “Which daily newspapers do you read 
daily?” Since the numbers of respondents reading the main newspapers content analyzed 
in this analysis were low, the answers to this question are recoded to include if the British 
respondents read another newspaper in addition to one of interest (The Daily Mail, The 
Sun, The Times, and The Guardian). Table 3-1 demonstrates the frequency distributions 
of daily newspaper readership among EB 56 respondents in Britain. 
 
Table 3-1. Daily Newspaper Readership Distribution among the British Respondents 




     
The Sun 270 13.6 27.5 27.5 
     
The Daily Mail 171 6.1 12.3 39.9 
     
The Times 30 1.5 3.1 42.9 
     
The Guardian 27 1.4 2.8 45.7 
     
Other Newspaper 398 20 40.6 86.2 
     
Multiple Newspapers 50 2.5 5.1 91.3 
     
No Daily Newspaper 85 4.3 8.7 100 
     
Total 981 49.3 100  
     
System missing  1007 50.7   
     
Total 1988 100   
     
 Source: Standard Eurobarometer 56 
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Table 3-1 shows that among the British respondents to the EB 56, there was a 
significant amount of people who read other newspapers (40.6%). It also indicates that 
The Daily Mail, The Times and The Guardian readers cumulatively constituted only 
approximately 18% of the British sample. 
Nevertheless, previous research suggests that large newspapers can set the agenda 
of smaller papers. As McCombs (2005, 549) puts it, “journalists routinely look over their 
shoulders to validate their sense of news by observing the work of their colleagues, 
especially the work of elite members of the press.” Thus, the agenda in these papers 
could have been filtered down to smaller papers and other media, making the media 
agenda accessible to all respondents throughout the country. The “homogeneity of 
agendas” thesis further supports this argument.  
For instance, the inaugural Chapel Hill study, which included elite media, local 
newspapers, and news magazines, found “homogeneity of agendas” among the media 
(McCombs and Shaw 1968). Another study on the comparison of British and American 
media effects on the formation of election campaign agendas also concluded the 
homogeneity of press agendas between tabloids and broadsheets (Semetko et al. 1991). 
Yet, in order to test for the effect of differences in tabloids and elite newspapers, 
Libération and The Daily Mail are also added in the content analysis (see Esser 1999, for 
a discussion of the division in the British press between quality and tabloid newspapers). 
As Seymour-Ure (1996, 214) puts it, “between 1945 and 1995, the [British] press 
became less predictable and manageable for the parties.” That is to say, British 
newspapers became less consistent in their support for one party or another and less 
inclined to follow the agenda set by party leaders. Nevertheless, there have been 
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variations in this trend. Despite the general trend toward diminishing political 
parallelism, however, the “political orientations of British newspapers today are as 
distinct as anywhere in Europe” (Hallin and Mancini 2004, 210). One of the most 
distinguishing features of the British politics is the presence of a highly partisan press 
(Curtice 1999; Newton and Brynin 2001). Hallin and Mancini (2004, 211) too maintain 
that “within the limits of the British political spectrum, strong, distinct political 
orientations are clearly manifested in news content.” Take, for instance, the most 
commonly cited headline The Sun had used for claiming credit for the Conservative 
victory in Britain, “It’s the Sun Wot Won It!” (April 11, 1992).   
The British national newspaper system provides numerous opportunities for right-
of-center journalists but relatively few for those on the left (Curtice 1999; Brynin and 
Newton 2003). The Guardian and The Mirror are among the few national newspapers on 
the political left, while the Daily Telegraph, The Times, The Daily Mail, The Sun, 
Express, or Star are among the many on the right (see Kriesi 2004). 
Strong political orientations are especially typical of the tabloid press. Tabloids 
“reject the constraints of objective reporting” and present the newspaper as speaking for 
the common citizen and “common sense,” often “mobilizing a tone of outrage” (Hallin 
and Mancini 2004, 211). In Britain, this generally takes the form of a right-wing populist 
stance, emphasizing nationalism, anticommunism, and hostility to the EU (Baker 2001). 
Furthermore, British tabloids often market themselves by launching campaigns around 
causes they expect to be popular (Harcup and O’Neill 2001).  
The quality papers in Britain are more subtle in their style and they generally 
provide more neutral coverage on political issues, when compared with their tabloid 
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counterparts (Baker 2001). But, even then, the “British broadsheets do employ a more 
interpretive style of writing than is typical in North American papers” (Hallin and 
Mancini 2004, 211). They have distinct political orientations, which can be seen in the 
political affinities of their readers. “In 1997, for instance, 57% of Daily Telegraph and 
42% of Times readers supported the Conservatives, as compared with 16% Independent 
and 8% of Guardian readers” (Hallin and Mancini 2004, 212). Semetko et al. (1991) in a 
comparative study of election coverage in the UK and the US in the late 1980s, describe 
British election coverage as “more ample, more varied, more substantive, more party-
oriented, less free with unidirectional comment and more respectful” than American 
coverage (quoted in Hallin and Mancini 2004, 215).  
The Guardian is one of Britain’s oldest newspapers with a well-respected national 
and international reputation. It maintains a radical, left-of-center editorial stance. The 
Times, owned by Rupert Murdoch, represents the conservative voice in the British press. 
The popular press, especially in Britain, is quite powerful through its immense circulation 
rates among British people. As such, including The Daily Mail in analysis enables us to 
test for the homogeneity of press agendas between tabloids and broadsheets. It is 
Britain’s most popular paper after The Sun. Like The Sun, it maintains a right-wing 
perspective.  
The combined readership of quality broadsheets is “dwarfed” by that of the Euro-
skeptic press, since the number of tabloid readers is larger than the broadsheet readers 
(Baker 2001). In the British electoral context, many studies concluded that the highly 
partisan British press is quite effective in not only setting the agenda or framing issues, 
but also in determining electoral outcomes (Curtice 1999; Brynin and Newton 2003). 
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The political identification of French newspapers varies, from clearly ideological 
papers such as L’Humanité and La Croix to relatively apolitical regional papers. The 
major Paris dailies reflect broad political tendencies, Le Monde and Libération 
representing the left-of-center, and Le Figaro and France-Soir the right-of-center (see 
Hallin and Mancini 2004).  
Le Monde remains to date, a highly unusual example of journalistic autonomy, 
since journalists retain the right to elect the director. Le Monde has until recently 
followed a policy of limiting the percent of revenue derived from advertising, which was 
seen as protecting the newspaper from outside influence. At Libération the 
nonhierarchical culture of its early years as a radical alternative paper was 
institutionalized in a Societe Civil des Personels similar to that of Le Monde. In 1996 
most of the shares of the paper were sold to a commercial company, Chargeurs S.A., with 
the employees retaining 20% ownership and the right to veto the appointment of a new 
director (Hallin and Mancini 2004, 117). 
Le Monde, which maintains a left-of-center editorial stance, has a diffusion of 
approximately 400,000 issues a day. It is read by an average of more than two million 
people every day in France. Le Figaro has a similar distribution rate to Le Monde, but it 
has a conservative editorial line. Its electronic version is the most visited French site for 
general news. Libération is one of France’s leading newspapers with a distribution of 
170,000 issues a day. It is left-wing and in favor of anti-racism and worker’s rights.  
This selection consists of press outlets that are considered influential sources of 
information for other media outlets and contains a good cross-section of national press 
coverage on social, economic, and political issues in Britain and France. Since the time 
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frame of this project is relatively short and the coverage of enlargement is limited when 
compared to other political issues, we content analyze the population of all Eastern EU 
enlargement-related newspaper articles in The Times, The Guardian, The Daily Mail, Le 
Monde, Le Figaro, and Libération.  
Observation of three different news media in each of the two countries provides 
six replications of the analysis testing each hypothesis. The unit of analysis in this project 
is the entire text of newspaper articles on Eastern EU enlargement. The next section 
explains another important decision point in a content analysis study: the category 
formation and operationalization processes.  
 
CATEGORIES AND OPERATIONALIZATIONS 
The categories that are created in a content analysis research should be not only 
sensitive to the message content, but also exhaustive and mutually exclusive. In addition, 
the distribution of these categories should not be skewed. Keeping these considerations in 
mind, the following section provides a detailed account of the category formation and 
operationalization processes for both levels of agenda setting theory. 
 
First-Level Agenda-Setting Analysis  
Regarding first-level agenda-setting effects, a keyword search is conducted to 
identify the volume of media attention devoted to enlargement. As has been the case in 
most agenda-setting studies, the salience in the media of the issue is defined in terms of 
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the number of stories (see Kiousis and McCombs 2004; King 1997; McCombs and Shaw 
1972; Rogers and Chang 1991).  
Articles that contain keywords – European Union enlargement, EU enlargement, 
accession, Elargissement de l’Union européenne, and adhésion – in the headline or the 
lead paragraphs are included in the analysis. In a second step, all the articles in the 
selection which were either duplicates (due to the different editions of newspapers) or 
were not sufficiently relevant (if the keyword appeared just as a passing remark in one 
sentence or in an irrelevant context) are eliminated. The selection included editorials and 
opinion pieces as well as news stories of more than two paragraphs. The final dataset 
contained 344 newspaper articles for the British press and 778 for the French press.  
Due to limitations in the public opinion survey data, for measuring public 
salience, this study employs an indirect measure – i.e. name recognition of EU 
enlargement. As illustrated by Kiousis and McCombs (2004), name recognition is a 
necessary condition for and can serve as an indirect measure of salience when other 
options are unavailable. The assumption is that people must be able to recognize 
enlargement in order to consider it salient.  
The public agenda is usually measured through survey research. As such, the first-
level agenda-setting analysis here focuses on name recognition or awareness of EU 
enlargement by the British and French publics, which is a measure available in the EB 
survey data. Both the Standard EB survey and Flash EB Surveys on Enlargement ask the 
following question to determine the salience of the enlargement for people: “Before this 
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interview, had you already heard of the enlargement of the European Union?” The 
answers to this question are used in measuring the public agenda.1
As a test of first-level agenda-setting effects, this project plots the average amount 
of EU enlargement-related press coverage per month against the percentage of EB 
respondents in France and Britain who indicated their awareness of enlargement. Put 
more precisely, the frequencies of EU enlargement-related articles are counted and then 
matched with the level of public salience in Britain and France.  
This analysis relies on simple correlation to test the statistical significance of the 
relationship between enlargement coverage and the proportion of respondents in Britain 
and France who expressed that they are aware of the Eastern enlargement of the EU. The 
results of the first-level agenda-setting analysis are presented in Chapter 4.  
 
Second-Level Agenda-Setting Analysis  
As discussed in Chapter 2, to test for the second-level agenda-setting effects, the 
agenda of “substantive” attributes to be analyzed includes three main categories: political, 
economic, and socio-cultural consequences of enlargement. For the construction of the 
“political,” “economic,” and “socio-cultural” consequences of enlargement frames, I 
draw largely on framework developed by Semetko and Valkenburg (2000).  
Regarding the analysis of major frames, Semetko and Valkenburg (2000) employ 
an “economic consequences” frame, which they argue reports an event, problem, or issue 
in terms of the consequences it will have economically on an individual, group, 
 
1 The available answers to this question were: yes (1) and no (2).  
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institution, region, or country. Neuman et al. (1992), Graber (1993), and Eichenberg and 
Dalton (1993) all identify “economic consequences” as a common frame in the news. To 
the “economic consequences” frame, this study adds the “political” and “socio-cultural” 
consequences of EU enlargement to investigate the extent to which these frames are 
mirrored in public support for EU enlargement. Please refer to Appendix B as well as 
Appendix D for a definition of variables and categories used in this analysis. 
Predominant attributes in the coverage of EU enlargement – i.e., political, 
economic, and social consequences of enlargement – over time are examined through 
rank order correlation in order to see whether the attributes the media apply translate into 
attributes the British and French publics use to evaluate the largest round of EU 
enlargement. Rankings on press and public agenda are compared to determine the 
strength of the press’s second-level agenda-setting effects on the British and French 
publics. Please refer to Appendix B for a definition of categories and subcategories used 
in coding. 
Each category is coded as a dichotomous variable. To test whether second-level 
agenda-setting effects resulted from the newspapers’ framing of enlargement, the content 
analysis data were compared with several questions asked by the Flash EB polls.  
Initially, the “affective” tones in the press coverage of Eastern enlargement’s 
different consequences were included in the content analysis. The frequency of 
“affective” tones of enlargement was going to be correlated with the public opinion 
survey results. But due to low levels of intercoder reliability measures in both Britain and 
France, this aspect of second level of agenda setting analysis is eliminated during the 
pretests. As such, Hypothesis 3 outlined in Chapter 2 is not quantitatively analyzed.  
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Consequently, using the Flash EB survey data, the correspondence between the 
news agenda of substantive attributes and the public agenda of substantive attributes on 
Eastern enlargement is calculated. Then, using Spearman’s rho, the results of content 
analysis are compared with the survey data on public’s attitudes on the consequences of 




Reliability is the extent to which a measuring procedure yields the same results on 
repeated trials (Carmines and Zeller 1979). The reliability of coding is important for 
conducting scientifically valid research. Reliability addresses the issue of consistency and 
is a necessary condition for validity of results. Intercoder reliability is the amount of 
agreement or correspondence among two or more coders (Neuendorf 2002).  
Four coders, who are native speakers of British English and French, respectively, 
were recruited for the coding of the British and French newspapers. They were trained 
before the coding and supervised during the coding stage. Written coding instructions, a 
copy of the codebook, copies of newspaper articles, and coding spreadsheet were 
provided to coders. The training sessions familiarized coders with the purpose of the 
research, the content that would be coded, and the codebook that would be used. Ethical 
standards of content analysis research were also emphasized during the training sessions. 
After repeated pretesting of the codebook to determine the reliability of coding decisions, 
a sample of articles from each newspaper was coded for all variables.  
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Besides the date and the newspaper in which the article appeared, newspaper 
stories on Eastern enlargement of the EU were coded in terms of topic, and affective and 
substantive attributes. Please refer to Appendix A for the coding scheme and the master 
codebook employed in this research. 
To ensure intercoder reliability, several pretests were conducted till Scott’s pi 
reached 0.86 across all the variables of content analysis. Scott’s pi is a reliability index 
takes into account the extent of inter-coder agreement that results from chance and is a 
very conservative measure of reliability (see Holsti 1969, 140-141). The research 
included a more leveled measurement design at first, but since the intercoder reliability 
was not reached, the categories were coded as dichotomous variables.  
Once the final version of the codebook was drafted, coders started coding each 
article directly onto SPSS spreadsheets. Following the advice of Neuendorf (2002), 
intercoder reliability tests were conducted on a randomly selected subsample of 10% of 
the news stories in Britain and France – 34 and 78 articles, respectively. Since the content 
that was coded was “manifest,” objectivity in coding the substantive attributes was not 
difficult to achieve. As such, measuring substantive attributes was fairly straightforward.   
Nevertheless, a similar argument could not be made regarding the coding of the 
affective attributes of enlargement. The coding of such attributes was problematic. As 
mentioned earlier, coders were asked to code the newspaper articles according to the 
following affective attributes: negative, somewhat negative, neutral, somewhat positive, 
or positive. These affective attribute categories were not as clear-cut as the substantive 
attribute categories. Consequently, since the intercoder reliability measures were very 
low regarding the affective tone of the enlargement-related newspaper stories, this aspect 
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of the analysis was abolished. For the explanation of coding categories employed in this 
research, please refer to Appendix B. 
 
QUALITATIVE CASE STUDIES  
Finally, since this project also deals with the policymaking side of the picture, 
aside from quantitative analysis, I employ qualitative methodology in order to evaluate 
the interaction between policymakers, public opinion and the media coverage on the issue 
of EU’s Eastern enlargement. More specifically, I conduct qualitative case studies of how 
the British and French governments have actually come up with their policy positions 
with regards to the issue of EU enlargement.  
This approach should provide an improved dialogue between data and theory. A 
thorough analysis of each case helps me formulate and refine the causal mechanisms 
between the official governmental positions, public opinion, and the media coverage on 
enlargement, as well as track the process of policymaking in these two leading European 
countries. Chapter 7 deals with this type of in-depth analysis in the British and French 
political contexts. Following a discussion of methodology, this project now presents the 
empirical results from the first-level agenda-setting analysis.  
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 Chapter 4: A Cross-National Comparative Analysis of Print Media’s 
First-Level Agenda-Setting Effects 
This chapter first conducts a cross-national comparative study of the news 
coverage of the Eastern enlargement of the EU in Britain and France from January 2002 
to May 2004. It scrutinizes the general patterns of media coverage to gain an overall 
perspective of the enlargement-related stories distribution in Britain and France. It then 
conducts statistical analysis to investigate the first-level agenda setting effects of press in 
these countries.  
 
A CROSS-NATIONAL COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF ENLARGEMENT COVERAGE 
Before testing the first-level agenda-setting effects, it is useful to conduct a cross-
national comparative analysis of press coverage on Eastern enlargement of the EU to 
detect the converging or diverging patterns in the enlargement-related press coverage in 
Britain and France. Accordingly, the following section first examines total distribution of 
the enlargement-related newspaper articles across different press outlets content analyzed 
in this project. Next, it displays the monthly distribution of press coverage of enlargement 
in these two European countries over time.      
 
The Distribution of Enlargement-Related Newspaper Articles across Press Outlets 
As explained in Chapter 3, for examining the distribution of the enlargement-
related newspaper articles in Britain and France, I have conducted a Lexis-Nexis database 
search with the main keywords to determine the articles to be included in content 
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analysis. The total amount of newspaper articles content analyzed in this research is 
1,122, 778 of which comes from the French press outlets and 344 from the British ones.  
Table 4-1 below presents the cross-national distribution of enlargement-related 
newspaper articles across different press outlets in Britain and France. As Table 4-1 
demonstrates, in the British case, the number of articles allotted to the Eastern 
enlargement issue in The Guardian and The Times were several times larger than in The 
Daily Mail. The Daily Mail’s coverage on enlargement was the lowest in the British 
context. Throughout the time frame of this project, The Daily Mail has only published 71 
newspaper articles on Eastern enlargement. While the numbers of enlargement-related 
articles in The Guardian and The Times were almost comparable; The Guardian has 
published 27 more newspaper articles (N = 150) than The Times did (N = 123).  
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Table 4-1. Number of Enlargement-Related Articles in British and French Newspapers  
  
Number of Enlargement-Related 
Newspaper Articles 
 
Britain (N = 344)  
 
 
The Guardian 150 
  
The Times 123 
  
The Daily Mail 71 
  
France (N = 778) 
 
 
Le Figaro 324  
  




 Source: Content Analysis Data 
 
Overall, as shown in Table 4-1, the amount of French press coverage of Eastern 
enlargement was more than twice as much as the British coverage of the topic. In the 
French case, Le Figaro has published 324 articles on Eastern enlargement from 2002 to 
2004. Its coverage of enlargement was substantially higher than the other two French 
newspapers’ reporting. Le Figaro’s total coverage of EU enlargement-related articles was 
almost as high as the coverage of all of the three British press outlets combined.  
Le Monde came second with 82 less articles than what Le Figaro has published 
(N = 242). Finally, Libération came last with 212 articles published on the topic. This 
number is still substantially higher than the number of articles The Guardian has 
published on enlargement.  
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Consequently, the descriptive analysis in this part shows that in France, the issue 
of EU enlargement attracted more media attention than in Britain. These results speak 
tentatively to Hypothesis 1 outlined in Chapter 2. For one, this difference in the amount 
of media coverage in both countries is certainly reflected on enlargement topic’s salience 
levels in respective European publics. That is to say, the topic of EU enlargement was 
better recognized by the French public, when compared with the British public.  
After looking at the aggregate figures for the number of EU enlargement-related 
newspaper articles published by different press outlets in Britain and France, this chapter 
now proceeds with a cross-national comparative examination of the monthly distribution 
of enlargement-related press coverage across time. Figure 4-1 shows the enlargement 
coverage distribution over time in Britain and France and gives an idea about the monthly 
distribution of Eastern enlargement-related newspaper coverage to the reader during the 
time frame of this project.  
Figure 4-1 is descriptively interesting, demonstrating the variation in the number 
of enlargement-related newspaper stories in each country. As shown in Figure 4-1, the 
enlargement press coverage trends in Britain and France display a marked relationship. 
The distribution of monthly press coverage on EU enlargement follows almost an 
identical trend in both countries. 
 
Figure 4-1. Monthly Distribution of British and French Press Coverage on Eastern 
Enlargement, 2002-2004 










































































To test for the statistical significance of these cross-national press coverage 
trends, I conduct a simple correlation analysis. The results of the correlation analysis 
between the number of print news stories about enlargement in Britain and France each 
month show that the Pearson’s r is positive, significant, and high (r = 0.814; p < 0.005; 
please refer to Table 4-2). This finding illustrates the fact that trends in the monthly 
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distributions of enlargement-related media coverage in both countries are in sync with 
each other.  
Although the pattern of monthly press coverage of enlargement is similar in both 
cases, the French print media apparently covers the issue of EU enlargement more 
extensively than the British print media. Take, for instance, one of the peak points in the 
distribution of monthly press coverage of Eastern enlargement in these two countries. 
Throughout October 2002, while the British press has in total published approximately 40 
articles on enlargement, the French newspapers have published approximately 100 
articles on this subject. Furthermore, there has been only a single instance in which the 
British newspaper articles on enlargement have outnumbered the French newspaper 
coverage (during February 2004). Even in that occasion, the British press outlets have 
published only four more articles on EU enlargement than the French press outlets have 
done. At all other times, the French newspapers have covered enlargement-related stories 
relatively more extensively.  
Furthermore, while the monthly average number of enlargement-related articles in 
Britain was 12; on average, in France, this figure was 28 articles, which amounts to 16 
articles more than average number of articles published by the British newspapers 
monthly. The cross-national difference between Britain and France in monthly coverage 
is especially noticeable during October 2002 and April 2004 (53 and 93 articles 
published, respectively). 
Consequently, a cross-national descriptive analysis of the distribution of the 
enlargement-related newspaper articles demonstrates that the monthly volume of press 
coverage on enlargement is higher in France than in Britain. This finding is in line with 
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the results of previous research, which concluded that the French media typically devote 
themselves with moderate frequency to EU topics and that there is little reporting on EU 
topics in the UK (Machill et al. 2006).  
The higher amount of press coverage in France results in better salience records 
among the French public when compared with the British public. As Figure 2-1 presented 
in Chapter 2 illustrates, there is approximately 30% difference in the enlargement’s 
salience between the French and the British people at any given time throughout the time 
frame of this project.  
Furthermore, the latest Standard EB 61 conducted just before the Eastern 
enlargement in March 2004, illustrates the exceptionally low level of trust (20%) the 
British public has for the press. This was approximately one third of the level of trust the 
French citizens had for the press at the time. Accordingly, one would expect the media 
priming effects to be stronger in the case of France. 
I conduct correlation analysis for the awareness measures to see if there is a 
statistically significant relationship between the British and French awareness of 
enlargement over time (Please refer to Table 4-2). As in the case of the monthly 
distribution of enlargement-related press coverage, Pearson’s r is again positive, 
significant, and high (r = 0.907; p < 0.005).  
As such, the results of this preliminary cross-national comparative analysis of EU 
enlargement newspaper coverage and public salience over time seem to confirm the 
expectations of the first level of agenda setting theory. To be precise, the analysis in this 
part validates the first-level agenda-setting hypothesis: the more coverage the Eastern 
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enlargement topic receives in the media, the more salient it becomes in people’s agenda. 
It is the goal of the following section to statistically confirm these preliminary findings.   
 
THE RESULTS OF THE FIRST-LEVEL AGENDA-SETTING ANALYSIS 
The remainder of this chapter presents the results of the first-level agenda-setting 
analysis in Britain and France, attained through the application of methodological steps 
outlined in Chapter 3.  
 
The First-Level Agenda-Setting Effects in Britain 
Daily newspapers are one of the most popular sources of information on EU 
enlargement for the British citizens. 45% of the British people prefer to receive 
information on EU enlargement through daily newspapers (Standard EB 56.3).  
Does exposure to the media agenda on enlargement affect the agenda of the 
British people? Analysis in this section seeks to provide an answer to this important 
question. Figure 4-2 combines the results of the content analysis with the public 
awareness measures attained from the EB survey data.   
Figure 4-2. First-Level Agenda-Setting Effects in Britain, 2002-2004  
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Figure 4-2 effectively displays a transfer of issue salience from the media to the 
public. As shown in Figure 4-2, the British newspaper coverage of EU enlargement was 
very low in the beginning of the time frame of this study. For instance, in January 2002, 
only three articles were published on the issue of EU enlargement by the British press 
outlets analyzed in this study. This low coverage was accompanied with low awareness 
score (only 43%) in the British public. Furthermore, according to Standard EB 56.3 
conducted in early 2002, British people were quite badly informed about the enlargement 
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issue. Nearly half the British sample (49%) said they were “not at all well informed.” The 
British people have an extraordinarily low level of information on EU enlargement: the 
UK figure for those who had “neither read,” “seen” nor “been told anything about 
enlargement” was more than three-quarters of the sample (76%) compared with an EU15 
average of 56%. 
In March 2002, the British press coverage on EU enlargement gradually started to 
increase, reaching a total of 18 articles published by three press outlets in June 2002. 
However, this trend was discontinued in August 2002, when the British coverage of 
enlargement reached one of its lowest points of the time frame of this study with only six 
articles published. It was followed with one of the lowest measures of British awareness 
of enlargement (51%) two months later, in October 2002. 
By August of 2002, the coverage of EU enlargement in the British newspapers 
started to increase tremendously, reaching the second highest point of the whole time 
frame of this study in October 2002. In September, the British press published 17 more 
articles than in the previous month. In October 2002, the number of Eastern enlargement-
related newspaper articles almost quadrupled (43 articles), when compared with the press 
coverage of the preceding month (11 articles).  
The especially high number of enlargement-related newspaper coverage during 
October 2002 was related to the fact that the European Commission has given a green 
light to the accession of 10 new member states from the Central and Eastern European 
countries and recommended the European Council’s approval of May 2004 as the 
enlargement date. Later in October 2002, the Brussels European Council (24-25 October 
2002) endorsed the recommendation of the European Commission that Cyprus, the Czech 
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Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, the Slovak Republic, and 
Slovenia will be able to assume the obligations of the EU membership in 2004.   
This increase in coverage was followed by one of the highest measures of public 
salience of enlargement in Britain from October to November 2002 (with a 15% increase 
in public salience). Even then, there appears to be a low level of attention paid to news 
about EU in the UK with 41% paying no attention at all. This is the largest figure among 
the Member States of the EU and is substantially higher than the EU15 average of 30%.  
In Standard EB 57 (conducted in October 2002), all respondents were asked 
“which sources of information on the EU” they used “to get information about the EU” 
(Question 11). 37% of the British people said that they did “not look for such 
information” and/or they were “not interested.” This answer was given by 21% of those 
surveyed overall in the EU15. This lack of interest in EU affairs by a large proportion of 
the UK sample is in line with general trends identified by various scholars in the past.  
In October 2002, the people surveyed in Britain were only marginally in support 
of enlargement with 38% agreeing, 35% disapproving, and 27% in the “don’t know” 
camp (Standard EB 57). The number of “don’t knows” decreased by 8% since Standard 
EB 56 survey in the UK. This may be due to the increased newspaper coverage on EU 
enlargement in Britain. With the increased exposure to the media coverage of EU 
enlargement, more people have started to form opinions on the topic.  
According to Standard EB 58 conducted between October and November 2002, 
there was a low level of involvement in enlargement debate, with only 21% of those 
polled across Europe feeling they were contributing either a “great deal” or “somewhat” 
to the debate. This figure is even lower in Britain (9%). When compared with the rest of 
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the EU Member States, the highest percentage of people (45%) considering themselves 
“not at all well informed” about the EU enlargement was from Britain. This is a very 
effective illustration of the typically apathetic nature of the British public opinion on EU-
related issues.  
From December 2002 to February 2003, the number of enlargement-related 
articles in the British press has decreased by more than half (from 19 to 7 articles). As 
shown by Figure 4-2, this decrease is also reflected in the level of awareness of the 
British public on enlargement between February and April 2003. While the British public 
salience of EU enlargement in February was 66%, in the following month there has been 
a 3% decrease in public salience. In April 2003, there has been an additional 10% 
decrease in public salience measures, resulting in 53% salience. However, the British 
people still did not feel “well-informed” about the new countries joining the EU 
(Standard EB 59). 79% of British people said that they were “not very well-informed” or 
“not at all well informed” about enlargement. 
Finally, from December 2003 to February 2004, the British press coverage on 
enlargement has tripled and this has resulted in a very steep increase in the British 
public’s awareness of enlargement from February 2004 to April 2004. According to 
Eurobarometer 61 conducted between February and March 2004, 42% of UK citizens 
felt that there is still “too little media coverage” of the EU, while only 13% consider it to 
be “too much.”  
Regarding the level of knowledge on enlargement, we observe a sharp decline in 
the level of “don’t know” responses that used to characterize the British people. That 
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observation may be attributed to the considerable increase in the print media coverage on 
EU enlargement during the preceding time period.  
All in all, for the British case, despite the fact that the percentage of people who 
have already heard of EU enlargement in the UK is well below the EU15 average 
according to the EB survey data, the results of this analysis show that issue salience 
increases among people with an increase in the enlargement-related press coverage in the 
British press.  
Moreover, the relationship between the coverage of the British press and British 
public’s awareness of enlargement is statistically significant (r = 0.603; p < 0.05). The 
Pearson correlation coefficient points out to a strong relationship and signals a positive 
direction, confirming the expectations of the first level of agenda setting theory. This 
correlation takes into consideration one month time-lag between the press coverage and 
its effects on public opinion. Hence, whenever the British coverage increases, we expect 
a similar increase in British people’s salience of enlargement. 
 
The First-Level Agenda-Setting Effects in France 
After confirming the existence of the first-level agenda-setting effects in Britain, 
this chapter now proceeds with the results of the first-level agenda-setting analysis in 
France. As described in the cross-national analysis of the enlargement coverage trends in 
the beginning of this chapter, the French newspapers published more extensively than the 
British newspapers in this study. As such, we expect the first-level agenda-setting effects 
to be stronger in the French context.  
Combining the content analysis data with the pubic awareness scores attained 
from the EB surveys; Figure 4-3 displays the results of the first-level agenda-setting 
effects in France. It presents similar tendencies to the British case (as illustrated by 
Figure 4-2) in terms of the interaction between public opinion and news coverage.  
 
Figure 4-3. First-Level Agenda-Setting Effects in France, 2002-2004 
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In general, what Figure 4-3 indicates is that the salience of enlargement in both 
the French public agenda and the newspaper agenda fluctuated over time. In the 
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beginning of the time frame of this project, the French press outlets did not pay much 
attention to the issue of Eastern enlargement. Put more specifically, during the first four 
months since January 2002, the press coverage of enlargement was more or less constant, 
with approximately 13 articles published monthly on the topic. Likewise, the level of 
information about enlargement in France was very low; even though, unlike in Britain, it 
was still close to the EU15 level (Standard EB 56.3). For instance, according to EB 56.3, 
more than 80% of the French sample did not feel “well informed” about the Eastern 
enlargement. More than 60% of the French people declared that they have “not heard,” 
“read” or “seen anything about the enlargement.” 
Following August 2002 up until October 2002, the French press coverage on 
enlargement increased tremendously (by 90 articles), reaching its second highest point on 
October 2002, with approximately 100 articles published on the issue. Similar to the 
British case, this increase in the French press coverage on EU enlargement during 
October 2002 was due to the fact that the European Council has decided on the names of 
the accession countries and the deadline for their accession to the EU. 
Subsequent to this major increase in press coverage, the French public’s 
awareness of EU enlargement reached its zenith in November 2002, with approximately 
90% of the French respondents expressing their awareness of the topic. The level of 
information significantly improved in November 2002. As such, information regarding 
the topic of EU enlargement became increasingly widespread among the French public 
through the media. 
From December 2002 to January 2003, there was a rather major decline by more 
than half (from 67 to 26 articles) in the number of articles devoted to enlargement by the 
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French press. This decline was followed by a similar decline in public awareness until 
March 2003. As Figure 4-3 clearly depicts, following this decline in the media coverage, 
the steepest decline in French public salience of enlargement occurred between March 
and April 2003, a decrease of almost 20%. Furthermore, three in four French respondents 
did “not feel informed” about the enlargement process (Standard EB 59). As a response, 
the French government launched a big information campaign on Eastern enlargement 
through millions of brochures and posters in public places.  
Despite this information campaign by the French government, there has been no 
corresponding increase in the media coverage of the topic. From April to August 2003, 
there was a continuous decrease in the monthly press coverage of enlargement, hitting 
one of its lowest points in August 2003 with only five articles devoted to enlargement.  
Nevertheless, starting with August, the French press coverage of EU enlargement 
gained back its momentum and reached another peak point in November 2003. The three 
French press outlets analyzed in this research published 21 more newspaper articles on 
enlargement (N = 40), when compared with the total coverage of the previous month (N 
= 29). This increase in the number of enlargement-related newspaper articles was once 
again followed by an increase in public salience from January to February 2004.  
Furthermore, as the scheduled date for EU enlargement approached, the French 
press outlets have begun to publish extensively on the enlargement topic and tackle this 
issue through numerous reports and articles. For instance, the amount of enlargement-
related press coverage has steadily increased, from 18 articles in January 2004 to an all-
time record of 138 articles in April 2004.  
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As Table 4-2 presents, the Pearson’s r measuring the relationship between public 
awareness and press coverage of enlargement in France is 0.481 (p < 0.05). It signifies a 
positive and fairly strong relationship between public salience and the press coverage of 
enlargement in the French case. As in the British case, this relationship is statistically 
significant. Hence, we reject the null hypothesis that there is no statistically significant 
relationship between the amount of French press coverage and the public awareness of 
the EU enlargement.  
As such, as in the British case, the results of this analysis provide a strong 
evidence for the existence of first-level agenda-setting effects. Hypothesis 1 is confirmed 
in both the British and French cases. A positive correlation is found between the total 
number of enlargement-related stories in the media and percentage of people who 
recognize enlargement of the EU. The results of the first-level agenda-setting analysis for 
both the French and the British contexts solidly concur with the existence of a transfer of 
issue salience from the media to the public. 
The media’s first-level agenda-setting influence is stronger in the British context. 
This observation may be attributable to the relatively lower levels of salience of the EU 
enlargement topic in both the press and public during the initial stages of the time frame 
of this study. As such public’s learning curve was steep in the case of Britain. This 
particular finding suggests that engaging in a cross-national first-level agenda-setting 
analysis has proven to be useful since it illustrates the extent to which media effects vary 
across borders. Since Figure 4-4 combines the first-level effects in Britain and France 
together, it enables us to spot the cross-national comparative media effects more clearly. 
The first thing to notice about Figure 4-4 is that the numbers of enlargement-
related articles in both countries fluctuate over time. Also, the above comparative 
statistics demonstrate that the press coverage on EU enlargement hit the highest points 
during European Council meetings and increased significantly in both countries as the 
date of enlargement approached. This trend is more evident in the French case than in the 
British one.  
 
Figure 4-4. Comparative First-Level Agenda-Setting Effects in Britain and France, 2002-
2004 
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Table 4-2. Correlation Coefficients for the Cross-National Comparison of Media Effects 









    
Pearson r                1          .481* .814**         .382* 








    




    
Pearson r            .382*    .907**          .603*             1 
  
  * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01 (two-tailed) 
 
In general, the visibility of the Eastern enlargement topic was limited to several 
time points. In both France and Britain, it failed to keep the media’s constant attention 
during the time frame of this project. In both countries, the enlargement-related 
newspaper coverage reached one of its peak points during October 2002. This is mainly 
due to the fact that the Brussels European Council has confirmed the names of the 
accession countries to be admitted to the EU in 2004.  
Starting from mid-2002 up until the start of the military operation in Iraq in 
March 2003, the transatlantic disputes regarding a possible intervention in Iraq distracted 
both the media’s and public’s attention from the issue of Eastern enlargement of the EU. 
During this time period, there was a considerable decline in the number of newspaper 
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articles devoted to the issue of enlargement in both countries. Hence, we can argue that 
the Iraq topic hijacked both the media’s and the public’s attention from the EU 
enlargement. 
In addition, the analysis here makes clear that there was a considerable increase in 
enlargement reporting shortly before the scheduled date for this event. This is in line with 
the trends outlined by several previous studies that have concentrated on the media 
coverage of major EU events (see Machill et al. 2006; De Vreese 2001, 2003). For 
instance, a cross-national comparative study of television coverage of major EU issues in 
Britain, Denmark, and the Netherlands concluded that “‘Europe’ was only marginally 
visible on the television news agenda prior to the [EU] events and vanished almost 
completely after a peak of varying intensity” (De Vreese 2001, 299). 
In both France and Britain, the awareness measures fluctuate correspondingly 
with the coverage on enlargement by the media. Early in 2002, enlargement had low 
salience on both the media agenda and the public agenda in both countries.  
The newspaper coverage of EU enlargement was particularly low until mid-July 
2002, with a monthly average of approximately 15 newspaper articles in France, and six 
newspaper articles in Britain. This low coverage was accompanied with low enlargement 
awareness scores among the French and British publics.  
But a rapid rise between September and November 2002 on the media agenda was 
followed within a month by a similarly steep rise on the public agenda from November 
2002 to January 2003. Levels of information on enlargement too improved considerably 
in November 2002: this rate increased from 80% to 88% in France; while in Britain, it 
increased from 51% to 65%. These figures signify that the information on EU 
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enlargement became increasingly widespread among people through the media. 




Wanta (1997a, 147) asserts that “the time frame is one of the most important 
considerations agenda-setting researchers must address in their analyses” and points to 
the fact that “a message transmitted through the news media needs some sort of repetition 
before it can fully influence an individual.” As Figures 4-2, 4-3, and 4-4 indicate, the 
first-level agenda-setting effects become prevalent among public with only one (or 
sometimes two) month-lag from September to October 2002 in both France and Britain. 
Furthermore, a relative decrease in both French and British media’s coverage of 
enlargement from January to February 2003 was followed by a similar decrease in the 
salience of enlargement among people in Britain and France. 
Since the media agenda examined over the two-year period were published prior 
to the public agenda, this evidence on time-order further supports agenda-setting’s causal 
assertion that the public agenda results, to a considerable degree, from the media agenda. 
Hence, the public agenda not only correlates with the media agenda, but it results from 
the media agenda. This serves as a strong evidence for the existence of first-level agenda-
setting effects.  
In other words, as the issue of enlargement receives more coverage in the 
newspapers, both the British and the French publics become more familiar with the issue. 
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The cross-national first-level agenda-setting analysis in this chapter demonstrates a strong 
connection between the salience of enlargement in the media and the salience of 
enlargement for people in Britain and France. Results in this chapter point to stronger 
first-level agenda-setting influence of the media in the British context. 
Consequently, regarding first-level agenda-setting effects, the analysis in this 
chapter reveals strong supporting evidence that the media transfers issue salience to the 
public in Britain and France. The findings of this level of analysis clearly demonstrate 
that both the British and the French publics learned how concerned they should be about 
EU enlargement through the amount of coverage the topic received in the press. After 
confirming the existence of strong traditional agenda-setting effects of the print media in 
both Britain and France, this research can now proceed with exploring the second-level 
agenda-setting effects.  
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 Chapter 5: A Cross-National Comparative Analysis of Print Media’s 
Second-Level Agenda-Setting Effects  
The data presented in the previous chapter visibly point to a transfer of “issue” 
salience from the press to the public. The analysis in this chapter goes one step further 
and examines whether “attributes” in media coverage of EU enlargement can influence 
how individuals view enlargement.  
Did the aspects most recalled by citizens on the issue of EU enlargement 
correspond to the themes mentioned most often by newspapers in Britain and France? To 
answer this question, the present chapter compares the subjects that people felt to be at 
the center of the Eastern enlargement debate with those that appeared most often in the 
analysis of newspaper content.  
Substantive attributes involve specific information about the EU enlargement 
issue. Along the expectations of the second level of agenda setting theory, this research 
anticipates that the aspects most recalled by citizens on the issue of EU enlargement 
would correspond to the enlargement themes mentioned most often by newspapers in 
Britain and France. 
Accordingly, this chapter examines several aspects of the second-level of agenda 
setting: (1) Did newspapers link enlargement to certain sub-issues (or, substantive 
attributes)? Did the public learn substantive attributes from media coverage? (2) Did 
newspapers link affective attributes to enlargement? Did the newspapers cover 
enlargement more positively on these issues? Did the public learn affective attributes 
from media coverage?  
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While the first group of questions is analyzed quantitatively, the second group of 
questions is analyzed qualitatively, due to the low levels of intercoder reliability on the 
affective attributes of enlargement. The qualitative analysis of affective attributes is 
interspersed with the descriptive analysis of substantive attributes of EU enlargement 
coverage throughout this chapter.  
As explained in Chapter 3, analysis of how EU enlargement is framed in the press 
and by the public establishes a ranking of enlargement’s attributes. Before proceeding 
with the results of the rank order correlation analysis conducted on the substantive 
attributes of enlargement, this chapter descriptively analyzes the amount of attention the 
different press outlets in Britain and France accorded to the three main consequences of 
EU enlargement.  
 
A CROSS-NATIONAL DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS OF THE USE OF DIFFERENT 
ENLARGEMENT FRAMES IN THE MEDIA 
This section presents the content analysis results regarding the use of different 
substantial attributes (i.e. political, economic, and social consequences of enlargement) 
by British and French newspapers in their coverage of the issue of Eastern enlargement. 
Such an endeavor helps give the readers a better idea about the distribution of different 
frames cross-nationally as well as their distribution across different press outlets in a 
given country. Please refer to Table 5-1 for a summary of the findings in this part of the 
analysis. 
86 
Table 5-1. The Distribution of Substantive Attributes of EU Enlargement across the 
British and French Press Outlets, 2002-2004 







    
The Times 62% 63.3% 37.3% 
    
The Guardian 57.7% 62.6% 33.3% 
    
The Daily Mail 52.1% 67.6% 57.7% 










    
Libération 77.4% 46.7% 44.3% 
    
Le Figaro 67.6% 52.5% 36.1% 
    
Le Monde 80.6% 48.3% 38% 
    
French Press 
(N=778 Articles) 74.3% 49.6% 38.9% 
    
 Source: Content Analysis Data 
 
British Print Media Framing Trends 
In Table 5-1, it is clear that, among the British press outlets, the economic 
consequences of Eastern enlargement were by and large given more emphasis than any 
other main consequences of EU enlargement. Also, as shown in Table 5-1, the economic 
consequences of enlargement were covered almost equally highly by the British 
newspapers content analyzed in this project. These consequences included the effects of 
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the enlargement on the expansion of the European markets, the investment opportunities 
in a bigger market, and employment/unemployment in the country.  
While the social consequences of enlargement were only covered by 40% of the 
344 British newspaper articles on enlargement (N = 137), the political and economic 
consequences were covered by 58.4% (N = 200) and 64% (N = 220) of the newspaper 
articles on enlargement, respectively.  
In the content analysis of individual British press outlets, the distribution of the 
use of different frames in the coverage of The Times and The Guardian were almost 
identical. The reports on enlargement in both of these quality newspapers emphasized the 
economic consequences of Eastern enlargement the most, followed by political 
consequences and social consequences, respectively. These broadsheets reported on the 
social consequences of enlargement in their stories only approximately half of the time 
they mentioned the economic and political consequences.     
By contrast, the emphasis in the enlargement-related coverage of The Daily Mail 
was quite different from the two broadsheets. As Table 5-1 depicts, when compared with 
the other newspapers’ coverage, the social consequences of enlargement were more 
extensively dealt with by The Daily Mail. This finding is most probably due to the tabloid 
format and the populist framing of this particular paper. Nevertheless, as the two 
broadsheets, The Daily Mail’s articles put the highest emphasis on the economic 
implications of the Eastern enlargement.  
In terms of the tone of the coverage, the coverage in The Daily Mail was both 
more negative towards the effects of Eastern enlargement and more critical of the 
government’s policies on the issue. Especially during six months before the Eastern 
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enlargement, The Daily Mail constantly fought to highlight the expected problems that 
would come with EU expansion. This was especially apparent on the issue of 
immigration. The Daily Mail has criticized the way the British government has treated the 
issue of free movement of labor and warned its readers with a heavily critical language 
that the Eastern enlargement would cause many problems ranging from negative 
consequences on the welfare and the education systems of Britain, as well as on 
unemployment in Britain. It has mainly portrayed migrant workers as a “conquering army 
of mainly poor and uneducated people, unable to speak English, who will work for 
virtually nothing, and drive down [the British] wages.” Take, for instance, the following 
excerpt from a Daily Mail article:  
 
Britain, already densely populated, with inadequate infrastructure and housing, 
and not in need of labour (there are, for heaven’s sake, still 1.4 million people 
unemployed [in Britain]) will be a magnet for those who live in poverty in these 
[accession] countries. If they cannot get work, they will not be deported, and they 
know we will not let them starve. Meanwhile, those who have paid taxes and have 
a claim on this country will have to support them. And there is very little the 
Government can do to prevent it. (The Daily Mail, “A Pounds 50 Fare to Britain 
and No Return,” February 25, 2004) 
 
The issue of immigration was not always covered with a predominantly negative 
tone in the British press. The following paragraph is an excerpt from The Guardian 
emphasizing the advantages of the EU enlargement on the labor market in the UK:  
 
There are lessons from this [EU] expansion for us all. Rather than worry about the 
influx of people from Eastern Europe, we should focus more on the potential 
benefits of an enlarged Europe. Migrants from Eastern Europe will help free 
bottlenecks in the labour market, and past experience of immigration in the UK 
suggests that they will be highly skilled and entrepreneurial. (The Guardian, “UK 
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Manufacturing Has Everything to Gain from an Enlarged Europe,” April 19, 
2004) 
 
The results of the qualitative analysis of newspaper content indicate that, among 
the British press outlets analyzed in this study, The Guardian’s coverage on enlargement 
emphasized the positive effects of enlargement more frequently. By contrast, the 
coverage of The Daily Mail was overwhelmingly negative. The Times covered the issue 
quite neutrally.   
Finally, regarding the coverage of enlargement’s three main consequences, The 
Times is better recognizable for its more frequent coverage of the political consequences 
of enlargement. Among the three press outlets in Britain, emphasis on political 
consequences was the heaviest in the coverage of The Times: the political implications of 
EU enlargement were covered 62% of the time. Nearly 58% of the articles published by 
The Guardian were devoted to the political consequences of enlargement. This figure 
was relatively lower in the case of The Daily Mail (52%).  
To investigate the statistical significance of the relationship between the use of 
different enlargement media frames and different press outlets, this chapter now conducts 
chi-square tests on content analysis data. The chi-square tests conducted on each frame 




2 Since content analysis examines the census instead of a random sample, the differences that are found are 
real, which makes it unnecessary to run statistics that report significant differences or project to the 
population. Even so, the statistical tests are conducted.  
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Table 5-2. Cross-tabulation of the Social Consequences Frame and The Times, The 
Guardian, and The Daily Mail 
    
 The Times The Guardian The Daily Mail 
   0          1     0         1     0        1 
Social Consequences       0   98       63      161    98       62     160     125    35   160 
    
                                         1   131     51      182    130     52     182     103    79   182    
    
Total   229     114    343    228     114    342     228  114   342 
    
Pearson r  - 0.118*   - 0.108*     0.228** 
    
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.005 
 
Table 5-2 indicates statistically significant relationships between the coverage of 
all three British newspapers and the use of the social consequences of enlargement frame. 
The directions of these relationships differ across these outlets: while for The Times and 
The Guardian, the relationship points to a negative direction; for The Daily Mail, it 
implies a positive direction. As illustrated by the Pearson’s r measure, the relationship is 
stronger in the case of Daily Mail’s coverage (r = 0.23). This finding confirms the 
expectations of this study: as the format of the media changes from broadsheet to tabloid, 
the emphasis on social consequences increases.  
This finding is in line with the results of another study which content analyzed 
2,601 newspaper stories to investigate the prevalence of five news frames identified in 
earlier studies: attribution of “responsibility,” “conflict,” “human interest,” “economic 
consequences,” and “morality” (Semetko and Valkenburg 2000). It has found out that 
serious newspapers and television news programs more often used the “responsibility” 
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and “conflict” frames in the presentation of news, whereas sensationalist outlets, like The 
Daily Mail, more often used the “human interest” frame. 
The specific press outlet coverage was further compared with the poll results 
through chi-square tests. These tests examined second-level agenda setting through 17 
substantive attributes. When I conducted chi-square tests on the specific consequences of 
enlargement and each of the newspapers under study, I have found several statistically 
significant relationships. For instance, The Guardian mostly emphasized the peaceful 
consequences of enlargement in the European continent (r = 0.11; p < 0.05). Or when I 
analyze the cross-tabulation of peaceful consequences of enlargement and the coverage 
of The Daily Mail, I found that there is a significant negative relationship between these 
two variables (r = 0.16; p < 0.05), which means that it did not cover the peace 
implications of the EU enlargement extensively, when compared with the other two 
British press outlets. This may imply that The Daily Mail has been more skeptical about 
the peace and stability implications of enlargement. 
Also, while there is a significant positive relationship between the coverage of 
The Guardian and the moral implications of enlargement in terms of the reuniting of 
European continent for the first time after the end of the Cold War (r = 0.16; p < 0.001); 
there is a negative significant relationship between the coverage of The Daily Mail and 
the moral duties of reuniting Europe (r = - 0.20; p < 0.005). Here again, the skeptical 
attitude of The Daily Mail is evident. 
Most importantly, on the issue of immigration-related consequences of EU 
enlargement in Britain, The Daily Mail framed enlargement as leading to a large number 
of immigrants settling in Britain (r = 0.15; p < 0.001). Similar observations hold valid for 
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the issue of illegal immigration as well. Its coverage made frequent references to the 
negatively biased arguments of the experts from Migration Watch UK.  
Last but not the least, on the issue of illegal immigration, the results of the chi-
square tests point to very important empirical findings that are again statistically 
significant. While the relationship between the coverage of The Guardian and illegal 
immigration related consequences of EU enlargement was negative (r = - 0.16; p < 
0.001), this relationship was positive for The Daily Mail’s coverage (r = 0.23; p < 0.005). 
Although causal relationships between variables cannot be concluded from chi-square 
results, the results of this analysis show trends based on the logic of the second level of 
agenda setting.   
 
French Print Media Framing Trends 
While the British press focuses mostly on the economic consequences of 
enlargement (e.g. unemployment, immigration, and illegal immigration, etc.), as shown 
in Table 5-1, the French press focuses more frequently on the political consequences of 
enlargement (e.g. its impact on the international influence of the EU, peace and stability 
in the European continent, and EU’s power vis-à-vis the US, etc.). This finding 
contradicts the results of a previous study, which compared the British media coverage of 
EU-related issues with the coverage of several other European media outlets. Put more 
specifically, Machill et al. (2006) concluded that when EU reporting occurs, the UK 
media place a political emphasis much more frequently than the media of other European 
states, in which the EU is mostly an economic topic.  
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The general trends illustrated in Table 5-1 indicate that in both the French and the 
British press outlets, the social consequences were covered the least among the three 
main consequences of enlargement (with approximately 40% in each case). The 
frequency with which the political consequences of enlargement were covered in the 
French press (74.3%) was almost twice as much as the frequency with which the social 
consequences were covered (38.9%). Political consequences of EU enlargement were 
followed by the economic consequences frame, covered approximately by 50% of all 
enlargement-related French newspaper articles. These results support the finding of a 
previous research that examined the Europe-related newspaper coverage in six European 
countries (see Trenz 2004).  
Among three French newspapers analyzed in this dissertation, Le Monde was the 
one that emphasized the political consequences of enlargement the most. Approximately 
81% of all enlargement-related articles published by Le Monde mentioned the political 
implications of EU enlargement one way or the other. Le Monde covered the political 
consequences of EU enlargement (80.6%) approximately twice as much as it covered the 
social consequences (38%). Le Monde’s coverage utilized the economic consequences 
frame in approximately half (48.3%) of the articles it has published on the Eastern 
enlargement.  
Among the three French newspapers, Le Figaro is the one that put the heaviest 
emphasis on the economic consequences of EU enlargement. More than half of the 
stories it has published on enlargement contained the economic consequences frame. 
However, as in Le Monde and Libération, among the three consequences of enlargement, 
Le Figaro’s coverage contained the political consequences the most.    
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Among the three French newspapers analyzed here, Libération distinguished itself 
with its strong emphasis on the social consequences of enlargement (44.3%). With its 
tabloid format and emphasis on the social consequences of Eastern enlargement, the 
coverage of Libération was comparable to the one of The Daily Mail. This finding 
provides evidence to the hypothesis that the format of the newspapers has an impact on 
the ways issues are covered. All in all, Europe was frequently framed as a vehicle of 
influence in world politics by French newspapers analyzed in this project. 
The results of the qualitative analysis indicate that while Le Figaro and Libération 
reported more negatively on the issue of EU enlargement; Le Monde’s coverage was 
more neutral on the issue. This finding confirms the results of a previous qualitative 
content analysis of Le Monde’s articles on Europe (see Le 2002). The more neutral 
characterization of the EU enlargement issue may be due to the fact that Le Monde’s 
political orientation is closer to the center, while the other two French newspapers’ 
political orientations are more radical, albeit located at the opposing ends of the political 
spectrum.  
Le Figaro’s portrayal of EU enlargement frequently focused on several negative 
political and cultural implications of EU enlargement. For instance, it criticized the fact 
the English language is going to dominate the enlarged Union. It generally praised the 
way the enlargement would help the EU to act stronger in world politics and applauded 
the peace-related implications of enlargement in the continent.  
Libération touched upon the social consequences of EU enlargement to a great 
extent. Its reportage on EU enlargement was quite negative. This may be related to the 
tabloid format of this particular outlet. It especially preferred representations on EU 
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enlargement that were more anxiety-driven. Concerns about increased unemployment, 
companies moving their production sites to Eastern Europe dominated the coverage of 
enlargement in this newspaper. In that sense, we can argue that the coverage patterns in 
Libération showed similarities to the patterns in the enlargement-related coverage 
patterns in The Daily Mail.  
 
THE RESULTS OF THE SECOND-LEVEL AGENDA-SETTING ANALYSIS  
After explaining several significant differences observed in the coverage of 
different press outlets content analyzed in this study, the remainder of this chapter 
proceeds with the empirical tests. It conducts an analysis on the second-level agenda-
setting effects and presents the results for the British and French cases, respectively.  
 
The Second-Level Agenda-Setting Effects in Britain 
Following a descriptive discussion of the coverage patterns of different 
consequences of enlargement by the British and French press, this chapter now proceeds 
with the results of the rank order correlation analysis in Britain. It first conducts rank 
order correlation for 17 different subcategories of the three main consequences of EU 
enlargement. It then conducts rank order analysis for the three main consequences of EU 
enlargement. Please refer to Appendix B for the definitions of categories used in coding.   
As explained in Chapter 3, various consequences of enlargement named in the 
Flash Eurobarometer surveys on enlargement are ranked according to the percentage of 
people naming each one to yield a description of the public agenda. In turn, these 
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rankings on each agenda are compared to determine the strength of the press’ attribute 
agenda-setting influence on British and French publics. The correlations between the 
ranking of issues on the media agenda and the ranking accorded those issues on the 
subsequent public agenda on European Union are calculated using Spearman’s rho. This 
rank ordering of the issues is considerably more precise than simply grouping sets of 
issues into those receiving high, moderate or low attention among the public.  
The null hypothesis for the rank order correlation is that the variables do not have 
a rank-order relationship in the population represented by the sample. To reject the null 
hypothesis is to say that there is a rank-order relationship between the variables in the 
population.  
Our null hypothesis here is that British press framings and the British public 
framings on enlargement do not have a rank-order relationship. The results of this rank 
order analysis are displayed in Table 5-3. 
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Table 5-3. British Press Coverage and Public Opinion Rank Order Correlation on 17 
Subcategories 














     
Environment 1 4.6 14 70.1 
Drugs and Crime 2 9.3 5 46.7 
Illegal Immigration 15 60.5 4 45.2 
Moral Duty to Unite Europe 8 27.9 15 71.8 
Culture  3 11.6 13 66.7 
Legal Immigration 17  69.8 7 57.8 
Unemployment 13 48.8 2 36.1 
Welfare System 14 53.4 3 37.2 
Cost of Enlargement 9 32.6 11 66.0 
Closeness to Citizens 5 16.2 6 51.4 
Historically Natural to Enlarge 7 23.2 10 65.3 
Expansion of Markets 4 13.9 17 90.1 
EU’s power in the World 6 20.9 16 72.4 
Agriculture 10 34.9 9 63.8 
Country’s Power within EU 12 44.1 1 25.3 
Difficult to take Decisions 16 62.4 12 66.4 
Peace 11 37.2 8 59.4 
     
  N=43  N=1000
Critical r (N = 17, p < 0.05) = 0.488     
Spearman’s r = - 0.495   
   
Sources: Content Analysis Data (December 1, 2002-March 30, 2003) and Flash 
Eurobarometer Survey 140 
 
Table 5-3 illustrates the rank order correlation between the British press coverage 
and British public opinion on 17 subcategories of consequences of EU enlargement. 
While the issues of immigration, welfare, and illegal immigration as related to the 
enlargement of the EU rank high in the British press, we cannot observe the same level of 
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salience among the British public. The British public ranks the expansion of markets, 
EU’s power in the world arena, and cultural and environmental implications of 
enlargement the highest. In Britain, people seem to have been more conscious of the 
expansion of economic markets, the implications of EU’s power in world politics, moral 
duty to unite Europe, environmental and cultural implications of EU expansion, and the 
cost of the EU enlargement than the press coverage of enlargement warranted. The 
British press coverage mainly focused on the impact of the Eastern enlargement on 
immigration, EU’s decision-making process, unemployment, and welfare system.  
Since the absolute value of the Spearman’s rho is greater than the critical r (N = 
17, p < 0.05), we can reject the null hypothesis. But Spearman’s rho is - 0.495, which 
indicates a negative direction for this relationship. Since the direction of the rank order 
relationship disagrees with the direction of the research hypothesis, the research 
hypothesis is not supported in the British case. Put more specifically, the results of this 
analysis do not support the existence of second-level agenda-setting effects in the British 
context. They actually point out to a disconnection between the British people and the 
major press outlets in Britain on the salience of 17 consequences of enlargement.  
One reasonable explanation for this finding may be the low level of trust the 
British people have towards the British press. People’s opinions are conventionally based 
upon information and their analysis of that information. In a country, such as the UK, 
where the level of knowledge on the EU is relatively low, the public perception of mass 
media channels is critical in the delivery of information. It is therefore relevant to look at 
the level of trust the British people have in the press outlets.  
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The confidence British people have in these channels of communication directly 
affects their perception and interpretation of the information that is delivered. Only 44% 
of EU citizens said that they viewed the press positively when asked if they tended to 
trust information obtained from the press (Standard EB 57). While this figure was more 
than 50% among the French sample, it was less than half of the French levels in Britain. 
Consequently, this high level of mistrust in the British press may be one reason for the 
difference between the British press and public opinion rankings of the salience of the 
consequences of the Eastern enlargement. 
Furthermore, since the coverage of enlargement was limited in Britain, this study 
could not work with a large N. This small N may be another reason for the empirical 
results attained here. Moreover, the British coverage of EU enlargement reached its peak 
only in April 2004, and even then only a total of 45 newspaper articles have been 
published a month. This low coverage may be another reason for the non-significance of 
the hypothesized relationship.  
Finally, the source for analyzing the second-level agenda-setting effects of press 
on public opinion is derived from the Flash EB Survey 140, which is conducted 
approximately one year prior to the actual date of enlargement. This was the latest Flash 
EB public opinion data collected on enlargement topic specifically.  
Nevertheless, the results of the content analysis of press coverage in Britain show 
that the number of articles allocated to the issue of EU enlargement has significantly 
increased starting from the end of 2003. As such, this latest available in-depth public 
opinion data on EU enlargement may not have accounted for the up-to-the-minute 
changes in people’s attitudes, since many people would be expected to change their 
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opinions as a result of increasingly intense coverage of the topic of enlargement by media 
outlets during the year 2004. The findings here are restricted due to the unavailability of a 
follow-up Flash EB survey data.  
Subsequent to a discussion of the 17 subcategories of EU enlargement, the next 
section regroups certain themes and issues together, reducing them to the major and 
tolerably comparable categories that appear in Table 5-4. Analysis in the following 
section conducts rank order correlation on three main consequences of enlargement to 
test the second-level agenda-setting effects of the British press on British public opinion.  
 
Table 5-4. British Press Coverage and Public Opinion Rank Order Correlation on Three 




Press Coverage  
British  
Public Opinion  
Main Consequences of EU 
Enlargement 
 
Ranking Newspaper Articles (%) Ranking 
Survey  
Data (%) 
Political Consequences          2 35.6 2 59.9 
Economic Consequences        3 37.8 3 61.3 
Social Consequences 1 22.6 1 50.5 
   
Sources: Content Analysis Data and Flash Eurobarometer Survey 140 
 
The results in this section of analysis, as illustrated by Table 5-4, are certainly 
more promising than the ones in the previous section. The relationship between the 
British public and media saliencies of three main consequences of enlargement is 
statistically significant (with r = 1). This points out to very strong evidence of strong 
second-level agenda-setting effects regarding the three substantive attributes of 
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enlargement. As such, Hypothesis 2 as outlined in Chapter 2 is confirmed in the British 
context.   
Economic consequences of enlargement are the most salient consequences in both 
the British public and the press agenda. Economic consequences are followed by political 
and social consequences respectively in both press and public agendas. In other words, 
there is an exact correspondence between framings of the print media and British people 
on the three main consequences of Eastern enlargement of the EU.  
After concluding on the strong relationship between press and public attention to 
three general consequences of EU enlargement, the analysis in the subsequent section 
concentrates on the development of British public and press agenda on specific 
consequences of EU enlargement.  
For the sake of illustrating the interaction of British press coverage and public 
opinion over time, Figures 5-1-5-5 plot the development of British public opinion (using 
Flash EB Surveys on Enlargement 132.1, 132.2, and 140) and newspaper coverage 
(through the use of cumulative press coverage one month before each survey) on several 
consequences of enlargement. 
 
Figure 5-1. Public and Press Attention to the Costs of Enlargement to Britain, 2002-2003  









British Public Opinion British Newspaper Coverage
 
Sources: Flash Eurobarometer Surveys on Enlargement 132.1, 132.2 and 140 
 
As illustrated by Figure 5-1, there have been increasing concerns in the British 
newspaper coverage on EU enlargement regarding the cost of enlargement for Britain. 
This trend was accompanied with an identical trend in the concerns in the British public 
opinion regarding the cost of enlargement for Britain. These figures show similar trends 
in the print media and public opinion regarding the cost of enlargement.  
While in August 2002, concerns regarding the cost of EU enlargement were only 
emphasized by one fourth of the enlargement-related coverage in the British press; it was 
emphasized 3% more in the press coverage during October 2002. In February 2003, this 
consequence of enlargement was emphasized by almost one thirds of the enlargement-
related newspaper articles in Britain.  
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One month after exposure to each of these cumulative press coverage figures, 
there were similarly increasing concerns among the British public regarding the 
enlargement’s economic burden for Britain. These concerns in the public opinion started 
with approximately 55% in September 2002 and increased to 62% in November 2002. In 
March 2003, these concerns were shared by more than 65% of the respondents in the 
British sample.  
These findings further support the common assumption in the agenda setting 
research regarding the one month rule for the media effects on public opinion. In other 
words, this relationship not only shows the identical patterns in the relationship between 
the print media coverage and the public opinion on the cost of enlargement, it also points 
out to a one month-lag between the newspaper coverage exposure and the public opinion    
 
Figure 5-2. Public and Press Attention to the Effects of EU Enlargement on the 
Complexity of Decision-Making in the EU, 2002-2003  
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Figure 5-2 too demonstrates a similar trend between the developments in the 
British newspaper coverage and public opinion regarding the effects of enlargement on 
EU decision-making. While in August 2002, one fourth of all newspaper articles 
published on enlargement emphasized the effects of enlargement on EU decision-making, 
in October 2002, 40% of all British newspapers analyzed in this research mentioned the 
effects of enlargement on EU decision-making. The press emphasis on this particular 
consequence of EU enlargement decreased in February 2003 to 67%.  
One month later, these tendencies in the press coverage were followed very 
closely by the British public opinion. In September 2002, only 61% of the people were 
concerned about the effects of enlargement on the decision-making processes in the EU. 
This measure has increased by 9% in November 2002, and from its November 2002 
levels it decreased by about 3% in March 2003.  
Figure 5-2 shows that the trends in the print media coverage and public opinion 
over time are again proportional to each other. Additionally, as in the previous figure, 
they point out to a strong time order between the media framings and the public framings 
of this particular aspect of enlargement. 
However, not all trends in the press coverage and public opinion are identical. As 
shown by Figure 5-3, there may be contradictory trends between the media coverage and 
public opinion regarding some other consequences of enlargement. For instance, Figure 
5-3 indicates that the British newspaper coverage on unemployment related consequences 
of enlargement decreased over time. 
 
Figure 5-3. Public and Press Attention to the Effects of EU Enlargement on 
Unemployment, 2002-2003  
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Sources: Flash Eurobarometer Surveys on Enlargement 132.1, 132.2 and 140 
 
However, the developments in the public opinion did not follow the media trends 
on this particular issue. As such, our hypothesis that the media salience of a certain 
subtopic would have an important consequence for public salience of this subtopic is not 
supported in this specific case.   
On the other hand, as shown by Figure 5-4, there has been a considerable 
relationship between the British newspaper attention to the effects of illegal immigration 
and the public salience of this particular consequence of enlargement. Over time, the 
British press attention to the illegal immigration consequences of enlargement has 
fluctuated very strangely. This unusual increase from August 2002 to February 2003 was 
followed by a similar increase in the public attention to the effects of enlargement on 
illegal immigration.  
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Figure 5-4. Public and Press Attention to the Effects of EU Enlargement on Illegal 
Immigration, 2002-2003  
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Sources: Flash Eurobarometer Surveys on Enlargement 132.1, 132.2 and 140 
 
However, there were no enlargement articles that emphasized the illegal 
immigration consequences of enlargement in October 2002. This trend did not 
correspond to a decline in the public salience of illegal immigration consequences of 
enlargement. Consequently, the results presented in this figure point to inconsistent 
results on the relationship between the media and the public salience of illegal 
immigration-related consequences of EU enlargement.      
Figure 5-5 illustrates the press and public attention to the effects of enlargement 
on immigration. These trends are similar to the ones identified for the effects of 
enlargement on illegal immigration (as presented by Figure 5-4). This figure indicates 
that there has been a major decline in the press attention allocated to the immigration 
consequences of enlargement from August 2002 to October. This decline did not match 
up with the trend in the public attention to that consequence observed from September to 
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November 2002. While the British newspaper attention to immigration consequences of 
enlargement fluctuated over time, the public attention to immigration underwent a 
constant increase.  
 
Figure 5-5. Public and Press Attention to the Effects of EU Enlargement on Immigration, 
2002-2003  
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Sources: Flash Eurobarometer Surveys on Enlargement 132.1, 132.2 and 140 
 
As noted earlier, however, these figures do not reflect the most up-to-date trends 
in the media and public opinion coverage of different consequences of enlargement. This 
is due to the fact that the latest public opinion survey presented in these figures was 
conducted in March 2003, more than one year prior to the enlargement date.  
In early 2002, the British public opinion was divided within itself about the 
benefits of EU enlargement (Standard EB 56). The benefits of enlargement for the British 
sample were that the EU would work better and that companies in the UK would benefit. 
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However, negative viewpoints were believed to be that the EU would be more distant 
from its citizens and it would still be weaker than the US.  
According to Standard EB 56, nearly half the British sample (46%) believed that 
the Eastern enlargement of the EU would lead to a significant number of people moving 
from the accession countries to the UK. Of this group, 73% believed some new arrivals 
would “abuse the social welfare system” and 70% believed that unemployment would 
increase. Within this same sample, two-thirds believed that there were already “too 
many” immigrants and that with enlargement there would be a shortage of housing in 
Britain.  
Most strikingly, in the final Standard EB survey conducted just before the Eastern 
enlargement, respondents from across the EU ranked the importance of immigration 
higher than terrorism, pensions, taxation, education, housing, the environment, public 
transport, defense and foreign affairs (Standard EB 60). As a side effect, there was a 
parallel concern that immigration would lead to a rise in the unemployment levels in 
Britain.  
These alterations in the media and public attention to different consequences of 
enlargement bring us to the issue of frame-changing. “During any news event’s life 
span,” Hsiang and McCombs (2004, 22) note, “the news media often reframe the event 
by emphasizing different attributes of the event – consciously or unconsciously – in order 
to keep the story alive and fresh.” This is referred to as “frame-changing.” In order to 
reveal the existence of “frame-changing,” Figure 5-6 plots the changes in frames in the 
British press coverage of the consequences of enlargement over time. It better accounts 
for the changes in the way the newspapers covered the enlargement topic with regards to 
its specific consequences. Different from the previous figures, Figure 5-6 also includes 
the January-February 2004 newspaper coverage to demonstrate the developments during 
that time period in the print media attention to different consequences of enlargement. 
However, due to the lack of a Flash EB survey conducted shortly before the enlargement 
in May 2004, this chapter cannot account for more recent media effects on public 
opinion.  
 
Figure 5-6. Frame Changes in the British Press Coverage of the Consequences of EU 
Enlargement, 2002-2004 































































As Figure 5-6 indicates, while the positive aspects of EU enlargement (arguments 
such as the effects of enlargement on peace, moral duty to unite, historically natural to 
enlarge) were covered during the initial stages in the time frame of this analysis; towards 
the end of the time period under study, the negative aspects of enlargement (such as the 
effects on unemployment, drugs, illegal immigration, and the welfare system) were 
emphasized increasingly by the British press. These negative aspects might be said to 
have contributed to the increasing concerns about the impact of EU enlargement on the 
daily lives of British citizens. This leads us to the concept of “compelling arguments.”  
Some attributes of an issue are more likely to be noticed and remembered by the 
people when compared with other attributes. Certain characteristics of an object may 
resonate with the public in such a way that they become especially “compelling 
arguments” for the salience of the issue, person or topic under consideration (McCombs 
2005, 547; Ghanem 1997).  
Implications of Eastern enlargement on immigration, illegal immigration, and on 
the abuse of the welfare system all provided “compelling arguments” for the salience of 
the EU enlargement issue in the British public agenda. In the British context, my 
examination of the various ways in which enlargement was framed in the British print 
media revealed that the salience of enlargement on the public agenda was related 
especially to the frequency of news stories about immigration (legal or illegal) in which 
the average British citizen would feel somehow threatened. 
The biggest change in the enlargement framings of the British press outlets has 
been observed on the issue of the implications on the British welfare system. From June 
to September 2002, the welfare implications of enlargement were covered by slightly 
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more than 10% of the British newspaper articles. In the following two months, its 
coverage increased by 2%. While for a brief time period there was a decrease by 5%; 
from January to February 2004, it was covered by more than 60% of all British 
newspapers published on the issue of Eastern enlargement.  
Another major change over time in British press coverage was observed on the 
issue of illegal immigration. To illustrate, between June and September 2002, less than 
20% of the British newspaper articles devoted attention to the illegal immigration-related 
consequences of enlargement. This figure reached 20% between December and March 
2003. And finally, from January to February 2004, more than 55% of the British articles 
covered the implications of Eastern enlargement on illegal immigration to the UK. More 
and more newspaper articles started to attract attention to the possibility of illegal 
immigration becoming a problem in Britain with the Eastern enlargement. The majority 
of the newspaper articles criticized the government’s “soft touch” on asylum and 
immigration. As illustrated elsewhere in this chapter, this type of framing was mainly 
apparent in The Daily Mail’s coverage.  
Focusing on the willingness of the people to attribute negative traits to EU 
enlargement allows for a test of a common criticism of media coverage of the issue of 
enlargement. As suggested by the previous figure, news coverage in Britain became more 
concentrated on the negative aspects of enlargement as the time of the enlargement 
approached. This suggests that, all else being equal, more media exposure should produce 
negative assessments of the issue of EU enlargement and decrease the likelihood of a 
person attributing positive traits to the issue. These expectations were confirmed by the 
results presented in both the following section and Chapter 6. 
This project hypothesizes that with an increase in the frequency of negative 
consequences of enlargement in the media coverage, the support level for enlargement 
will decrease. This is an argument mainly tested by the priming analysis presented in the 
end of Chapter 6. But the next section deals with the developments in public framings on 
EU enlargement’s different consequences over time, and then compares the results with 
the results from the content analysis section. 
  
Figure 5-7. Changes in the British Public Framings of the Consequences of EU 
Enlargement, 2002-2003 




























































  Sources: Flash Eurobarometer 132.1, 132.2, and 140. 
 
When we compare the public opinion surveys and news coverage from 2002 to 
2003 through Figures 5-6 and 5-7, we can see that in both the media coverage and the 
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public agenda there were increasing concerns about an increase with EU enlargement in 
the number of Eastern European citizens coming to Britain.  
Even in 2001, more than a majority (approximately 53%) of the British people 
disagreed with the statement that after the enlargement, there would be better 
employment. Nearly 60% of the Brits believed that there would be increased levels of 
unemployment after the enlargement. 75% thought that there would be more organized 
crime and 65% thought that there would be more drug trafficking after ten new countries 
acceded to the EU. 55% projected that there would be more illegal immigration after the 
enlargement. As such, predominantly, the economic concerns regarding the negative 
impact of EU enlargement has led to decreased support among the British public. 
Furthermore, according to the Standard EB 61 survey conducted from February to 
March 2004, immigration was “the most important issue facing UK citizens” in the 
spring of 2004 and was cited by 41% of the British sample. In autumn 2003, immigration 
was the second most important issue facing UK citizens, following crime (Standard EB 
60). It was cited as the most important problem by 32% of those polled in Britain.  
But in spring 2004, due to increased print media coverage, immigration concerns 
of the British people overtook crime, which moved from first to second place. Terrorism 
was rated the third most important issue by the British sample, and healthcare system 
received the fourth place. The issue of enlargement was covered by references to two of 
these important topics identified by the British public: immigration and healthcare 
system.  
As such, Chapter 7 elaborates on the way the British official policy on 
immigration is “reviewed” subsequent to a major increase in the number of alarming 
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reports from the media regarding the prospects of increased legal and illegal immigration 
to Britain. It seeks to demonstrate how the print media’s increased emphasis on 
enlargement’s potential impact on immigration and welfare system abuse contributed to 
the development of strong public concerns regarding immigration and exploitation of the 
British welfare system by immigrants, and hence, caused several changes in the British 
government’s immigration policy. 
 
The Second-Level Agenda-Setting Effects in France 
Subsequent to a discussion of the second-level agenda-setting effects in Britain, 
this chapter proceeds with an analysis of the French case. The 17 subtopics on the media 
agenda and those on the public agenda were again rank-ordered respectively, according 
to the frequency of the codes assigned to each subtopic category. Table 5-5 displays the 
comparison of the rankings of the French press and public salience of 17 different 
consequences of Eastern enlargement.  
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Public Opinion  
Consequences 










Environment 1 7.4 8.5 60.6 
Drugs and Crime 2 11.9 6 53.4 
Illegal Immigration 3.5 23.1 2 31.1 
Moral Duty to Unite Europe 3.5 23.8 13 73.5 
Culture  5 44.8 17 84.5 
Legal Immigration 6 50.7 8.5 60.8 
Unemployment 7 57.5 4 44.9 
Welfare System 8 59.7 5 45.5 
Cost of Enlargement 9 61.9 12 72.9 
Closeness to Citizens 10.5 65.6 3 43.6 
Historically Natural to Enlarge 10.5 67.2 11 69.6 
Expansion of Markets 12 70.8 16 82.6 
EU’s power in the World 13.5 74.6 14 76.1 
Agriculture 13.5 74.6 7 55.2 
Country’s Role in the EU 15 83.6 1 27.1 
Difficult to take Decisions 16 85.8 15 78.5 
Peace 17 87.3 10 61.4 
     
  N=134  N=1000 
Critical r (N = 17, p < 0.05) = 0.488   
Spearman’s r = 0.14   
   
Sources: Content Analysis Data (December 1, 2002-March 30, 2003) and Flash 
Eurobarometer 140 
 
As Table 5-5 illustrates, the direction of the relationship between rankings of the 
salience of the consequences of enlargement in the French press and public is positive. 
The media rankings are positively correlated with the public rankings of different 
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consequences of enlargement in France (Spearman’s rho = 0.14). But this relationship is 
not statistically significant. The non-significant relationship may be due to the small 
population size or to the large number of subcategories employed in this analysis.  
While the French press emphasized the implications of EU enlargement on peace, 
security and stability in Europe, decision-making processes in the EU, and relative weight 
of France within an enlarged Union; the French public was mostly interested in the 
cultural implications of enlargement, market expansion, the effect of enlargement on 
decision-making processes, and on the strength of the EU in the world arena.  
For instance, the starkest difference between the French press coverage and public 
opinion on different consequences of EU enlargement is observed on the issue of 
France’s role in the Union. While this aspect was identified as a priority by the French 
people, French press coverage on EU enlargement did not grant this aspect precedence.  
Despite the statistical insignificance of the findings, one can conclude that, when 
compared with the British case, there is a better rate of correspondence between the press 
and the public agendas in the French case. In other words, the rankings of the salience of 
different consequences of enlargement between the public and the media were not 
disjointed like the ones in Britain. This is illustrated by a positive Spearman’s rho 
measure attained as a result of this analysis.  
Figure 5-8 displays the change over time of people’s attention to different 
consequences of EU enlargement. When compared with the previous Flash EB, the 
negative consequences of EU enlargement have been deemphasized by the French people 
in the more recent Flash EB conducted on EU enlargement. This may be said to have 
contributed to the decreased opposition to EU enlargement from autumn 2003 to spring 
2004 (Please refer to Figure 6-2). 
 
Figure 5-8. Changes in the French Public Framings of the Consequences of EU 
Enlargement, 2002-2003 

























































  Sources: Flash Eurobarometer 132.1, 132.2, and 140.  
 
Figure 5-8 effectively shows that in the French public agenda, there was an 
increasing attention to the positive aspects of EU enlargement that are predominantly 
political, such as the moral duty to enlarge the EU, the impact of enlargement on EU’s 
power in the world and on market expansion. This is very much in line with our 
expectations from content analysis, which illustrated the substantial emphasis in the 
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French press coverage allocated to the political consequences of enlargement (Please 
refer to Table 5-1).  
Increasing French public attention to the predominantly positive political 
consequences of enlargement is accompanied with a decreasing public attention to the 
negative effects of EU enlargement. To illustrate, when compared with the public opinion 
measures in the Flash EB survey (November 2002), the latest Flash EB on enlargement 
conducted before enlargement (March 2003) shows that there has been a decline in the 
public attention to the cost of enlargement, as well as to the impact of enlargement on the 
French power within the enlarged EU, EU decision-making, unemployment in France, 
immigration to France, and on the French welfare system.  
One striking finding from Figure 5-8 is that there has been an extensive public 
attention on the effect of EU enlargement on French culture towards the end of the time 
frame of this study. This emphasis was paralleled by the media coverage on the negative 
effects of enlargement on the French language and culture. For a detailed discussion of 
the effects of these changes in public attitudes towards EU enlargement, please refer to 
Chapter 6. 
This chapter concludes with the results of the rank order correlation analysis for 
three main consequences of enlargement in France, since the rank order correlation 
analysis on 17 subcategories did not yield statistically significant results. Table 5-6 
summarizes the relative emphasis placed on each general subtopic by the media and the 
public. As in the British case, the results in this section are more promising as illustrated 
by Table 5-6. 
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Table 5-6. French Press Coverage and Public Opinion Rank Order Correlation on Three 





Press Coverage  
French  
Public Opinion  
Main Consequences of EU 
Enlargement 
 
Rankings Newspaper Articles (%) Rankings 
Survey  
Data (%) 
Political Consequences          3 70.3 3 64.4 
Economic Consequences        2 49.4 2 58.3 
Social Consequences 1 45.5 1 56.7 
   
Sources: Content Analysis Data and Flash Eurobarometer Survey 140 
 
As demonstrated by Table 5-6, both the French people and the French press rank 
the salience of political, economic and social consequences of EU enlargement 
identically. As such, when the large numbers of categories are regrouped under three 
general headings, the significant correspondence between the press coverage salience of 
these general consequences and the public framing of enlargement becomes clearly 
evident.  
As shown in Table 5-6, when the French print media and the public talk about the 
enlargement topic, they both emphasize the political consequences of enlargement the 
most, then the economic and social consequences, respectively. Similar to the results of 
the British second-level agenda-setting analysis concerning three general consequences 
of enlargement, the findings in the French case also suggest a sturdy correlation between 
the media framings and the public framings. Accordingly, Hypothesis 2 is confirmed in 




The results of these second-level agenda-setting analyses clearly demonstrate the 
benefits of engaging in a cross-national comparative analysis to assess media effects. In 
each country, both the media and the public paid the least attention to the social 
consequences of enlargement. This is a cross-national similarity suggested by the 
findings of this analysis.  
An explanation for this similarity may be that the nature of the enlargement topic 
is not so much conducive to concerns about social consequences. In other words, the 
economic and political consequences of enlargement are more likely to gain precedence 
in both the press coverage and the general public. They are more likely to receive more 
attention, since they present relatively more difficult challenges for people. Both the 
economic consequences and the political consequences aspects are very closely related to 
the well-being of the people in these countries.   
There is also a very significant cross-national difference in the way the 
enlargement topic is considered in Britain and France. While the British print media and 
the British public put the heaviest emphasis on the economic consequences of 
enlargement; the French press and the French public most intensely emphasized the 
political consequences of EU enlargement towards the end of the time frame of this 
study. This cross-national difference in emphases placed on different attributes of 
enlargement demonstrates that there are clear differences between the ways the French 
and the British people think about the enlargement issue.  
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Most importantly, the results of the rankings in both Britain and France confirm 
the time order assumption in the agenda setting research. As explained in Chapter 3, the 
content analysis data utilized in the second-level agenda-setting analysis used the 
newspaper articles that were published one month prior to the Flash EB survey field 
research dates. As such, the statistically significant rankings between the press framings 
and the public framings not only demonstrate that the press attribute-agendas and the 
public attribute-agendas were highly correlated, but also suggest that the press framings 
led to different public framings on enlargement.  
Consequently, the results in this chapter successfully confirm Hypothesis 2 
outlined in Chapter 2: the more salient a substantive attribute (political, economic, and 
social consequences) is in the press coverage of EU enlargement, the more likely the 
people are to describe Eastern enlargement topic in terms of that substantive attribute. In 
other words, this chapter confirms that the substantive attributes of EU enlargement 
emphasized by the media determine enlargement’s substantive attributes salient to the 
public in both countries. 
Although this analysis presented strong, positive, and statistically significant 
findings on the second-level agenda-setting effects regarding three main consequences of 
EU enlargement; it did not point to strong second-level effects on public opinion with 
regards to 17 consequences of enlargement. In other words, the results of the second-
level agenda-setting analyses on 17 subcategories of enlargement in both Britain and 
France were not statistically significant.  Future studies may try to decrease the number 
of 17 subtopics to 5 or 6 subcategories for making the rank order correlation analysis 
more manageable. 
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Due to the statistically insignificant results from the rank order correlation 
analyses of 17 subcategories of enlargement, this chapter cautiously concludes that the 
“pictures in our heads” regarding the EU enlargement are influenced by the prominence 
of EU enlargement’s attributes in the press coverage.  
Furthermore, the trend public opinion analyses conducted by the Flash EB 
surveys on enlargement discontinued in March 2003. This means that we do not have a 
detailed analysis of public opinion on enlargement in the final year before the 
enlargement date. It limits the findings of the current analysis since we cannot account 
for the effects of the recent trends in print media framings on more up to date attitudes on 
different consequences of enlargement.  
This limitation becomes especially significant in the British case, since the results 
of the first-level agenda-setting data presented in Chapter 4 indicate a tremendous 
increase in the British print media salience of enlargement towards the end of the time 
frame of this study. With increased exposure to press coverage on enlargement, people 
are expected to have a better idea about what aspects they will give priority to when they 
think about enlargement.  
 
DISCUSSION 
All in all, both the British and the French publics accorded similar attention to 
various consequences of enlargement. In both countries, the citizens were predominantly 
concerned with market expansion, strength of the EU after enlargement, moral and 
cultural implications of enlargement.  
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Due to the lack of a more recent public opinion survey conducted to measure 
people’s opinions regarding the EU enlargement, the findings in this chapter does not 
account for the development of public opinion during the final year before the EU 
enlargement. On the other hand, though, as Figure 4-1 shows, starting with August 2003, 
EU enlargement-related coverage has tremendously increased in both countries. As such, 
the agenda setting theory would expect an enhanced rate of convergence between the 
public and press attribute agendas with an increased coverage of the issue. 
While the British press mostly focused on immigration, complication of decision 
making processes, illegal immigration, welfare, unemployment, and the relative weight of 
Britain in an enlarged Union; the French press focused on peace, stability and security 
implications of enlargement, complication of EU decision-making processes, the relative 
weight of France after the enlargement, agriculture, and strength of the Union in the 
world arena.  
One observation that is extremely noteworthy is that the attributes emphasized by 
the British press coverage on enlargement concentrate more on the bread-and-butter type 
of concerns regarding enlargement’s consequences on the daily lives of people. By 
contrast, the aspects of enlargement emphasized by the French press coverage underline 
the broader and more abstract consequences of EU enlargement. These types of 
consequences are less likely to affect the daily lives of people concretely.  
People are more likely to remember and attach greater value to more concrete 
issues, in which the problems of daily life are closely involved. Put differently, problems 
that are critical to their domestic well-being are more likely to attract people’s attention, 
rather than subjects like Europe and international relations.  
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However, it is important to be more precise about these relationships and to look 
at the details of this rather multifaceted and complex picture. Therefore, the following 




 Chapter 6: Consequences of Agenda-Setting or Other Factors? 
Analyzing the Determinants of Public Support for EU Enlargement  
The literature on EU public opinion has mostly concentrated on analyzing the 
determinants of public support for EU integration, generally ignoring the determinants of 
public support for EU enlargement. Since the Eastern enlargement of the EU has been 
one of the most vital developments shaping both the nature and the composition of the 
EU, public attitudes towards this issue command special attention. Public support for 
enlargement has important implications for the democratic deficit debate, as will be 
illustrated in Chapter 7. As such, this chapter delves into the factors that may have an 
effect on people’s attitudes towards EU enlargement.  
Findings from Chapters 4 and 5 demonstrate the significance of the print media’s 
attention to and framings of the enlargement issue in determining people’s awareness of 
this issue and its substantive attributes. The previous analyses, however, did not deal with 
testing the impact of the EU enlargement-related newspaper coverage on public attitudes 
towards the issue. In light of the recent developments in agenda setting theory, the 
present chapter analyzes the consequences of the media’s agenda-setting and priming 
effects on public attitudes towards EU enlargement.   
Although the influence of the media is substantial, arguably, it may not be the 
only factor determining the public attitudes towards enlargement. Therefore, this chapter 
also analyzes the effects of other independent variables on people’s attitudes towards EU 
enlargement. It tests the determinants of people’s support for EU enlargement through 
bivariate and multivariate analyses at the individual level. In short, this chapter seeks to 
find an answer to the following questions: Why do some Europeans support the idea of 
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EU enlargement while others don’t? Is it because of their exposure to enlargement-related 
media coverage or due to some other factors? 
 
DATA 
Agenda setting research generally conducts aggregate-level analyses of public 
opinion (Willnat 1997). Chapters 4 and 5, and the analysis in the beginning of this 
chapter followed that common trend and conducted aggregate-level agenda-setting 
research combining the results of the content analysis with the public opinion data.  
Even though the aggregate-level and descriptive data are useful to a point, an 
individual-level multivariate analysis of data is essential for getting a better sense of the 
true influence of various factors that affect people’s attitudes toward EU enlargement. 
Consequently, this project’s character has somewhat differed from previous attempts to 
study the media effects and EU public opinion. This chapter mainly analyzes the 
individual-level public opinion data. 
At first, it utilizes the Standard Eurobarometer 56 survey data to find out about 
the factors that are influential in determining the attitudes toward EU enlargement. This is 
the only EB survey data that measures people’s media consumption habits and their 
attitudes toward the Eastern enlargement of the EU simultaneously.  
However, since the fieldwork for this survey was conducted from October to 
November 2001, it does not account for more recent developments in public opinion on 
enlargement. As such, although the findings presented in this chapter are useful to display 
the interaction between different factors and the support for EU enlargement, they may be 
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limited in terms of their implications to more recent developments in European public 
opinion.  
The final part of this chapter runs statistical analyses on a later survey – Flash 
Eurobarometer on EU Enlargement 132.2. Even though this survey did not ask questions 
measuring people’s media consumption habits, it asked many questions to specifically 
determine people’s attitudes toward various consequences of EU enlargement. More 
importantly, this survey is conducted at the end of 2002. As such, it accounts for more 
recent developments in public opinion on enlargement, when compared with Standard 
Eurobarometer 56.  
 
CONSEQUENCES OF AGENDA-SETTING AND PRIMING 
As stated in the beginning of this chapter, the previous empirical chapters did not 
deal with testing the impact of the EU enlargement-related newspaper coverage on public 
attitudes towards the issue. Therefore, the goal in the first part of this chapter is to 
analyze the consequences of media’s agenda-setting and priming effects on public 
attitudes towards the EU enlargement.  
Accordingly, the next section provides an analysis of the consequences of agenda-
setting in Britain. This type of analysis could not be conducted on the French sample in 
the Standard EB 56 dataset due to the unavailability of information regarding the names 




An analysis of the Consequences of Agenda-Setting in Britain  
This analysis focuses on the consequences of the British print media’s agenda-
setting effects for the British public attitudes towards enlargement. It expects to find the 
enlargement-related print media coverage to serve as a catalyst for changes in or 
development of opinions.  
Unlike the previous chapters in this research, the present analysis concentrates on 
exploring the impact of people’s regular exposure to daily newspapers on their attitudes 
towards the EU enlargement. Doing so should free us from considerations about whether 
the respondents have actually been regularly exposed to newspaper coverage.  
Question 2b in Standard EB 56 asks people which daily newspapers they read 
regularly. The answers to this question are recoded in a way to construct the daily 
newspaper readership categories of The Sun, The Daily Mail, The Guardian, The Times, 
another daily newspaper, multiple daily newspapers, and no daily newspapers. The daily 
newspaper readership variable constitutes our independent variable in the current 
analysis.   
Question 38 of Standard EB 56 asks the respondents which options they tend to 
support regarding the EU enlargement. The available answers are: “the EU should be 
enlarged to include all,” “the EU should be enlarged to include some,” and “the EU 
should not be enlarged.” The attitude towards enlargement is the dependent variable in 
this analysis.  
Following the consequences of agenda-setting argument, this analysis expects 
respondents’ regular consumption of daily newspapers to have an important effect on 
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their attitudes towards enlargement. The relationship between the daily newspaper 
readership on EU affairs and the answers to Question 38 is displayed in Table 6-1.  
 
Table 6-1. Cross-tabulation of British Daily Newspaper Readership and Attitudes 
towards the EU Enlargement (with three options) 
























The Sun 32% 41.8% 17.5% 8.8% 194 
The Daily 
Mail 26.2% 43.7% 26.2% 3.9% 103 
The Times 17.9% 57.1% 14.3% 10.7% 28 
The Guardian 25.9% 55.6% 11.1% 7.4% 27 
Other 
Newspaper 33.9% 43.1% 15% 8% 313 
Multiple 
Newspapers 48.8% 36.6% 9.8% 4.9% 41 
No Daily 
Paper 36.2% 43.5% 17.4% 2.9% 69 
Total 
N = 775 32.5% 43.5% 16.9% 7.1% 775 
Source: Standard Eurobarometer 56 (Cell entries are row percentages) 
 
The results presented in Table 6-1 confirm our expectations that the regular 
exposure to the coverage of different press outlets has an impact on attitudes towards EU 
enlargement. These results also indirectly support our hypothesis that the tone of press 
coverage affects public opinion. While this analysis provides some useful findings; due to 
small sample sizes, the results were not statistically significant.  
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Put more specifically, the readers of The Daily Mail had the most negative 
attitudes on enlargement (with approximately 26% of its readers against enlargement), 
followed by the readers of The Sun. These observations confirm the expectations from 
our content analysis, and suggest that the readers who were exposed to negative coverage 
on a topic were more likely to develop negative views of the topic.  
Again, validating our expectations from the content analysis of The Guardian and 
The Times in Chapter 5, opposition to EU enlargement was the weakest among the 
readers of The Guardian, followed by the readers of The Times. Overall, these tendencies 
support the expectations of the “consequences of agenda-setting” thesis.  
Another significant observation emerging from Table 6-1 is that among the 
respondents who were exposed to multiple newspapers, support for EU enlargement “to 
include all” was higher than the support for other options. This finding signifies that 
people who were exposed to different points of view on enlargement were more likely to 
support enlargement than not. Also, among the same group, the enlargement opposition 
percentage was the lowest when compared with the enlargement opposition percentages 
of the other groups. To sum up, people who were exposed to multiple daily newspaper 
coverage were less likely to oppose enlargement. 
Among the people who did not read any newspaper, the support level for 
enlarging the Union to “include all members” was the second highest following the 
support level of the multiple newspaper readers. This suggests that exposure to the 
coverage of a single source had a negative impact on the support for EU enlargement.  
Question 40a of Standard EB 56 asks people whether they think their lives will be 
“better,” “worse,” or “about the same,” after the new countries have joined the EU in 
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2004. This question enables us to detect the level of optimism or pessimism of the British 
respondents about the effects of EU enlargement on their living standards.  
 
Table 6-2. Cross-tabulation of British Daily Newspaper Readership and Attitudes 
towards the Effects of Enlargement on the Quality of Life  





Readership Better Worse About the Same Total N 
The Sun 5.7% 19.6% 74.6% 209 
The Daily Mail 11.3% 16.5% 72.2% 97 
The Times 15.4% 19.2% 65.4% 26 
The Guardian 29.6% 7.4% 63% 27 
Other Newspaper 11.7% 11% 77.3% 326 
Multiple 
Newspapers 21.4% 11.9% 66.7% 42 
No Daily Paper 14.3% 12.9% 72.9% 70 
Total 
N = 797 11.5% 14.3% 74.2% 797 
Source: Standard Eurobarometer 56 (Cell entries are row percentages) 
 
This analysis helps us draw conclusions about the tone of the newspaper coverage 
in each press outlet on enlargement. The results should again support British content 
analysis findings presented in Chapters 4 and 5. As depicted in Table 6-2, the readers of 
The Sun were the most pessimistic ones among the British respondents about the possible 
effect of enlargement on their lives. To illustrate, 19.6% of The Sun readers thought that 
their lives would be worse after new countries have joined the EU. Furthermore, The 
Daily Mail readers very closely followed the readers of The Sun in their pessimistic 
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expectations about the impact of enlargement on their daily lives. Consequently, in line 
with our expectations from the findings in the previous chapters, the regular readers of 
the tabloid newspapers developed pessimism about the effects of EU enlargement on 
their quality of life. This supports the previous findings that these press outlets tend to 
cover the enlargement topic with a predominantly negative tone.   
On the other hand, among the British respondents, The Guardian readers were the 
most optimistic ones regarding their expectations of the impact of the Eastern 
enlargement on their daily lives. Since the enlargement-related coverage of The Guardian 
was mostly positive, this finding again confirms expectations emerged from the content 
analysis data presented in Chapter 5. The chi-square test result indicates a highly 
significant relationship for the relationship summarized in Table 6-2 (p < 0.005). 
Another important finding that emerges from Table 6-2 is that a significant 
majority (74.2%) of the British respondents thought that enlargement would not have any 
impact on their lives. However, one should keep in mind that this survey was conducted 
in 2001. This tendency has probably changed when enlargement has become an 
“obtrusive issue” with an increased exposure to the enlargement-related press coverage 
over time. Individuals who did not hold opinions about enlargement were expected to 
form opinions as a result of increased exposure to information about enlargement. This 
hypothesis could not be tested due to the unavailability of trend data on this question. 
Finally, Question 49-4 of Standard EB 56 asks a more direct question to its 
respondents; it inquires if they are “for” or “against” EU enlargement. As Table 6-3 
displays, the highest opposition to EU enlargement again comes from The Daily Mail 
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readers. This observation again supports the previous findings suggested by Chapter 5 
regarding the attitudes of The Daily Mail readers towards enlargement.  
 
Table 6-3. Cross-tabulation of British Daily Newspaper Readership and Attitudes 
towards the EU Enlargement (with two options) 




For Against Total N 
The Sun 59% 41% 178 
The Daily Mail 55.7% 44.3% 88 
The Times 68% 32% 25 
The Guardian 76.2% 23.8% 21 
Other Newspaper 63.5% 36.5% 271 
Multiple 
Newspapers 69.4% 30.6% 36 
No Daily Paper 71.9% 28.1% 64 
Total 
N = 683 63% 37% 683 
Source: Standard Eurobarometer 56 (Cell entries are row percentages) 
 
As shown in Table 6-3, The Guardian readers have the highest levels of support 
for EU enlargement among the British respondents. Similar to the findings in Table 6-1, 
this finding also points to the positive impact of the predominantly positive coverage of 
this broadsheet on the public support for enlargement. This once again confirms the 
expectations emerged from the content analysis results in Chapter 5.  
As Table 6-3 suggests, the most enlargement-skeptic portion of the public is The 
Daily Mail readers (44.3% opposition), followed by The Sun readers (41% opposition). 
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The most enlargement-friendly portions of the British public come from the readers of 
The Guardian with 76.2% supporting the enlargement and the readers of The Times with 
68% support level.  
More interestingly, similar to the findings suggested in Table 6-1, Table 6-3 
demonstrates that the non-readers of daily newspapers have the highest support levels for 
EU enlargement. Accordingly, one may argue that exposure to newspaper coverage 
decreases the support for enlargement since the most popular print media outlets in 
Britain cover the issue from a skeptical point of view. As such, we may conclude that 
there is a negative relationship between the exposure to newspaper coverage and the 
support for EU enlargement. However, one should also note that the relationship 
summarized in Table 6-3 is not statistically significant. 
 
A Discussion of the Consequences of Agenda-Setting  
Findings presented here are not surprising when we consider the content of the 
enlargement-related press coverage in different newspapers. Generally, the coverage of 
The Guardian and The Times were positive on the issue of EU enlargement. On the other 
hand, the coverage of the tabloids like The Sun and The Daily Mail were much more 
critical on EU enlargement, especially attracting attention to the negative impacts of 
enlargement, such as an increase in illegal and legal immigration and unemployment 
levels. These findings are in line with the results of a previous study that concluded 
strong effects of newspaper readership on the support for the Euro in Britain (Mortimore 
et al. 2000). 
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When compared with the British quality newspaper circulation levels, the 
readership levels of the British tabloid newspapers are significantly higher. As such, we 
expect the tabloid coverage effects on public opinion to be stronger than the effects of the 
broadsheets. In other words, we expect the tabloids to more strongly affect British public 
opinion. This may explain the high opposition levels to enlargement in the British public 
(Please refer to Figure 6-2).  
What is more striking is that the second largest pro-enlargement group of the 
British society came from non-readers. This suggests that the consumers of newspaper 
articles on EU enlargement tend to adopt a more pessimistic viewpoint towards the topic, 
which in a way confirms the expected outcome that the media in Britain is Euro-skeptic 
and that it affects readers’ opinions in a negative way. This finding again supports the 
previous point made in this discussion: tabloid newspapers may have a better likelihood 
of affecting the overall public opinion on enlargement since they are more widely 
consumed by the British people.  
These results suggest that people are more sensitive to the salience of negative 
information than to that of non-negative information in the mass media (see Schoenbach 
and Semetko 1992). This is called the thesis of “negativity-effectiveness,” and the 
findings presented in this section support this argument.  
The Guardian readers are the most optimistic ones about the effect of the 
enlargement on their daily lives, whereas The Sun and The Daily Mail readers are among 
the most pessimistic ones. The results of the chi-square test display a statistically 
significant relationship between the readership of different British newspapers and 
people’s opinions about the effect of enlargement on living standards (p < 0.005).  
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The results presented here consistently point to strong agenda-setting 
consequences of the media on public opinion. They suggest that the daily newspaper 
readership has a strong influence on the attitudes toward enlargement. In sum, the 
evidence presented in Tables 6-1, 6-2, and 6-3 lead us to confirm the strong attitudinal 
effects of daily newspaper readership in Britain. Having analyzed the consequences of 
daily newspaper readership on attitudes towards the EU enlargement, the remainder of 
this part of the chapter tests the priming hypothesis outlined in Chapter 2.  
 
Priming Analysis  
Priming deals with the consequences of agenda-setting as well. With regards to 
recent improvements in the agenda setting theory, one interesting question to ask is 
whether and to what extent the predominance of political, economic, and socio-cultural 
consequences of enlargement covered in the press has influenced the overall evaluation 
of the enlargement of the EU in Britain and France. This link between the prominence of 
an object and public opinion is called priming, a process whose psychological basis is the 
selective attention of the public.  
The present section explores whether people were primed by the media coverage 
when they formed their attitudes on EU enlargement. In other words, it asks which aspect 
of the enlargement issue people assign the most significance to when they evaluate this 
issue. As hypothesized in Chapter 3, when a certain consequence of enlargement is made 
more prominent in the press coverage, the weight assigned to that particular consequence 
by people would be greater when they form their opinions on EU enlargement.  
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The current analysis seeks to link the framing changes in the print media and 
public (as displayed in Chapter 5) with the changes in the overall public attitudes towards 
the EU enlargement. Figures 6-1 and 6-2 illustrate the changes in public attitudes towards 
EU enlargement over time.  
Immigration has been one of the highly salient issues vis-à-vis the enlargement 
debate: both the British and the French people felt strongly about it. For instance, in 
November 2003, one thirds of the British people identified immigration (only second to 
crime) as the most important problem facing the country. This figure was more than 
twice as high as the EU15 average of 14% (Standard EB 60). Only two months before the 
enlargement day, in the spring of 2004, immigration became the most important issue 
facing UK citizens overtaking crime and was cited by 41% of the British sample 
(Standard EB 61). 


























  Source: Standard Eurobarometer Surveys 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61 
 



























  Source: Standard Eurobarometer Surveys 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61 
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ded to a decline in the 
popular support for EU enlargement. As can be seen in Figure 6-1, from autumn 2003 to 
spring 2004, there has been a noticeable decrease from approximately 40% to 30% in the 
support of UK citizens for enlargement. This decrease led to the lowest point in the 
British support levels for enlargement. It is very important for the purposes of this study 
that this all-time low level of support came just before the enlargement date. British 
people’s preoccupation with the immigration-related consequences of enlargement may 
be the primary reason for this substantial decline in the popular support levels. 
Moreover, as Figure 6-2 indicates, starting from autumn 2002, there has been a 
constant increase in the British opposition levels to enlargement up until spring 2004. 
This trend is probably related to the fact that there has been a tremendous increase in the 
British press coverage of the predominantly negative consequences of enlargement 
towards the end of this time frame (Please refer to Figure 5-6 for observing the British 
print media frame changes).  
Moreover, in the first survey conducted after 1 May 2004 (Standard EB 62), 
immigration was still cited as the most important issue facing the UK and was cited by 
29% of the respondents. While this figure still represented the highest concern recorded 
for this issue anywhere in the EU, it was substantially lower than the 41% noted just 
before the enlargement date.  
This evidence further suggests the negative effects of the increased hysteria in the 
print media about the possible immigration-related consequences of enlargement in the 
spring of 2004, just before the enlargement day. British newspapers started to 
increasingly publish on the issue of enlargement especially in the last four months before 
The rising popular concerns about immigration correspon
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enlargement were generally 
parallel
nd France had identical levels of support for EU 
enlarge
igure 6-2, opposition to EU enlargement too remained 
somew
 in autumn 2002, support for enlargement started to decrease and 
opposit
of this study (Please refer to Figures 5-7 and 5-8). 
the enlargement date (Please refer to Figure 4-1). As such, the print media coverage of 
the immigration-related consequences of EU enlargement was a very important factor in 
determining the public attitudes towards EU enlargement.   
These patterns in the British public opinion on 
ed in the French public opinion. As displayed by Figures 6-1 and 6-2, throughout 
the time frame of this study, public opinion on enlargement underwent a considerable 
degree of variation in both countries.  
In spring 2001, both Britain a
ment. In both countries, the support level was 35% (Standard EB 55). Figure 6-1 
shows that while the support for enlargement remained fairly constant (around 40%) from 
2001 to 2002 in both France and Britain, these support levels were well below the EU15 
average (by at least 10%).  
As displayed by F
hat stable from 2001 to 2002 in both countries. During that time frame, the main 
foreseen consequences of enlargement were a stronger EU, the unification of the 
continent and a means for new members to increase their economic and political 
development. 
Starting
ion started to increase in both countries, but more so in France. French public 
opinion on enlargement particularly became more negative. As indicated by the results of 
public opinion analysis, this is due to the fact that more and more people became 
conscious of the negative consequences of enlargement towards the end of the time frame 
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While the support levels were more or less identical in both countries, strikingly, 
the level of opposition to enlargement differed si
e, in spring 2001, the opposition to enlargement in France (47%) was the highest 
among the EU15 while in Britain it was relatively lower (34%) (Standard EB 55).  
These differences in opposition levels continued until the end of the time frame of 
this study (Please refer to Figure 6-2). British opposition trends closely followe
verage opposition trends over time, but were always slightly higher than the EU15 
average. In autumn 2001, while in Britain, approximately 33% of people were against 
enlargement during that time frame, in France, the opposition levels were around 46% 
and followed an upward trend.  
This cross-national difference in attitudes towards enlargement was probably due 
to the sizeable number of “don’t
 size of opposition in Britain was due to the significant number of people who did 
not know whether they support the enlargement. To illustrate, in spring 2001, one fourth 
of the British population said that they had not decided about their position on 
enlargement (Standard EB 56). The number of “don’t know”s was generally much lower 
(about 10% lower) in France. As suggested by the results of the first-level agenda-setting 
analysis in Chapter 4, this may be attributable to the fact that, in France, people were 
exposed to higher numbers of enlargement-related press articles than in Britain.    
British support levels over time noticeably followed a declining pattern. Starting 
from autumn 2002, there was a movement in attitudes towards enlargement in B
ng a major net shift from “don’t know” to “no.” A simple explanation for what 
happened between 2002 and 2004 would be that those who were initially unsure of their 
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and opp




position were largely mobilized against enlargement, due to their increased exposure to 
enlargement-related media coverage. It can be argued that the print media coverage on 
enlargement led people to realize that the European project was developing in ways they 
were not prepared to support, particularly those people who had little prior information 
about developments. 
The trend in France was somewhat different. From autumn 2002 to spring 2003, 
support for enlargement reached its lowest point in France. The gap between supporters 
onents of enlargement widened tremendously. Just before this decline in support, 
there was a major surge in the French press coverage of the EU enlargement (Please refer 
to Figure 4-1).  
At the time there were increasing references in the French press about a possible 
reform of the Co
 budget between France and Germany. In other words, the accession countries 
were presented as the source of French people’s problems, rather than a cure for Europe. 
This increase in the salience of enlargement’s economic subtopics is probably the cause 
of the decrease in the support for EU enlargement among the French public opinion.  
For instance, according to Standard EB 60, conducted from October to November 
2003, French respondents believed that the most important problems facing the cou
nemployment (54%), crime (30%), and the economic situation (29%). It is no 
coincidence that these were also the most frequently covered subtopics of the French 
press coverage on the EU enlargement topic. There was a lot of pessimism in the French 
newspaper coverage towards the economic consequences of enlargement. This pessimism 
was reflected in the public attitudes towards the EU enlargement.  
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pring 2004. In autumn 
2003, t




lustrated in Figure 5-8, just before the 
enlarge
re 
about 7% higher than the EU15 average and 6% higher than the British average. This can 
Following the all-time low figure in support levels, popular support for 
enlargement gradually increased by 7% from spring 2003 up until s
he French opposition level reached its zenith. This all-time high figure was 15% 
higher than the opposition levels in Britain, and 18% more than the EU15 opposition 
levels.  
As illustrated by Figure 4-1, the print media salience of EU enlargement has once 
again in
ces in the French press to various negative consequences of enlargement, ranging 
from the possible outsourcing of French companies to immigration, the welfare system, 
and unemployment-related consequences of EU enlargement. This explains why the 
opposition levels reached their all-time high point during this time period.  
Finally, from autumn 2003 to spring 2004, there was a very remarkable change in 
the direction of the attitudes towards enlargement in France. While the opp
in and in EU15 followed an upward pattern under this time period, the French 
opposition level followed a downward pattern.  
This trend was accompanied by a decreasing attention among the French public to 
the negative effects of EU enlargement. As il
ment date, there was an increasing attention allocated to the positive aspects of 
EU enlargement, such as the moral duty to enlarge the EU, the impact of enlargement on 
EU’s power in the world and the positive effects of enlargement on market expansion.  
However, this did not mean that the French public opposition to enlargement was 
totally eliminated in the spring of 2004. Even then, the opposition levels in France we
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still be




s that public 
attitude
of enlargement, enlargement is more likely to attract support from the public. By contrast, 
 explained by the ongoing pessimistic evaluations of the economic consequences 
of enlargement by the French press. As such, even in March 2004, French people’s 
concerns regarding unemployment have increased by 4% when compared with the results 
of Standard EB 60. Unemployment was still identified as the most important problem 
facing the country by 58% of French respondents (Standard EB 61).  
On the other hand, in Britain, from autumn 2002 to spring 2004, opposition was 
following a continuously upward pattern. As demonstrated by Figure 6-1, support levels 
in Britain were in a major decline. The decrease in British support 
tumn 2003 to spring 2004. This, again, does not come as a surprise, when one 
considers the changes in the media and public frames noted prior to May 2004.   
As illustrated by Figure 5-6, the negative aspects of enlargement, such as the 
effects on unemployment, drug trafficking and organized crime, illegal immigration, and 
welfare system have been increasingly mentioned by the British press. These 
 might have contributed to the increasing concerns about the impact of EU 
enlargement on the daily lives of British citizens, as depicted in Figure 5-7. 
Implications of enlargement on immigration, illegal immigration, and on the 
abuse of the welfare system all provided “compelling arguments” for the salience of the 
EU enlargement issue in the British public agenda. This analysis suggest
s towards enlargement changed depending on the changes in the public attention 
to different consequences of enlargement. This finding confirms the existence of media’s 
priming effects in both the British and the French contexts.   
When the public attention is on the predominantly positive political consequences 
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ore likely. In conclusion, 
anecdo
edia coverage and public opinion is 
spuriou
 powerful mediating forces of social class, religion, age, 




when the public attention is on the predominantly negative economic consequences of 
enlargement, public opposition to enlargement becomes m
tal public opinion data and scattered evidence from content analysis appears to 
support the existence of priming effects of the media. Nevertheless, the priming thesis 
should be subjected to further quantitative testing. 
Even though the consequences of print media’s agenda-setting and priming 
effects on public opinion are substantial, print media may not be the only determinant of 
the public support for enlargement. Some scholars challenge the media effects argument 
and maintain that the relationship between the m
s to some alternate correlate of media coverage. To test these claims, this chapter 
now turns to an examination of the impact of several independent variables on the 
support for EU enlargement. 
 
ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS FOR THE PUBLIC SUPPORT OF EU ENLARGEMENT 
Newton (2006) claims that the powers of the mass media are weak because they 
are often “diluted” by more
and personal knowledge and experience. Any true test of the relationship between th
and public opinion on enlargement needs to take these other factors into account.  
As such, this part of the chapter tests the effects of a number of alternative 
independent variables (besides the media exposure) on the public attitudes towards 
enlargement. In what follows, this chapter examines attitudes towards the Eastern 
enlargement of the EU as a result of a number of variables such as demographic
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variabl
est in enlargement, 
political sophistication, exposure to different media (TV or press), or the predominance 
 the public support for EU enlargement. It 
utilizes
er significantly from those which would be 
expecte
es, the media consumption habits, perceptions of specific consequences of EU 
enlargement, political sophistication and political interest. To achieve this, the remainder 
of this chapter employs two different methods: it first conducts an individual-level 
bivariate analysis, and then an individual-level multivariate analysis.  
 
Individual-Level Bivariate Data Analyses 
This analysis illustrates the individual-level bivariate relationships between a 
number of independent variables, such as demographic variables, inter
of various consequences of enlargement and
 cross-tabulations, chi-square tests, and binary correlations on the Standard EB 56 
survey data to display the effects of several independent variables on the support for EU 
enlargement at the individual-level analysis.  
The purpose in cross-tabulations is to examine the relationship between two (or 
more) variables by breaking down the variables into subgroups and subcategories. Chi-
square test determines relationship between two variables, and evaluates whether 
frequencies that are empirically obtained diff
d under our assumptions. The majority of cross-tabulation tables are shown in 
Appendix E, but for the sake of illustrating several important relationships I present a 
limited set here.  
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ariable 
The dependent variable is the support for EU enlargement. The Standard EB 56 
 question: “Are you, personally, in favor of or against the 
enlarge
ographic characteristics, such as gender and age, are used as independent 
ojecting the support for EU membership (Anderson and 
Reiche




survey asks the following
ment of the European Union?” Support for EU enlargement is a dichotomous 
variable, with support coded as 1 and no support coded as 0.  
 
The Independent Variables  
Dem
variables in many studies pr
rt 1996; Gabel and Palmer 1995; McLaren 2002; De Vreese and Boomgaarden 
2005). Based on the literature on public attitudes towards European integration, one 
might expect a gender gap in the attitudes toward the EU enlargement (Givens 2004; 
Inglehart 1990; Liebert 1999; Nelsen and Guth 2000). Accordingly, women are expected 
to be more skeptical towards the EU enlargement. 
Some may argue that all media are not the same. The study then measures the 
impact of TV exposure on enlargement suppor
esis that exposure to television news has a different impact on people’s 
perceptions of enlargement than does exposure to newspaper coverage. It also explores 
the hypothesis that due to the negative tone of political news coverage, higher levels of 




his chapter also examines the 
relation
The Effects of the Attitudes towards Specific Consequences of EU Enlargement 
 Britain, an overwhelming majority of those who thought that enlargement 
s true for 
those 
This chapter further examines the effect of “cognitive mobilization” – or, 
involvement in politics – on the support for the EU enlargement. Inglehart 
 (1991) note that the more information one receives about the EU, the less 
threatening the EU becomes. Accordingly, I expect the people with higher levels of 
political sophistication to support the EU enlargement. 
In sum, in addition to testing the relationship between the print media exposure of 
people and public support for EU enlargement, t
ship between age, gender, TV exposure, political sophistication, as well as 
attitudes regarding different consequences of EU enlargement and the individual-level 
public support for EU enlargement. All of the above-mentioned variables are dummied 
and entered into cross-tabulation procedure, which was conducted separately for Britain 
and France. These relationships were also analyzed through chi-square tests. The results 




would make their lives better tended to support enlargement. The same trend i
who thought that enlargement would make no difference in their lives. Among 
those who opposed to enlargement in Britain, people who thought that enlargement 
would make their lives worse had a higher proportion, when compared with their 
counterparts among the supporters of EU enlargement (Please refer to Table E-1 in 
Appendix E). These findings indicate a positive and a statistically significant relationship 
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nt and the enlargement’s effects on people’s lives. A significant 
majorit





between the perceived impact of enlargement on people’s lives and support for EU 
enlargement (p < 0.001). 
The French sample follows a similar pattern on the relationship between the 
support for EU enlargeme
y (80%) of the French people thought that their lives would remain about the same 
after the enlargement. 65% of those who opposed enlargement believed that their lives 
would be worse after the expansion of the EU. 93% of those who thought that their lives 
would become better supported enlargement (Please refer to Table E-2 in Appendix E). 
These findings are again statistically significant (p < 0.001) but are not surprising since it 
is natural for people to engage in cost-benefit analyses when making decisions about such 
policy issues that may potentially affect their daily lives.   
As such, we can conclude that citizens’ considerations about the effects of 
enlargement on their daily lives played a major role in det
ment. Those who thought that enlargement would make their lives worse tended 
to oppose enlargement; whereas, those who thought that it would make their lives better 
tended to support the issue. This was true for both the British and the French people.  
Next, this analysis continues with the cross-tabulations of several perceived 
consequences of EU enlargement and support for EU enlargement (Please refer to Ta
ne significant result of these cross-tabulation analyses is that in the French case, 
there have been major concerns about the unemployment-related consequences of EU 
enlargement. As shown in Table 6-4, 76% of those who thought that enlargement would 
increase the unemployment levels in the country opposed the EU enlargement in France.  
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Unemployment in France  
Q. 40cc. After new countries have joined, there will be more 
unemployment 
Table 6-4. Cross-tabulation of Support for EU Enlargement and Enlargement’s Impact on 
Attitud wards 
Enlargement Disagree Agree Total N
Enlargement 75.8% 63 
Support for 
es to
   
Opposition to 41.9% 
Enlargement 
Total N 
58.1% 24.2% 34 
31 66 97 
Source: a
 
Stand rd Euroba 6 (Cell entries mn percentages
onally, among those who disagreed with the statement that enlargement 
crease unemploym ent. These findings are 
atistically significant (p < 0.001), and signify that French people’s unemployment 
concern
Immigration in France  
Q. 40cc. After new countries have joined, there will be more people 
coming from the new member countries to France 
rometer 5 are colu ) 
Additi
would in ent, 58% supported the EU enlargem
st
s were important in determining their support for EU enlargement. This aspect is 
going to be dealt with in detail in Chapter 7. Concerns regarding the impact of 
immigration were also important in determining people’s support for enlargement. 
 
Table 6-5. Cross-tabulation of Support for EU Enlargement and Enlargement’s Impact on 
Attitud wards 
Disagree Agree Total N
Enlargement 76.6% 63 
Support for 
es to
Enlargement    
Opposition to 54% 
Enlargement 
Total N 
46% 23.4% 34 
50 47 97 
Source: Standard Euroba  (Cell entries mn percentagesrometer 56 are colu ) 
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s Table 6-5 indicat n France, more than o thirds of those wh ught that 
 enlargement. 
Similarly, those who did not think that enlargement would increase immigration tended 
to oppose enlargement. This relationship is statistically significant at the 0.05 level.  
Furthermore, Table E-3 in Appendix E effectively illustrates how the concerns 
about illegal immigration also played an important role in determining the attitudes of the 
French people on enlargement. 76% of those who agreed with the argument that 
enlargement would increase illegal immigration to France opposed to enlargement, 
whereas 56% of those who disagreed with that argument supported enlargement. This 
finding is also statistically significant at the 0.05 level.  
Additionally, economic concerns in France were predominant among the public 
during the enlargement debates (Please refer to Table E-4 in Appendix E). 77% of those 
who thought that enlargement would increase prices in the country opposed the 
enlargement. By contrast, 57% of those who disagreed with that statement supported 
enlargement. This finding is statistically significant at the 0.05 level. As such, French 
people’s concerns regarding the cost of living in France after new countries have joined 
the EU were also important in determining their support for EU enlargement. 
A es, i  tw o tho
enlargement would increase immigration to France opposed the EU
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Illegal Immigration in Britain  
Q. 40cc8. After new countries have joined, there will be more illegal 
Table 6-6. Cross-tabulation of Support for EU Enlargement and Enlargement’s Impact on 
immigration to Britain Attitudes towards 
Enlargem
Opposi 40% 64.9% 42 
60% 35.1% 40 





Total N 45 37 82 
Source: Standard Eurobarometer 56 (Cell entries are column percentages) 
 
As shown in Table 6-6, 65% of the British respondents who believed that 
enlargement would increase illegal immigration to Britain opposed enlargement. On the 
other hand, about 60% of those 
increase illegal immigration to the UK supported enlargement. This finding is also 
analysis in Chapter 5, the British people’s concerns about illegal immigration had 
immigration concerns were influential in both the British and French public opinion on 
enlargement.    
The focus on the relationship between different consequences of enlargement and 
public support for enlargement is useful for detecting the priming effects of the media. In 
Britain, for instance, people’s attitudes towards illegal immigration had a statistically 
significant relationship with their support for enlargement. Similarly, in France, people’s 
attitudes towards unemployment, illegal, and legal immigration were important 
who disagreed with the argument that enlargement would 
statistically significant at the 0.05 level. As expected by the results of the framing 
important effects on their attitudes towards the EU enlargement. Consequently, 
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eterminants for the public support for enlargement. As such, we expect the media 
attitudes towards enlargement. These observations support the results from the first part 
fter analyzing the rel udes towards various 
of enlargement and support for EU enlargement, this chapter now deals 
ct of gender and age on the support for enlargement. 
owing section tests if there is a statistically significant relationship 
betwee
d
coverage of these subtopics of enlargement to be influential in shaping the public 




The Effect of Demographic Variables 
While Table E-5 in Appendix E demonstrates that the distributions are too close 
to draw any meaningful conclusions about the relationship between gender and 
enlargement support in Britain. This relationship is not statistically significant. Similarly, 
in the French case, we cannot observe any discernable differences between the attitudes 
of female and male respondents toward enlargement (Please refer to Table E-6 in 
Appendix E). As in the British case, this relationship is not statistically significant in 
France. We cannot confirm the existence of a statistically significant relationship between 
gender and attitudes toward enlargement. 
The foll
n age and support for EU enlargement in both countries. The literature on EU 
integration suggests that the younger portions of the society develop more favorable 
attitudes towards EU integration, when compared with the older portions of the society. 
Accordingly, similar tendencies are expected regarding the age and support for EU 
enlargement.  
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ended to support more 
the EU enlargement. This finding confirms our expectations that age is a significant 
rgement.  
tions of Media Objectivity 
Age was found to be a statistically significant factor in determining the support 
for EU enlargement in Britain (r = - 0.135; p < 0.005). There is a weak but negative 
relationship between age and support for EU enlargement (Please refer to Table E-7 in 
Appendix E).  
Senior British citizens had much higher opposition levels to enlargement. By 
contrast, the younger generations in the British society generally t
determinant of the support for the enla
In France too, the direction of the relationship between age and support for EU 
enlargement is negative (r = - 0.085; p < 0.05). But it is again a very weak relationship, 
and the distributions in each cell are too close to draw definitive conclusions. But we can 
see that the most ardent supporters of EU enlargement come from the 25-35 age-group in 
France. Once again, our expectations regarding the relationship between age and support 
for EU enlargement are confirmed (Please refer to Table E-8 in Appendix E). 
 
The Effects of Media Exposure and Percep
This section presents the cross-tabulation results for the media (newspaper or TV) 
consumption habits of people and their support for EU enlargement. This helps us 
determine differences in attitudes towards enlargement as a result of the exposure to 
different mediums. This analysis then proceeds with a description of the relationship 
between people’s perceptions of media objectivity and support for EU enlargement. 
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Coverage in Britain  
Newspaper as Information  
Source on EU 
Table 6-7. Cross-tabulation of Support for EU Enlargement and Exposure to Newspaper 
Attitudes towards 
Enlarge
Opposition to  39.3% 32.6% 253 
227 683 
ment No Yes Total N 
Enlargement 
Support for  
Enlargement 60.7% 67.4% 430 
Total N 456 
Source: Standard Eurobarometer 56 (Cell entries are column percentages) 
 
hose who read newspapers to gain information about EU affairs supported the 
ers. 
On the other hand, those who did not read newspapers opposed EU enlargement more 
than those who read newspapers. This finding supports the results suggested by the 
consequences of agenda setting section in this chapter.   
The relationship between people’s reliance on newspaper for EU affairs and their 
support for EU enlargement is again not statistically significant in the French case. 
Nevertheless, if we look at the results in Table 6-8, we can see that in France, similar to 
the case in Britain, those who read newspapers to gain information on EU developments 
Table 6-7 demonstrates that 67% of the British survey respondents who regarded 
newspapers as their information sources on EU supported the enlargement. 61% of those 
who did not regard newspapers as information sources on EU matters supported the 
enlargement. This finding is not statistically significant, but the descriptive statistics are 
vital for the purposes of this study.  
T
issue of EU enlargement less when compared with those who did not read newspap
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nd to support EU enlargement much less than those who do not read newspapers. These 
enlargement in both countries.    
ss-tabulation of Supp for EU Enlargement and Exposure to Newspaper 
verage in France  
Newspaper as Information  
Source on EU 
te
results may be attributable to the predominantly negative press coverage on EU 
 




ent Y Total 
369 
upport for  
Enlarge 53.6% 54.9% 434 
Total N 535 268 803 
Enlargem No es N 
Opposition to 
nlargement 46.4% 45.1% E
S
ment 
Source: Standard Eurobarometer 56 (Cell entries are column percentages) 
 
When compared to France, in Britain, among the opponents of EU enlargement, 
there was a bigger difference between the people who relied on newspapers to gather 
informa
ecially since this research could 
not con
tion on EU events and those who did not rely on newspapers for such 
information. This is probably due to the fact that the British newspapers generally cover 
EU affairs more negatively, when compared with the French newspapers.  
This analysis continues with an emphasis on the effects of reliance on TV for 
information on EU affairs. This is a useful exercise esp
duct a content analysis of TV news on enlargement. This exercise should help us 
in identifying possible differences (if any) between the effects of the TV and the 
newspaper exposure on the public attitudes towards the EU enlargement. 
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Coverage in Britain   
TV as Information  
Source on EU 
Table 6-9. Cross-tabulation of Support for EU Enlargement and Exposure to TV News 
Attitudes towards 
Enlargement No Yes Total N 
Opposition to 40.3% 33.5% 253 
Enlargement  66.5% 430 






urobarometer 56 tries a entages) 
wn in Table 6-9, t ish people who regarded TV as an information 
ent slightly more than those who did not 
 as a source. While, on the other hand, opposition to EU enlargem as less 
among people who watched TV to gain information on EU affairs, when compared to 
those w
 TV and press 
coverag
ally significant 
relationship (p < 0.001) between the support for EU enlargement and the reliance on TV 
 (Cell en re column perc
As sho he Brit
source on EU affairs supported the EU enlargem
regard TV ent w
ho did not watch TV.  
In other words, the opposition to enlargement decreased with exposure to TV 
coverage on EU. This observation implies that the TV news coverage on EU in Britain 
was primarily positive. However, this relationship is not statistically significant. As such, 
this analysis concludes that there were differences between the effects of
e on people’s attitudes on enlargement in Britain. These findings tentatively 
suggest that while TV exposure was likely to encourage support for the Eastern 
enlargement, press exposure was likely to discourage it.   
In order to test for cross-national differences in the effects of TV coverage, this 
analysis now turns to the French case. Table 6-10 depicts the statistic
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(r = 0.128).  
oss-tabulation
overage in Fr
TV as I ion  
Source on EU 




 of Support for EU Enlargem
ance   
ent and Exposure to TV News 
nformat 
Attitudes towards 





Opposition to 53.4% 40.4% 
ment 46.6% 59.6% 434 
Total N 343 460 803 
Source: Standard Eurobarometer 56 (Cell entries are column percentages) 
ent almost twice as much as those who did not rely on TV 
for suc
bjectivity and support for EU 
enlarge
 
In France, the respondents who relied on TV for gaining information on EU 
affairs supported EU enlargem
h information. This finding supports the tendencies outlined in the British case. 
TV has a more positive impact on the support for EU enlargement when compared with 
the press. 60% of those who regarded TV as information source supported EU 
enlargement; while 53% of those who did not regard TV as information source on EU 
opposed to enlargement.    
The following section presents the findings of the Pearson correlation analyses for 
the relationship between people’s perceptions of media o
ment. This study expects that when people think that the media are objective, they 
are more likely to support EU enlargement than not. It first starts with the results for the 
newspaper objectivity and then continues with the results for TV objectivity.  
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 newspaper coverage objectivity, respectively. In Britain, the relationships 
between the support for EU enlargement and people’s perceptions of media objectivity 
coefficients are identical for both relationships (r = 0.09). The results of these analyses are 
iptive purposes. In Britain, people give better objectivity scores to TV 
to newspapers. This illustrates the skepticism newspaper coverage raised 
itish public.  
 received better scores for objectivity 
er, unlike the 
case in Britain, in France, the relationships between the support for enlargement and 
percept
The Effects of Interest in the Enlargement Topic 
for EU enlargement and people’s level of interest in the topic (r = 0.265; p < 0.001). This 
Questions 9a and 9b of Standard EB 56 ask people about their perceptions of 
television and
(press and TV objectivity) are not statistically significant. The Pearson correlation 
important for descr
than they did 
ramong the B
Similar to the case in Britain, TV coverage
among the French people, when compared with the press coverage. Howev
ions of TV and press coverage objectivity are not so strong but are statistically 
significant (r = 0.171, p < 0.05; and, r = 0.211, p < 0.05 respectively). In other words, as 
the perceptions of media objectivity increased, French people became more likely to 
support EU enlargement than not. With these important results, this analysis now turns to 
an assessment of the effects of people’s interest in enlargement on their attitudes towards 
the topic. 
 
There is a statistically significant and positive relationship between the support 
160 
is in lin
re not interested in the topic (Please refer 
to Tabl
 the British context. As such, we can conclude that there is a very important 
positive relationship between people’s interest in enlargement and their attitudes toward 
t cross-national role of interest in 
enlargem
 
e with the expectations from the political communication literature: as political 
interest increases, so does the support for an issue.  
As expected, 77% of those who expressed their interest in EU enlargement 
supported. 51% of those who are not interested in EU enlargement still supported the 
issue. By contrast, among the opponents of enlargement, those who were interested in the 
topic were by far surpassed by those who were not interested in the topic. This again is in 
line with our expectations. People who showed interest to enlargement issue were more 
likely to support enlargement than those who we
e E-9 in Appendix E).  
Similar to the case in Britain, 67% of French respondents who expressed their 
interests in enlargement supported the EU enlargement. On the other hand, 63% of those 
who were not interested in enlargement opposed enlargement. People who were not 
interested in enlargement tended to oppose enlargement more than people who were 
interested in this development. In other words, interest in enlargement and support for the 
issue are dependent on each other (Please refer to Table E-10 in Appendix E).  
These findings are statistically significant (r = 0.302; p < 0.001) and confirm the 
findings in
enlargement. After confirming the importan
ent on the support for the issue, this section now turns to an analysis of the 
impact of political sophistication. 
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iterature on the role played by the 
interve
ut enlargement on the support for enlargement. 
is positive 
and sta
ed to be very well informed about the topic. Among 
those who supported enlargement, only seven people did so.  
The Effect of Political Sophistication 
There is little consensus in the priming l
ning variables of political knowledge, political awareness, or political 
sophistication (Van der Brug et al. 2007). This section seeks to shed new light on the 
effect of political sophistication on people’s attitudes towards EU enlargement.  
Question 35 in Standard EB 56 asks, “How well informed do you feel about 
enlargement?” Although it is a subjective measure based on a self-proclaimed measure, it 
still gives us an important opportunity to draw several conclusions regarding the effects 
of the level of information abo
As expected, Table E-11 in Appendix E shows that with an increase in the level of 
information on enlargement, people became more likely to support enlargement than not 
(even though the numbers are extremely low in the “very well” or “well-informed” 
categories). However, if we look at category 1, i.e. people who thought that they were 
“not at all informed” about enlargement, we can see that those who expressed opposition 
to enlargement were more than those who expressed support. This relationship 
tistically significant (r = 0.135; p < 0.005). 
In other words, in the British case, we can argue that political sophistication was 
an important element in determining people’s attitudes toward enlargement. Another 
substantial result from Table E-11 is the low number of people that expressed that they 
feel very well-informed about enlargement. Among those who were against enlargement 
(N = 247), only one person claim
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sults of the 
first-lev
 determine people’s attachment to the 
EU. Th
e who did not feel attached 
The tendencies in the French c
ship between political sophistication and support for enlargement is positive and 
statistically significant (r = 0.175; p < 0.001). With an increased political sophistication, 
people became more likely to support enlargement than not. But, 57% of those who 
thought that they were “not at all informed” about enlargement opposed the issu
 Table E-12 in Appendix E). 
An important cross-national comparative result emerges from this analysis. In 
France, the percentage of people who claimed to be “well” or “very well” informed about 
enlargement was slightly larger than the case in Britain. As suggested by the re
el agenda-setting analyses in Chapter 4, this finding may be due to the extensive 
coverage on enlargement in the French media. In other words, this broad coverage in the 
French press might have educated the French people about the different dimensions of 
the EU enlargement.  
 
The Effect of Attitudes towards the EU 
Question 47d of Standard EB 56 sought to
is analysis hypothesizes that people’s attachment level to EU would affect their 
attitudes toward the EU enlargement. It expects the support for EU enlargement to be 
greater among the people who expressed their attachments to the EU. 
In Britain, only 6.2% of the people expressed that they were closely attached to 
the EU. This proportion is less than half of the French percentage (Please refer to Tables 
E-13 and E-14 in Appendix E). Also, the percentage of peopl
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to EU i
s more than twice as much as the support for 
enlarge
among the people who did not feel attached to the EU, opposition 
to enlargement was much higher than the support for the topic. Again, among the French 




EU, the more likely they are to support the EU enlargement. In line with our 
n Britain was much more sizeable than was the case in France. This does not come 
as a surprise considering the fact that the British people are renowned for their Euro-
skepticism whereas the French people are famous for their Euro-enthusiasm. The 
question is: How do these findings relate to their support for EU enlargement? 
As expected, among the British people who did not feel attached to the EU, 
opposition to EU enlargement wa
ment. Additionally, among those who are “somehow” and “very attached” to the 
EU, support levels for EU enlargement were higher than opposition levels. Again, when 
people’s attachment levels were low, the proportions of opposition to EU enlargement 
were higher than the proportions of support for the topic. As such, this analysis concludes 
that there is a strong, positive, and statistically significant relationship between people’s 
attachment to the EU and their support for enlargement (r = 0.339; p < 0.001).  
In France too, 
people who expressed that they are o
ent was higher than its support. However, among the people who were 
“somehow” and “very attached” to the EU, support levels for EU enlargement were 
higher than opposition levels. These results point to a strong positive correlation (r = 
0.397) between the level of attachment to the EU and the support for EU enlargem
lly significant at the 0.001 level (Please refer to Table E-14).  
In addition, Question 53 of Standard EB 56 asked people about their favorability 






expectations, the results of the Pearson’s r correlations in both the British and French 
cases suggest that there is a strong, positive, and statistically significant relationship 
between people’s favorability towards the EU and their support for the enlargement (r = 
0.480, p < 0.05; and r = 0.494, p < 0.01, respectively). In other words, as fa
s the EU increased, the support for EU enlargement also increased in both France 
and Britain.  
This part provided individual-level bivariate analyses for the relationships 
between several independent variables and people’s support for EU enlargement. The 
following part conducts an individual-level multivariate public opinion analysis in France 
to explore the factors that are involved in determining public support for EU enlargement. 
 
An Individual-Level Multivariate Data Analysis in France, 2001 
Following an analysis of the individual-level bivariate relationships between 
several independent variables and the support for EU enlargement, the next step in this 
research is to determine which of these factors best account for the likelihood of 
supporting the EU enlargement. As such, this research continues with a multivariate 
analysis that illustrates the individual-level dynamics of the interaction between these 
independent variables and the support for EU enlargement in France.3  
It conducts an individual-level analysis on public opinion to explore the 
interaction of different factors in determining the overall public support fo
r words, it aims to provide a better understanding of what other independent 
                                                 
3 A multivariate analysis could not be conducted on the British sample in year 2001 due to the large 
number of missing values in the British public opinion data. 
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rpreting the results of a logistic regression, the odds ratios are usually used 
to quan
 
alysis are: gender 
(coded 
the continent, on peace, on the elimination of conflicts, on the fight against terrorism, on 
variables are involved in the EU enlargement public opinion formation process. A 
logistic regression is conducted on the French sample to determine the contribution of a 
number of independent variables in the prediction of the dependent variable, support for 
EU enlargement. In other words, this analysis conducts binary logit on the French sample 
of the Standard EB 56 data in order to model the probability of support for enlargement. 
In inte
tify the effect of significant independent variables on the dependent variable. As a 
rule, odds ratios less than 1 correspond to decreases and odds ratios more than 1 
correspond to increases in odds. Odds ratios close to 1 indicate that unit changes in that 
independent variable do not affect the dependent variable. 
The Dependent Variable 
As in the previous analyses in this chapter, the dependent variable is the support 
for EU enlargement, a dichotomous variable (with support coded as 1 and no support 
coded as 0).  
 
The Independent Variables 
The independent variables employed in this individual-level an
as female); age; newspaper exposure; TV exposure; perceptions of objectivity of 
TV; perceptions of newspaper objectivity; people’s interest in enlargement; political 





Of the 32 independent variables included in this analysis, only the statistically 
significant and some key ones are presented in Table 6-11. As such, Table 6-11 suggests 
odel for explaining an individual’s support level for enlargement. In other words, it 
presents the results for a general model of public support for EU enlargement in France. 
1 2 3 4
β5 * Exposure to TV + β6 * Interest in Enlargement + β7 * Political 
 + β8 * Impact on Workings of the EU + β9 * Impact on Companies + β10 * 
pact on Immigration + β11 * Impact on EU Power + β12 * Attachment to EU + β13 * 
avorability towards EU 
in the world. 
economic growth, on employment, on the quality of life, on EU’s power in the world, on 
economies of the new members, on EU decision-making; on the variety of products, on 
national companies, on the role of France within the EU; on quality of food, on 
environment, on immigration, on the EU power vis-à-vis the US, on EU’s relations with 
the citizens; people’s attachment to town; their attachment to region; their attachment to










Table 6-11 presents the predicted change in odds for EU enlargement support for 
a unit increase in the corresponding independent variable, such as gender, age, reliance 
on newspapers, reliance on TV news, interest in enlargement, political sophistication, 
attachment to EU, favorability towards the EU, and perceived impact of enlargement on 
the internal workings of EU, on national companies, on immigration, and on EU’s power 
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Table 6-11. A Model of Public Support for EU Enlargement in France, 2001 
 French Support for EU Enlargement, 2001 
Gender 0.70; 2.01 
  
 (0.48) 
Exposure to Newspaper Coverage  - 2.47; 0.08* 
  
Exposure to TV Coverage 1.326; 3.76 
 (1.45) 
  
 in Enlargement 3.02; 20.51** 
 (1.24) 
  
Political Sophistication - 1.35; 0.26* 







Constant - 10.98; 0.00*** 
  
 (0.98) 










Easier for Others to Settle in - 0.57; 0.57 
 (1.75) 
  
EU Stronger than US - 1.34; 0.26 
 
ent to EU 1.02; 2.77 





Entries are log-odds; and odds rati
***p < 0.01; **
o coefficients statistics. Standard errors in parentheses. 
p < 0.05; *p < 0.10 (two-tailed tests) 
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 6-11 is that 
there is a statistically significant bu o 
newspaper coverage and the support for EU enlargement. This means that for every one 
unit increase in exposure to newspaper coverage, the odds of supporting the EU 
enlargement (vs. no support) decrease by a factor of 0.08 (p < 0.10). This finding 
provides limited support for the relationships identified by the previous cross-tabulation 
analyses on the individual-level bivariate relationships be aper exposure and 
support for EU enlargement in France (Please refer to Tables 6-1, 6-3, and 6-8). 
However, this relationship is relatively weak.  
d increasing exposure to newspaper coverage on EU affairs, 
they became less likely to support enlargement. This supports the “negativity-
e ectiveness” thesis noted earlier in this chapter. The tone of the media coverage is a 
v nt of the support for EU enlarge rtant implication 
o inding is that the journalists need to pay extra caution to the content of their 
reporting on EU affairs since it has vast consequences on the gap between elites and 
p e explained in Chapter 7.  
The relationship between the TV coverage and enlargement support is positive, 
but not statistically significant. As Table 6-11 displa h one unit increase in 
exposure to TV coverage, the odds of supporting the EU e rease by a factor 
of 3.76. This comparison between exposure to newspaper and TV coverage supports the 
previous findings in this chapter (Please refer to Table 6-1
V coverage tends to be more supportive of the EU enlargement, people 
 the topic. On the other hand, since 
The most important empirical finding presented by the model in Table




ery significant determina ment. An impo
f this f





exposed to TV coverage are also more supportive of
169 
the pre
represents a stronger relationship than the 
relation
nlargement increase substantially.  
osition on issues regarding 
Europe
ss coverage is relatively negative, people who are exposed to newspaper coverage 
are more skeptical towards the issue than not. Future studies should content analyze both 
the TV news coverage and the press coverage of European affairs to explore the 
differences in media effects on public opinion between these two different outlets.   
Another significant finding indicated by Table 6-11 is that, as expected, as the 
level of interest in enlargement increases, people’s likelihood of supporting enlargement 
also increases. The relationship is strong, positive, and statistically significant. For every 
one unit increase in the interest in enlargement, the odds of supporting this development 
increase by a factor of 20.51 (p < 0.05). This 
ship between the newspaper exposure and the support for EU enlargement. 
What is more surprising is that for every one unit increase in the thoughts about 
the positive impact of enlargement on the workings of the EU, the odds of supporting 
enlargement increase by a factor of 130.94 (p < 0.01). This demonstrates the strongest 
statistically significant relationship in this multivariate analysis. Put more specifically, 
when people’s thoughts on the positive implications of enlargement on the internal 
workings of EU increase, the odds of supporting e
This observation signifies that people consider the benefit of enlargement for the 
Union (instead of the benefit of enlargement for themselves) when they consider their 
support for EU enlargement. It is very counterintuitive, since most works in the EU 
integration literature suggest that people engage in cost-benefit analyses of the impact of 
integration on their own lives when they come up with their p






in be due to the fact that this analysis does not take into account 
the more recent developments in public attitudes towards enlargement. This study expects 
This unexpected finding may be due to the fact that the public opinion data for 
this analysis is derived from the year 2001. As the enlargement issue received more 
public attention, people might have started to think about enlargement more in line with 
the expectations of the cost-benefit analysis argument. Put more precisely, sinc
e on enlargement became more comprehensive as the enlargement date 
approached, people might increasingly have started to realize the impact of this 
development on their own lives, and hence, based their decisions to support enlargement 
on considerations regarding the consequences of this development for their own lives 
(rather than consequences for the EU itself). 
The results of this logistic regression analysis also point to a strong relatio
n the support for EU enlargement and another perceived consequence of EU 
enlargement. This time it is the perceived benefit of enlargement on national companies. 
There is a positive and statistically significant relationship between the perceived benefit 
for national companies and the support for enlargement (p < 0.05). For every one unit 
increase in the perception that there will be increased benefits for the national companies, 
the odds of supporting the EU enlargement increase by a factor of 18.7.  
As the analysis illustrates, the perceptions of positive consequences of EU are 
likely to increase the support for enlargement among the public. However, the two 
negative consequences displayed in Table 6-11 are found to be statistically insignificant 
for determining the decision to support enlargement. These are the impact of enlargement 
on increased immigration and on the power of the EU vis-à-vis the US in the world. 
These findings may aga
171 
an incr
s a negative and statistically significant 
relation
ease in the attention to negative aspects of EU enlargement as the enlargement day 
approaches, yet it is too early in the time frame to observe any such changes in the 
Standard EB 56 public opinion data.       
On the other hand, as hypothesized, there is a very strong, positive and 
statistically significant relationship between favorability to the EU and the support for EU 
enlargement. For every one unit increase in favorability, the odds of supporting the EU 
enlargement (vs. not supporting) increase by a factor of 2.30 (p < 0.01).  
One of the most unforeseen and contradictory results from the multivariate 
analysis is that political sophistication ha
ship with the support for EU enlargement. This finding is inconsistent with the 
individual-level bivariate tendencies outlined in Table E-12.  
The results of the individual-level analysis suggest that for every one unit increase 
in self-declared political knowledge on enlargement, the odds of supporting the EU 
enlargement (vs. not supporting) decrease by a factor of 0.26 (p < 0.10). This finding is 
particularly striking since we would expect people who know more on the EU 
enlargement to be more likely to support the issue (than not support it).  
One reason for this negative relationship may be that this independent variable is 
not based on people’s actual level of knowledge on enlargement, but their self-suggested 
level of knowledge on the topic. Even if respondents may claim that they are 
knowledgeable on the enlargement issue, in reality, they may not have been as well-
informed as they have suggested. 
Another explanation for this negative relationship may be that as people become 
more educated on the specific aspects of the topic, they may become alienated from 
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al and legal immigration in their countries, they 
may be
ms the previous 
results 
s suggest that gender, age, 
exposu
 companies, and 
favorab
illustrated by the model in Table 6-11, there were a 
number
enlargement. This has something to do with the realization of several negative 
consequences of enlargement. If people learn that enlargement will cause increased 
unemployment as well as increased illeg
come more likely to oppose it. Further analysis should be conducted to come to a 
decisive conclusion on this significant relationship.   
The gender variable has an odds ratio coefficient of 2.01, which signifies that 
women are more likely than men to support EU enlargement. This confir
on the relationship between gender and support for EU enlargement. However, 
this is not a statistically significant relationship. Furthermore, the age variable does not 
seem to have any discernable effect on the support for EU enlargement (Exp(B) = 0.95). 
In sum, the results of this logistic regression analysi
re to TV coverage, considerations about immigration, power of the EU vis-à-vis 
the US, and personal attachment to EU are not statistically significant variables in 
determining the support for EU enlargement in France. On the other hand, exposure to 
newspaper coverage, political sophistication, interest in enlargement, projections of 
enlargement’s impact on the workings of EU and benefit for national
ility towards the EU are statistically significant variables for predicting the French 
support for enlargement in 2001.  
As such, while the current analysis concludes that print media has a negative and 
statistically significant influence on the public support for EU enlargement, this influence 
is found to be quite limited. As 
 of other significant variables that determined people’s support for EU 
enlargement.  
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is only natural to expect significant 
change
Individ
ns on the validity of priming thesis.  
However, as explained earlier, these results should be treated with caution since 
they only account for the public support for enlargement in 2001, three years before the 
enlargement date. Furthermore, there were only 112 observations for the French sample 
in 2001. This was due to a large number of missing values (“don’t know”s) in the 
Standard EB 56 data. In the course of three years, it 
s in public opinion regarding the enlargement topic with an increased attention to 
the topic by the media. The remaining sections in this chapter conduct individual-level 
multivariate analysis on both the British and the French samples using Flash EB 132.2 
survey data in order to provide a more recent analysis of developments in public opinion.   
 
ual-Level Multivariate Data Analyses in Britain and France, 2002 
This section presents the findings from the analyses of the relationships between 
people’s expectations regarding the consequences of EU enlargement and their attitudes 
towards enlargement in Britain and France in year 2002. Besides its more up-to-date 
account of changes in public opinion on enlargement, this analysis further helps us 
determine which consequence(s) receive(s) the highest attention among the British and 
French publics during the public opinion formation process. As such, the results of this 
analysis have important implicatio
  
The Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable is the support for EU enlargement, a dichotomous 
variable. Support for enlargement is coded as 1 and no support is coded as 0.  
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trafficking, on unemployment, on social welfare, and, on culture.    
Results for the British Sample 
Of the 19 independent variables included in this analysis, only the statistically 
significant and some key ones are presented in Table 6-12. As such, Table 6-12 suggests 
a model for explaining an individual’s support level for enlargement in Britain. 
 
Support for EU enlargement = β1 + β2 * Enlargement awareness + β3 * Personal 
ost of 
6 7 β8 * 
Impact on the expansion of markets + β9 * Impact on culture  
 
Table 6-12 presents the predicted change in odds for support for EU enlargement 
for a un
The Independent Variables 
The independent variables employed in this individual-level analysis are: gender 
(with female coded as 1); awareness of EU enlargement; perceptions of national 
importance of EU enlargement; perceptions of personal importance of EU enlargement; 
perceptions of enlargement as moral duty; perceived impact of enlargement on peace, on 
EU’s power in the world, on the cost of enlargement for the country, on the role of 
country within the EU, on EU decision-making, on EU’s relations with the citizens, on 
expansion of markets, on immigration, on illegal immigration, on crime and drug 
 
Importance of EU enlargement + β4 * EU’s power in the world + β5 * C
enlargement + β  * Impact on UK’s role within the EU + β * Historically natural + 
it increase in the corresponding independent variable. 
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able 6-12. A Model of Public Support for EU Enlargement in Britain, 2002 
 
 




Awareness of EU Enlargement 0.925; 2.521*** 
  
 (0.172) 
Personal Importance of EU Enlargement 0.316; 1.372** 
  
 (0.328) 
The Cost of EU Enlargement - 0.917; 0.400** 
  
Impact on UK’s Role within the EU - 0.551; 0.577* 
 (0.285) 
  
 the EU 1.092; 2.979*** 
 (0.276) 
  




Constant - 1.245; 0.288* 
 (0.263) 
Importance of EU Enlargement for the UK - 0.116; 0.891 
  
 (0.154) 
Positive Impact on EU’s Role in the World 0.742; 2.101** 
  
 (0.343) 
Historically Natural to Expand
 (0.391) 





Entries are log-odds; and odds ratio coefficients statistics. Standard errors in parentheses. 
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10 (two-tailed tests) 
as the level of enlargement 
awareness increases, people’s likelihood of supporting enlargement also increases. The 
 
One significant finding indicated by Table 6-12 is that 
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t increase in 
the interest in enlargement, the odds of suppor r 
of 2.521 (p < 0.01).  
Another notable finding suggested by the results of this analysis is that in Britain, 
p  enlargement for their country did not play a 
statistically significant role in affecting their likelihood of upporting the issue. On the 
other hand, people’s perceptions of the personal importance of EU enlargement played an 
i or the issue. F it increase in 
the perception of enlargement as personally significant, the odds of supporting this 
development increase by a factor of 1.372 (p < 0.05). It is very natural to observe this 
relationship, since as noted earlier people have a tenden  cost-benefit 
analyses when they come up with their attitudes towards cer
For every one unit increase in British people’s expectations of a positive impact 
o ds of supporting enl  by a factor 
of 2.101 (p < 0.05). This means that if people believe that enlargement will contribute to 
the power of the EU in the world, they become more likely to support this development.  
displayed by Table 6-12, when people think that the EU enlargement will be 
costly, their likelihood of supporting enlargement decreases by a factor of 0.400 (p < 
0.01). Also, if when the British people think that enlargement will make the UK less 
g this issue decreases by a factor of 
0.577 (p < 0.1).  
The results of this logistic regression analysis point to a strong but negative 
relationship between the British support for EU enlargement and the perceived impact of 
relationship is strong, positive and statistically significant. For every one uni
ting this development increase by a facto
eople’s perceptions of the importance of EU
 s
mportant role in determining their support f or every one un
cy to engage in
tain policy issues.  
f enlargement on EU’s power, the od argement increase
As 
important within the EU, their likelihood of supportin
177 
bably due to the concerns the British people had regarding possible 
effects 
ip in this 
multiva
Results for the French Sample 
significant and some key ones are presented in Table 6-13. As such, Table 6-13 suggests 
a model for explaining an individual’s support level for enlargement in France in 2002. It 
presents the predicted change in odds for support for EU enlargement for a unit increase 
in the corresponding independent variable. 
enlargement on culture. For every one unit increase in the perceived impact of 
enlargement on culture, the odds of supporting enlargement decrease by a factor of 0.363 
(p < 0.01). This is pro
of post-enlargement immigration waves and other negative consequences of 
enlargement on their culture and society.  
Furthermore, as expected, Table 6-12 shows that people’s perceptions of the 
enlargement’s effect on the expansion of markets have the highest impact on people’s 
support for enlargement in Britain. The expansion of markets has been one of the 
components of the economic consequences of the EU enlargement. For every one unit 
increase in people’s perceptions of the positive impact of enlargement on the expansion 
of markets, their odds of supporting enlargement increase by a factor of 4.480 (p < 0.01). 
This is by far the strongest statistically significant and positive relationsh
riate analysis. This finding implies that the anticipated economic consequences 
were vital when the British people developed their attitudes towards the EU enlargement; 
and, supports the findings of the second-level agenda-setting analysis in Britain.  
 
Of the 19 independent variables included in this analysis, only the statistically 
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Table 6-13. A Model of Public Support for EU Enlargement in France, 2002 
 
 
French Support for EU Enlargement, 
2003 





Personal Importance of EU Enlargement 0.326; 1.385** 
  
 (0.226) 
EU’s Power in the World 0.630; 1.877** 
  
 (0.224) 
Impact on the EU’s Proximity to Citizens - 0.608; 0.545** 
  
 (0.226) 
Impact on the Expansion of Markets 0.472; 1.604* 
 (0.260) 
  




Constant - 1.675; 0.187** 
 
 (0.217) 
National Importance of EU Enlargement 
 (0.138) 
Moral Duty to Expand the EU 0.730; 2.076*** 
  
 (0.238) 
Impact on France’s Role within the EU - 0.810; 0.445*** 
  
 (0.232) 
Historically Natural to Expand the EU 0.912; 2.489*** 
  
 






Entries are log-odds; and odds ratio coefficients statistics. Standard errors in parentheses. 
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10 (two-tailed tests) 
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As can be seen in Table 6-13, the mode  
is as follows:  
 
S nder + β3 * Nation  EU 
enlargement + β4 * Personal Importance of EU enlargement + ral Duty to Enlarge 
+ 6 * Impact on EU’s power in the world + β7 * Impact on the Country’s role within the 
E  the citizens + β9 * Historically natural + β10 * 
Impact on the expansion of markets + β11 * Impact on Social Welfare + β12 * Impact on 
Culture  
In France, in 2002, gender is found to be a statistically significant factor 
determining the likelihood of support for EU enlargement. P pecifically, women 
h  EU enlargement,  men in 
France (p < 0.10). This tendency was similar for the French sample in 2001. But the 
results were not statistically significant at that time.  
France, there was tatistically 
significant relationship between the anticipated personal importance of enlargement and 
people’s likelihood of supporting the enlargement issue. For every one unit increase in 
the perceived personal significance of EU enlargement, the odds of supporting EU 
enlargement increase by a factor of 1.385 (p < 0.05). Furthermore, as in the British case, 
the French people’s perceptions of the impact of enlarge  the expansion of 
m ntributed to the support for enlargement. Again, as in the British case, for 
every one unit increase in people’s perceptions of the impact of enlargement on culture, 
the likelihood of supporting enlargement decreased significantly.  
 
l supported for the French sample in 2002
upport for EU enlargement = β1 + β2 * Ge al Importance of
 β5 * Mo
 β
U + β8 * Impact on the EU’s proximity to
 
ut more s
ave more likelihood of supporting the when compared to




owever, unlike the British sample, the results of this logistic regression in 
French
onal importance of enlargement and support for enlargement. This 




significance of this EU affair personally.  
of EU enlargement as 
moral duty and historically natural, and the impact of enlargement on EU’s power in the 
H
 sample point to a statistically significant and positive relationship between the 
perceived nati
French people form their opinions on enlargement. When determining their opinio
enlargement, the French sample emphasized the importance of enlargement both
personally and for their country, while the British sample only considered the perceive
Furthermore, the French people’s concerns about the impact of enlargement on 
social welfare were found to decrease their likelihood of supporting the EU enlargement. 
For every one unit increase in people’s perceptions of the impact of enlargement on the 
welfare system in France, the odds of supporting the enlargement decrease by a factor of 
0.564 (p < 0.01).  
Most importantly, confirming the results of the second-level agenda-setting 
analysis in France, among the three main consequences of EU enlargement, the French 
sample is found to pay most attention to the political consequences of EU enlargement. 
As illustrated by Table 6-13, people’s perceptions of EU enlargement as a moral duty, the 
impact of enlargement on EU’s power in the world, impact of enlargement on France’s 
role within the EU, impact of enlargement on EU’s proximity to citizens, perceptions of 
enlargement as historically natural were all identified as statistically significant factors in 
determining the support for EU enlargement.  
Among these independent variables, people’s perceptions 
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world 
 citizens were found to decrease the likelihood 
of supp
political consequences of the addition of ten new members that are 
sympat
ent in 2002. In other words, the 
finding
were found to increase the likelihood of support for enlargement. Especially, 
people’s perceptions of enlargement as a historically natural development had the 
strongest positive relationship with people’s likelihood of supporting the EU 
enlargement. For every one unit increase in French people’s perceptions of enlargement 
as a historically natural development, the odds of supporting enlargement increase by a 
factor of 2.489 (p < 0.01).  
However, people’s perceptions of enlargement’s negative effects on both France’s 
role within the EU and proximity of EU to
ort for enlargement. To illustrate, for every one unit increase in people’s concerns 
about a possible negative impact of enlargement on France’s role within the EU, the 
French people’s odds of supporting enlargement decrease by a factor of 0.445 (p < 0.01). 
This finding effectively underlies the sensitivities of the French people regarding the 
possible negative 
hetic to US foreign policy preferences.  
Additionally, people’s concerns about enlargement’s potential negative effects on 
the proximity of EU to masses led to a decreased likelihood of support for enlargement 
among the French public. For every one unit increase in the concerns regarding this 
particular political consequence, the odds of French support for EU enlargement decrease 
by a factor of 0.545 (p < 0.05). These statistically significant and strong findings indicate 
that the projected political consequences of EU enlargement were notable when the 
French people formed their opinion about enlargem
s of the second-level agenda-setting analysis are confirmed in this section.  
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s of the media on public opinion. They suggest that the daily 
newspa
 weight assigned to these particular 
conseq
 at the 
dividual level.  
CONCLUSION  
This chapter was primarily interested in identifying the factors that are influential 
in determining the public support for EU enlargement. In line with the recent 
developments in the agenda setting research, this chapter first dealt with the 
consequences of agenda-setting. The results presented in this chapter illustrate strong 
agenda-setting consequence
per readership has a strong influence on people’s attitudes toward enlargement. 
The results presented in this chapter also suggest that people are more sensitive to the 
salience of negative information than to that of non-negative information in the press 
coverage of enlargement.  
Regarding the consequences of agenda setting, this chapter also conducted a 
priming analysis. The findings of the priming analysis suggest that the public attention to 
different consequences of enlargement (as determined by the press attention to these 
subtopics) is influential in determining the
uences by people when they form their opinions on the EU enlargement. The 
issues of immigration in Britain and unemployment in France perfectly illustrate the 
validity of the priming argument.  
Besides testing the effect of print media exposure on people’s support for 
enlargement, this chapter also analyzed the effects of age, gender, TV exposure, political 
sophistication, as well as different attitudes towards the consequences of EU enlargement 
on public support for EU enlargement. In that sense, this is one of the pioneering projects 
that specifically analyze the determinants of public support for EU enlargement
in
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ded that people’s considerations about the effects of enlargement on their 
daily l
r, this relationship was not statistically significant in either 
case. F
 are also found to be significantly correlated with the 
support
It conclu
ives played a major role in determining their attitudes toward enlargement. 
Regarding the French public support for EU enlargement, the results in this chapter draw 
attention to a significant impact of the concerns regarding unemployment as well as legal 
and illegal immigration-related consequences of enlargement. Furthermore, French 
concerns regarding the immigration-related consequences of EU enlargement were 
paralleled in the British public opinion formation process. 
Both in France and in Britain, those who read newspapers to gain information on 
EU developments tended to support EU enlargement much less than those who did not 
read newspapers. Howeve
indings in this part also tentatively suggest that while TV exposure encouraged 
support for EU enlargement, press exposure discouraged it. These tendencies are 
confirmed at the individual-level analysis as well. 
The perceptions of media objectivity were also positively correlated with the 
enlargement support in both countries (yet, the results were only statistically significant 
in France). Interest in the enlargement issue, political sophistication, personal attachment 
to EU, and favorability towards EU
 for enlargement in both countries.  
Following the bivariate analysis of the relationship between different independent 
variables and the support for EU enlargement at the individual-level, this chapter further 
concluded with an individual-level multivariate analysis, in order to get a better sense of 
the influence of various independent variables that may affect people’s support for the 
EU enlargement. 
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 conducted by future studies 
regardi
 support for enlargement.  
ment. As such, this relationship commands 
further 
hat the British people were more prone to emphasizing the economic 
Exposure to newspaper coverage was found to have a negative relationship with 
the support for EU enlargement. This again supports the negativity-effectiveness thesis 
suggested by an earlier finding in this chapter. 
The comparison between exposure to newspaper and TV coverage supports the 
previous bivariate findings in this research. Since TV coverage tended to be more 
supportive of the EU enlargement, people exposed to TV coverage were also found to be 
more supportive of the topic. Further analysis should be
ng the differences in the effects of these different mediums on public attitudes.   
Furthermore, confirming the results of the bivariate analysis in this chapter, an 
individual’s level of interest is again found to be positively correlated with his or her 
likelihood of supporting enlargement. Also validating the previous results presented in 
this chapter, this research found a very strong, positive and statistically significant 
relationship between favorability to the EU and the
However, the individual-level results regarding the effect of political 
sophistication on the support for enlargement challenged the bivariate results on the 
topic. Put more specifically, the results of the multivariate individual-level analysis 
suggested a statistically significant but a negative relationship between political 
sophistication and support for EU enlarge
analysis. Finally, as mentioned earlier, the results presented in this chapter should 
be treated with caution since they are derived from a public opinion survey conducted 
three and two years prior to the enlargement date. 








uences of EU enlargement when developing their opinions towards enlargement. 
Similarly, our findings regarding the French sample suggest that the French people 
emphasized the political consequences of EU enlargem
s on enlargement at the end of year 2002.  
The results presented in the empirical chapters of this research are very important 
for the purposes of this research. But without contextualization, they do not add much 
clarity to the interactions between the media, the masses and the elites. Hence, in order to 
provide some background for the empirical findings presented in Chapters 4, 5, and 6, th
ng chapter reviews the political climate in Britain and France during the EU 
enlargement debates.   
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 Chapter 7: The Connection between Elites, Public Opinion, and the 
 movement towards greater European 
integra
entirely elite-driven exercise that fails to engage the mass public 
altogether. Hence, “democratic deficit” and “lack of transparency” are familiar 
expressions in academic and media commentaries on the shortcomings of the EU. 
The interaction between the public opinion, the mass media and the political elites 
is usually ignored by the political communication scholars. Scholars are still in the 
process of defining how public opinion intersects with the European Community’s 
policymaking process.  
After confirming the media effects on public opinion through empirical analyses 
in the previous chapters, this research now proceeds with searching for answers to the 
following questions: Is there a direct connection between what the public thinks and what 
policymakers do? What role do the media play in this process?  
The current chapter adds some flesh to the empirical findings presented in this 
research. It is essential to review the political climate in Britain and France during the 
debates regarding the Eastern enlargement in order to provide some background for the 
Media in Britain and France 
European Union, from the beginning, has been an elite-driven project. European 
elites have historically and typically favored the
tion. Indeed, it is empirically undeniable that most of the time they have done so in 
disregard of public opinion.  
It is not uncommon to see European elites initiating EU projects even when most 
of the public is against such moves. As the failure of the ratification of the European 
Constitution by the French and Dutch people in 2005 demonstrates, the EU runs the risk 
of ending up being an 
187 
empirical analysis conducted in this research. Through case studies of British and French 
policies on EU enlargemen coverage, public opinion, 
and pol




c positions British and French governments staked out with 
regards
t, this chapter delineates how media 
icymaking intersect with one another.  
Recent studies in agenda setting theory broadened the scope of agendas beyond 
measuring the public and media agendas to include policymakers (Rogers and Dearing 
1988, 1996). As Rogers and D
ition among issue proponents to gain the attention of media professionals, the 
public, and policy elites.” Analysis in this chapter aims to broaden our understanding of 
the flow of information and the critical linkages between the media, political elites, and 
the masses, the center of the democratic process.  
The period under study in this analysis is replete with exciting developments in 
both Britain and France. As such, this chapter supplies some point of referen
 to the reader. This chapter places the EU enlargement debate in political context 
to provide an in-depth examination of the relationship between the people, the media and 
official policies of Britain and France on EU enlargement. It also examines the 
development of specifi
 to enlargement from 2002 to 2004.  
France and Britain are two major actors within the EU that are well-known for 
their different approaches towards the EU project. Britain is infamous for its Euro-
skepticism, while France is renowned for its Euro-enthusiasm.  
As Moravcsik (1993) asserts, the big three actors in the EU – the UK, France and 
Germany, seeks to shape EU development to serve “rationally constructed state 
preferences.” As explained in the remainder of this chapter, this line of reasoning works 
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 an ambivalent attitude whereas the British 
govern
ter points to the important role played 
by the m
 the European continent that remained 




well in providing a general outline for the responses of British and French governments 
on the issue of EU enlargement. As a consequence, regarding the issue of EU 
enlargement, the French government has taken
ment has generally been in favor of it.  
In contrast, the majority of both the British and French publics were against the 
Eastern enlargement of the EU in May 2004. This has important implications on the 
democratic deficit debate in the EU. Since the legitimacy of elite actions depends upon 
the level of public support for European integration processes (see Rohrschneider 2000 
and Meyer 1999), this chapter explores the interaction between the elites, the media and 
public opinion on Eastern enlargement. This chap
edia in affecting both the public opinion and actual policy.  
 
THE EASTERN ENLARGEMENT OF THE EU: AN OVERVIEW 
The Eastern enlargement of the EU in 2004 was the fifth and the largest 
enlargement round in the history of the EU. It marked a very important achievement in 
European history, symbolically as well as politically. Put more specifically, this round of 
EU enlargement signified the reunification of
Cold War era.  
The ten new Member States constituted a large addition of landmass to the EU.
Moreover, with the Eastern enlargement, the EU population increased by 74.1 m
 the Central and Eastern European countries. The EU after the 
Eastern enlargement had approximately 450 million citizens. Differences in incomes per 
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gly manifest. 
date approached, the 
affected publics turned increasingly against Eastern enlargement.  
15 Member States did not 
hold referenda on the issue of Eastern enlarg
 a delimiting factor, determining the speed of 
the even
capita between the old members of the EU and the new members were much larger than 
in previous enlargement episodes. Since this issue had many implications on the lives of 
people living in the EU15, throughout the debates on EU enlargement, the cleavage 
between the elite and general public was strikin
Due to the increased media attention allocated to the enlargement topic and its 
consequences, this issue has become more “visible,” and hence, more liable to arouse 
public disquiet over time. Needless to say, it sparked contentious public debate in both 
the British and French publics. As shown by the empirical analyses in this research, two 
subjects – immigration and unemployment – especially dominated the enlargement 
debate in Britain and France. Media started to increasingly put economic problems at the 
top of the issue list in both Britain and France. As the enlargement 
Unlike in the case of the European Constitution, the EU
ement. Although it is the elite opinion that 
ultimately determined this particular EU policy, we cannot say that public was not 
assigned a role in the EU enlargement process.  
In democracies, public opinion sets parameters on policymaking. The argument in 
this chapter is that public opinion served as
tual integration of the new Member States into the EU. While EU enlargement 
was preordained, the general public in Britain and France still had to be convinced that 
their general interests were being addressed. As the European publics became more 
aware of the impact of European integration on their lives, they demanded recognition for 
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icular industrial sectors, and 
effects 
e in Britain and France 
during 
 to the following questions: How did the 
media 
their concerns. At this point, people’s sensitivities about the issue of immigration played 
a constraining role on the actions of European policymakers.  
Immigration was, and still is, a very controversial issue in both the British and the 
French societies. Furthermore, references to problems of part
of enlargement on markets were fairly frequent in both countries. The balance 
generally tilted in the negative direction when the economic and social consequences of 
EU enlargement were discussed in Britain and France. This is the reason why the British 
and the French public opinion usually had the highest opposition levels to enlargement 
among the EU15 members. The high salience of immigration-related and economic 
concerns during the enlargement debates in both Britain and France justifies a detailed 
look at these issues.  
Accordingly, this chapter contemplates the political climat
the debates on Eastern enlargement. The analysis in this chapter tracks policy 
developments that might be attributable to increased public concerns on several 
enlargement-related issues, which emerged subsequent to an increased print media 
attention to these issues. It seeks to find answers
affect public opinion and official policy on EU enlargement? How did public 
opinion affect government positions?  
 
A CASE STUDY OF BRITISH OFFICIAL POSITION ON EASTERN ENLARGEMENT 
Britain has always been regarded as “unique” in having a continuing aversion or 
skepticism towards the European integration (Bulmer 1992, 5). Wallace (1995) refers to 
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ent, among other key EU 
develop
 joined the EC in 1973. Immediately after its accession to the EU, 
Britain
oric on the EU changed greatly. After coming to 
power, the Labour government has repeatedly emphasized its determination to establish a 
tioned 
the necess
public, this rhetorical change failed to be translated into action.  
this as “British singularity.” Britain was “reluctant” to become a part of the Economic 
and Monetary Union, the Euro, and the Schengen Agreem
ments. The centralist structure of Britain, its late accession to the EU, and its long 
history of parliamentary sovereignty render the handling of European integration 
complicated.  
In 1950, Britain turned down the chances of becoming a member of the European 
Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). In 1955, Britain declined the invitation of ECSC 
members for the establishment of a customs union. In 1961 and 1967, the British 
application for entry to the European Community was declined by De Gaulle. Once De 
Gaulle retired in 1969, the way was finally open for the British membership. 
Consequently, Britain
 requested renegotiation of its entry terms. After renegotiation, Britain held a 
referendum in 1975 on whether to withdraw from the EC. British people voted to remain.  
Under the Conservative Prime Ministers Margaret Thatcher and John Major, its 
minimalist attitude towards European integration distanced Britain from the rest of the 
EU. Although one should note that under Prime Minister Major, the British policy toward 
the EU was less Euro-skeptic than it was during the Thatcher administration.  
With Tony Blair, Britain’s rhet
more positive relationship with the EU. Prime Minister Blair has repeatedly men
ity for Britain to locate itself “at the heart of the continent” and be a 
“passionate European.” But due to the strength of Euro-skepticism among the British 
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Additionally, the rift between the UK and continental Europe became wider due 
to Britain’s ardent support for the George W. Bush Administration’s foreign policy 
initiatives – the War on Terrorism and military intervention in Iraq. These developments 
exposed severe tensions between the UK and the core countries of the EU, France and 
Germany. Wh
y were opposed to the US-UK stance on Iraq. The next section provides several 
explanations for explaining the “awkward” nature of the UK-EU relationship.  
Europe, most frequently, is viewed as a threat to British national sovereignty 
(Baker 2001). Accordingly, the British policy towards the EU is referred to as “semi-
detachment,” and Britain is often characterized as a “reluctant” or “awkward” partner of 
the EU (See George 1992, 1994; Gowland and Turner 2000). 
British historical experience lends a heightened sense of national identity and 
greater awareness of the importance of preserving sovereignty, which is socialized into 
ing generations of political leaders and the general population. This means that 
national interests are defended more enthusiastically in Britain than elsewhere, because 
the dangers of losing national identity and sovereignty are more readily apparent or less 
likely to be tolerated (see Wallace 1991; Young 1993; Baker 2001; Geddes 200
Taking into account the Anglo-Saxon tradition of laissez-faire capitalism (in 
contrast to France’s emphasis on social market democracy) it comes as no surprise that 
Britain has traditionally seen Europe as part of a free-market project, rather than a 
political project (Geddes 2004). As such, “Britain appears to retain a Churcillian ‘with’ 
but not ‘of’ Europe” (Geddes 2004, 26).  
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 had been 
in favo




entral and Eastern European countries with 
significantly lower levels of economic development into the Union was perhaps seen by 
The peripheral geographical positioning of the island may also be said to 
contribute to the isolation of Britain from the European continent. Closer political union 
would possibly weaken Britain’s special relationship with the US and undermine its 
ability to run an independent, liberal economic policy. Consequently, British official 
policy has traditionally been very skeptical towards the EU.  
One exception to this traditional Euro-skepticism of the British governments can 
be vividly observed on the issue of Eastern enlargement. The UK official policy
r of the EU enlargement. On June 29, 2000, The Times published the following 
headline to announce the British policy: “Britain to Champion Enlargement of the EU.” 
There are several explanations for this atypical policy stance of the UK. The 
Labour Party was already emphasizing its strong support fo
ion. When it came to power in 1997, it maintained its support for the expansion 
process and wanted to give momentum to the ongoing and protracted negotiations on 
enlargement.  
Moravcsik (1993) suggests that each Member State instrumentalizes the European 
framework in a way to maximize their interests. If we follow this line of reasoning in 
explaining the formulation of the British policy on enlargement, we can see that it w
rest of the UK to support the EU enlargement, which would push the EU towards 
becoming less constraining, less integrationist, and wider not deeper.  
Britain was, in other words, a strong supporter of the “widening” of the EU to 
include the Eastern European countries, largely because this would delay further 
“deepening” of the Union. Including C
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policym




Europe of equals, not finding that some other countries have moved on to 
an inne
 Union.   
akers as a way of stalling moves by the French-German axis towards further 
European integration in the form of common currency and federalism.  
For instance, on 27 June 2000, French President Jacques Chirac called for the 
formation of a “pioneering group” of nations within the EU, which would push ahead 
faster with further integration. Again, only one week before 
llor Gerhard Schroeder proposed an ambitious plan for a federal Europe led by an 
“inner-core.” These would lead to the creation of a “two-speed” Europe, something the 
UK government opposed, partly for fear of losing influence in the Union and partly to 
prevent divisions both within the Government and among the British citizens about th
f the EU.  
Pushing for further enlargement provided a panacea for this particular concern. 
British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook justified the British calls for a faster enlargement 
in The Times. He announced, “We want those countries to be joining [to EU] as full 
members of a 
r chamber from which they are excluded” (quoted in Craske 2000). 
Furthermore, these Central and Eastern European countries primarily pursued pro-
American and pro-British foreign policies in the aftermath of the Cold War. Inclusion of 
these new members into the EU would shift the internal balance of power in favor of the 
UK and hence increase the political influence of the UK in an enlarged
Additionally, Britain did not face immediate border issues with the Central and 
Eastern European countries. Hence, Britain did not share the concerns of those EU 
Member States that are in closer geographical proximity to the acceding countries 
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changes in its immigration policy; more importantly, it attempts to 
provide
media’s agenda-setting power fi
broadsheet press like 
(Hughes and Smith 1998). As such, these factors made it relatively unproblematic and 
less risky for the UK to support the Eastern enlargement of the EU.   
The next section specifically focuses on the issue of immigration in Britain and 
places it within the EU enlargement debates since expansion of EU borders towards the 
East blew a fresh breath into the discussion on the role of migration. It seeks to discover 
the interrelationship among the media, the public, and policymaking, and shed some light 
on the role of media in explaining the initial gap between the official policy and public 
opinion regarding immigration policies in Britain.  
Accordingly, the next section asks what has caused the British government to 
announce several 
 an answer as to why the British government has chosen to make these policy 
changes just before the enlargement date, at the last minute.  
 
The Issue of Immigration in Britain 
The issue of immigration in Britain illustrates the tremendous potential of the 
rst on public and then on policymakers. Until the very 
end of the time frame of this study, the EU enlargement issue received very little debate 
in the British context.  
Initially, the debate on the Eastern enlargement tended to take place in serious 
The Times and The Guardian. Coverage of the issue in the tabloid 
press was largely reduced to occasional passing references, for example, in the middle of 
an article on asylum and immigration policy. Hence, as illustrated by Chapter 4, in the 
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 this particular EU 
policy.
quences of Eastern EU enlargement. 
Finally
As Jones and Baumgartner 
(2004, 2) correctly note, in democracies, there is “little doubt that people have a strong 
ght to be addressing,” even if public opinion tends 
to be vague when it com
rgue that by setting the agenda of the British people, the British 
print m
to adopt a more restrictive approach towards the immigration issue. In other words, the 
beginning, the British public only had a vague awareness of the timetable for Eastern 
enlargement, lacking a thorough understanding of the content of
  
Later on, the number of enlargement-related newspaper articles increased. As the 
results of the first- and the second-level agenda-setting analyses indicate, there was a 
transfer of both “issue” and “attribute” salience from the print media agenda to the public 
agenda. As demonstrated in Chapter 5, in Britain, the transfer of “attribute” salience was 
most noticeable for the immigration-related conse
 as suggested in Chapter 6, immigration has been one of the most important 
determinants of public support for the EU enlargement.  
Following the increased salience of the immigration issue in the media agenda, 
immigration soon became a top item on the public agenda. 
sense of what issues the government ou
es to complex solutions of problems. The impact of public 
opinion on immigration policies is more relevant than appears. This begs the question of 
why and how the policies change (Lahav 2004).  
In this chapter, I a
edia carried out three major tasks vis-à-vis the debate on enlargement: it conveyed 
information between the government and the public; mobilized public opposition against 
the initial stance of the British government regarding immigration from the Central and 
Eastern European countries; and finally, helped convince the government that it needed 
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 the Eastern enlargement. I now turn to explaining this process in detail.  
alience” into their equation for 
explain
organizers of societal cleavages, also 
become
media focused and escalated public attention; through its effects on public opinion, it has 
led to a change in the way the British government reacted to the question of immigration 
vis-à-vis
Freeman (1995, 884) hypothesizes that public opinion in liberal democracies is 
slower to mobilize and crystallize, and more indifferent if not more favorable to 
immigration, than it would be if more and better information were available. The logical 
extension of this argument would be that as the information becomes more readily 
available on the issue of immigration, the public opinion takes shape more rapidly and 
becomes more hostile towards immigration.  
Givens and Luedtke (2004) include “political s
ing the immigration policy harmonization in the EU. They maintain that salience 
can politicize an issue by mobilizing society as a whole against certain areas of 
immigration policy harmonization. Referring to the model developed by Baumgartner 
and Jones (1993), Givens and Luedtke (2004) suggest that increased salience adds an 
important dimension to the nature of political change through changing public 
indifference to issues. As a result, they posit that “not only does the public become more 
involved in an issue, but political parties, the 
 involved” (Givens and Luedtke 2004, 150). They hypothesize that this 
mobilization may lead to more restrictive immigration policies at the national level. This 
is exactly what we have observed regarding the issue of immigration in the British 
political context.  
With an increase in the media salience of EU enlargement, we have seen a 




ation Flows 2004). The rightwing group 
Migrati
frequently from the immigration-related aspects by the British press, immigration-related 
concerns of the British public also increased.  
To start with, Freeman (1995, 883) suggests that “the most direct ba
tion about immigration is the scarcity and ambiguity of official data.” It was 
exactly the case in Britain. Even the report that the Home Office commissioned, The 
Impact of EU Enlargement on Migration Flows (2004, 58) complained about “the lack of 
good data.” The report forecasted that migration to Britain as a result of EU enlargement 
will be “relatively small,” at between 5,000 and 13,000 immigrants per year up to 2010 
(The Impact of EU Enlargement on Migr
on Watch UK, on the other hand, claimed 40,000 people a year would enter the 
UK from Eastern Europe.  
Against this background of confusion and uncertainty due to limited level of 
knowledge among the British public on immigration, media framings of EU enlargement 
increasingly referred to the negative implications of the Eastern enlargement for 
immigration to the UK and the British welfare system. Over time, the British tabloids 
started to publish the immigration scare stories more extensively. As Pat Cox, President 
of the European Parliament at the time, correctly noted, “It is greatly to be regretted that – 
at a moment of such historic significance for Europe – so much of the debate has been 
reduced to accountancy and mere hype, speculation and unsubstantiated claims about 
migration” (The Guardian, “Blunkett Urged to Resist Immigrant Crackdown,” February 
24, 2004). 
As the enlargement day loomed closer, due especially to the intense tabloid press 
coverage of potential risk of “waves of foreigners flooding the nation and swamping 
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and political context. The British public 
started 
           
public services,” immigration and Eastern enlargement topics started to cause a number 
of controversies raised in the British public 
to prioritize the issue of immigration in the context of EU enlargement debate. As 
a consequence, in Britain this issue has grown to define something of a political cleavage, 
separating one party, newspaper, or person from another. 
Until very late in the enlargement time frame, Britain and Ireland stood alone in 
their willingness to open their borders to workers from the new Member States (or in 
their unwillingness to impose transitional measures) whereas, other EU members like 
France, Germany, Austria, and Italy introduced transition periods and banned migrants 
from the newly acceding Central and Eastern European countries for these transition 
periods.4  
Britain’s “open door” policy was heavily criticized by British tabloids. As 
mentioned earlier, in Britain, the largest difference over time in press coverage has been 
observed on the issue immigration. Towards the end of the time frame of this research, 
British newspaper articles increasingly covered the possibility that illegal and legal 
immigration would become a problem in Britain as a result of the latest round of EU 
enlargement. Most of the newspaper articles criticized government’s “soft touch” on 
asylum and immigration. Among the British press outlets content analyzed in this 
research, this was most apparent in The Daily Mail’s coverage. The results of content 
analysis in this project illustrate tabloids’ inherent hostility towards the EU and its 
policies. 
                                      
4 These restrictions were allowed to last for a maximum of seven years. After May 2011, all Member States 
would be required to allow the citizens from new Member States to move to work freely in their countries. 
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 claimed that the “open door” 
policy 
n April 3, 2004, 46% of the respondents identified “immigration and asylum-
seekers
 should be handled jointly within the EU (Standard EB 59). These surveys make 
evident both the extent of the immigration controversy in Britain, and the feeling among 
For example, referring to a British government advertising campaign in Slovakia 
asking people not to come to the UK, The Daily Mail asked: “Are ministers living in the 
real world?” Or, under the headline “See you in May,” The Sun speculated that “tens of 
thousands” of Eastern European Gypsies were planning to settle in the UK. Right-wing 
skeptics of the British government’s immigration policy
would signal a green light to “benefit tourists” entering the UK to have access to 
state handouts. 
As May 2004 approached, the public opinion surveys taken in England strongly 
depicted that the British public had prioritized the issue of immigration as related to the 
Eastern enlargement. To illustrate, according to a public opinion survey conducted by 
YouGov o
” as “the most important political issue” in the country, while only 29% identified 
“the war on terrorism” as such. On the other hand, in the same survey, 80% of the 
respondents maintained that the “present Government’s policies on immigration and 
people who seek asylum in Britain” was not tough enough.  
Another public opinion survey carried out by MORI in 2003 suggested that 85% 
of people in Britain disagree that the Government has immigration under control. Regular 
MORI surveys of the British public similarly showed a major increase in those who see 
immigration as the most important issue facing Britain. While two thirds of the UK saw 
immigration policy as being a domestic affair, the majority of the EU (52%) saw it as an 
issue that
the British people that immigration and asylum were out of control. 
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ome Secretary David Blunkett and other supporters of UK’s “open door 
policy,
 would swamp their 
labor m
t public preferences 
Fuelled by the sensationalist journalism of the British tabloid press, a strong 
opposition to granting complete free movement of labor from the new member countries 
emerged among the British public. Opponents of enlargement in Britain feared increased 
unemployment with the arrival of cheap labor from the new Member States or increased 
drug trafficking and organized crime in their country, issues that are mainly emphasized 
by press outlets such as The Daily Mail and The Sun.  
British H
” on the other hand, asserted that the arrival of new workers would boost the 
British economy. Blunkett claimed that the British economy requires “overseas workers 
to help fill skill gaps” in the British labor market. However, they were unable to convince 
the majority of the British people that hold concerns about immigration’s consequences.  
As a result of the heightened alarm in the British media, especially in The Daily 
Mail and other tabloids, there emerged growing concerns among the British public about 
more and more Eastern Europeans flying to Britain with a “one-way ticket.” Many 
British citizens feared that migrants from the new Member States
arkets and exploit their welfare systems. They feared that the weaker economies 
of these Central and Eastern European countries would encourage Eastern Europeans to 
migrate in search of work. As Blair stated, “immigration and politics do not make easy 
bedfellows. They never have” (Guardian Unlimited, Speech by Tony Blair to the 
Confederation of British Industry on migration, April 27, 2004).  
In democracies, the policy priorities of the public and of the government should 
correspond in order to achieve legitimate representation. Referring to the “electoral 
connection” in EU politics, Carruba (2001) provides evidence tha
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influen





ce elites. As Stimson, MacKuen and Erikson (1995) comment, politicians receive 
the faintest signals and clues in their political environment. The “policy mood” argument 
suggests that the public opinion trends guide the policymakers and that elites respond to 
public pressure because of reelection considerations. 
Policymakers try to anticipate the impact of media coverage of issues on the 
public and build their political strategies on that prem
aintain, “political actors do not primarily react on media coverage itself but on 
presumed public opinion.” While citizens tend to perceive politics through the media, 
“politicians also tend to rely exclusively on the media” for learning about citizens’ 
concerns (Kriesi 2004, 191).  
The British government’s response to the alarming media coverage on
ation-related consequences of EU enlargement is an effective example of this 
phenomenon. The British government adopted the immigration issue and proposed 
several changes in its immigration policy to signal its commitment to the concerns of the 
British people and address these immigration-related concerns among the public.  
When immigration became a key issue during the enlargement debates in the UK, 
the Labour party was accused by the Conservatives of having a too liberal asylum seeker-
immigration policy. The Conservative Party traditionally wants to keep immigration as a 
key issue in political debates, since it is an important policy area in which British people 
give the Conservatives higher marks than the Labour government.
                                                 
5 Consequently, the immigration issue became one of the major issues of the British elections on May 
2005.  
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 continuously called on the British 
govern
mmigration. In February 2004, only three months to the 
enlarge
 at the 
time of
he free movement of 
labor and immigration policy. 
                                                
The Opposition leaders in Britain reacted on negative media coverage about the 
immigration-related consequences of Eastern enlargement almost immediately in order to 
hammer the government for not having effectively dealt with the problem earlier. For 
instance, Conservative Party leader Michael Howard
ment to follow the example of its EU counterparts and impose restrictions on 
immigration from new Member States. Howard asserted that “uncontrolled immigration” 
would put community relations at risk.  
The heavy criticism by the tabloid press and the opposition led popular concern 
over the large increase in immigration from Eastern Europe has caused the UK to take a 
more cautious approach on i
ment day, British Prime Minister Tony Blair conceded there was a “potential risk” 
of an influx from new Member States (Guardian Unlimited, “EU Enlargement: Facts and 
Fears,” February 23, 2004). Blair accused Conservatives of trying to exploit public 
concerns about immigration and discredited the tabloid scare stories on Eastern 
immigration by reminding the British people of the similar scare stories published
 Spanish accession, which went unfulfilled. 
In order to reassure the public, in his speech in the House of Commons, Blair 
announced that the government was examining rules governing the eligibility to benefits 
of new migrant workers.6 Confirming the expectations of Carruba (2001), British public 




6 These restrictions do not apply to Cyprus or Malta because of their small size and their relative econo
strength
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ember countries of the EU to 
register
intained that the new measures would enable “managed 
migration” and protect the British benefits system. 
Due to the increased public pressure, the British government at the final hour 
made some minor changes to its liberal policy towards asylum and immigration and 
adopted a number of limitations to the free movement of labor and imposed welfare 
access restrictions on those coming from Eastern Europe. On the face of increasing 
negative coverage of enlargement and expected public backlash, British ministers rushed 
out a host of announcements – from restricting benefits and housing for migrants to 
cutting back on work permits. 
Winning a cabinet battle to prevent the introduction of work permits, British 
Home Secretary David Blunkett announced the government’s plans to limit the numbers 
of people from Central and Eastern European countries to claim benefits in Britain. 
According to this new policy, “migrants to Britain who are resident for less than a year 
will need to prove they have a job or can support themselves without access to state 
benefits before they register for work” (The Guardian, “Blunkett Urged to Resist Migrant 
Crackdown,” February 24, 2004). The register, Blunkett claimed, would also act as a 
means of keeping track of numbers entering the UK. 
These measures required migrants from the new m
 for work in Britain and denied them the right to social security benefits and other 
services, including health care. They were designed to protect Britain from the negative 
immigration and welfare system related consequences of enlargement. These restrictions 
were proposed to last for at least two years and possibly longer. The then Immigration 
Minister Beverley Hughes ma
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ble to police” (The Daily Mail, “A Pounds 50 Fare to 
Britain
 Chairman of Migration Watch UK, 
caution
 Trade Union Confederation (TUC) 
General Secretary Brendan Barber, urged the cabinet to stand firm against rightwing 
The tabloid press was again quick to criticize these policies of the government 
and suggested that these “last-minute measures” demonstrated the government was 
“panicking” about “thousands of people that are planning to come and work in Britain” 
on May 2004. Tabloids were very pessimistic about the effectiveness of these policies. 
Regarding these newly announced changes to British immigration policy, The Daily Mail 
noted that “[Blunkett’s] plans that [immigrants] must register for work and pay taxes will 
be unenforceable and impossi
 and No Return,” February 25, 2004).  
Negative framings of the enlargement issue by tabloids are hardly surprising. The 
British tabloid press is notorious for its anti-EU coverage (see Anderson and Weymouth 
1999; Harcup and O’Neill 2001). The British tabloid newspapers generally take a right-
wing populist stance, emphasizing nationalism, anticommunism, and hostility to the EU. 
Furthermore, British tabloids often market themselves by launching campaigns around 
causes they expect to be popular (Harcup and O’Neill 2001).  
Writing in The Daily Mail, Sir Andrew Green,
ed that the “[British] Government’s 11th-hour decision to mount an advertising 
campaign warning Eastern Europeans of the pitfalls of entering the UK if they are not 
prepared to work would have the opposite effect to that desired.” He maintained that 
“there is a serious risk” that this campaign would “backfire by drawing attention to the 
possibilities rather than deterring potential migrants” (The Observer, “Can a Bigger 
Europe Work for Britain?” February 22, 2004). 
By contrast, some political elites, like the
206 
demand
criticism by tabloids and the Conservative 
Party o
air stated that “now 
is the ti
ir’s Migration Speech,” April 27, 2004).  
s to close the door on migrants, and to honor its earlier commitment to permit 
citizens of the new EU states to work in Britain from May 1. 
To make things worse, British immigration minister Beverley Hughes resigned 
due to a scandal over the handling of visa applications from Eastern Europe in the 
beginning of April 2004. Hughes stepped down from her post along with claims that 
immigration officers, struggling with an accumulation of visa applications, had rubber-
stamped bids to move to Britain from citizens of EU accession countries.  
This scandal further fuelled the bitter 
f the Labour government’s capabilities in controlling immigration. As the 
immigration concerns escalated, the government announced that it was suspending all 
visa applications from Bulgaria and Romania, candidate countries that were planning to 
join the EU in 2006.  
On April 27, 2004, with only three days left to EU enlargement, in his address to 
the Confederation of British Industry (CBI), British Prime Minister Bl
me for controlled migration, simultaneous with tackling the abuses [of the benefits 
system] we have identified” and declared “we have begun a top to bottom analysis of the 
immigration system, how it operates, how it can be improved, how it can agree migration 
where it is in [the UK’s] interests and prevent it where it isn’t.”  He maintained that the 
British government’s strategy against illegal immigration aims to secure the British 
borders, and “prevent abuse by those who entered the UK legitimately but then attempt to 
stay on illegally” (The Guardian Unlimited, “Bla
In an attempt to address the concerns of the British people on the effects of EU 
enlargement on the British welfare system, Blair announced, “we are putting tighter rules 
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ply to benefit claims and 
housing
 been long in 
creation
ment for about one year. 
media 
to restrict migrants’ access to benefits and housing.” He continued, “No one will be able 
to come to the UK from anywhere in the enlarged EU sim
” (Guardian Unlimited, “Blair’s Migration Speech,” April 27, 2004).  
Michael Howard accused Blair of “blind panic,” as the British Prime Minister 
tried to regain control of the immigration agenda with a speech to the CBI in London. 
The Shadow Home Secretary, David Davis too criticized the government by arguing that 
the new announcement is “a panicky response to a problem which has
” (Guardian Unlimited, “Howard Attacks Blair’s Immigration Plans,” April 27, 
2004). Several ministers including Beverley Hughes (before her resignation) and 
Anthony Smith insisted that the British government was not panicking in the face of 
tabloid and Tory pressure, saying the proposals being announced by Blunkett were being 
formulated the govern
On April 29, 2004, only two days left for the enlargement date, the Government 
put in place a package of measures to enable people to work legally, help fill the half a 
million job vacancies in the UK labor market, boost productivity and the UK’s overall 
economic growth. The Home Office announced the details of the Worker Registration 
Scheme applicable to citizens from the Central and Eastern European accession countries 
(excluding those from Cyprus and Malta) who wanted to come to the UK to work. 
Individuals from the Central and Eastern European accession countries were required to 
register under this scheme within one month of starting a new job in Britain. It came into 
effect on 1 May 2004. These announcements provide excellent illustrations of how the 





rding the enlargement issue.  
 
Since EU expansion, 91,000 people from the new member states have registered 
to work in Britain. The amount of people registered has significantly surpassed the Home 
Office expectations. Shadow Home Secretary David Davies has described the
ations system as a “shambles” following the release of this official figure, 
prompting speculations of radical changes to the UK immigration system. 
As illustrated by this case study, the British government responded to the 
concerns of the people, and introduced several regulations for its “open doors” policy on 
immigration. The rise of the immigration question in the UK seemed to mirror a similar 
debate that was going on in France with the looming shadow of EU enlargement hanging 
over the issue. The next part concentrates on the debates regarding the Eastern EU 
enlargement in the French political context and fleshes out the interactions between the 
French media, public and the policy makers rega
A CASE STUDY OF THE FRENCH OFFICIAL POSITION ON EASTERN ENLARGEMENT 
France was one of the original members of the European Economic Community 
in 1958. Since the departure of De Gaulle from power, France has been a staunch 
supporter of further European integration, regarded as the “locomotive” for major 
economic and political developments within the EU. France traditionally plays a leading 
role in the EU. French people are typically pro-European.  
As mentioned in Chapter 3, Britain and France can be said to have swapped their 
traditional European positions on the issue of Eastern enlargement. To be more precise 
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while F
ent of the EU, 
since th
had scaled 
own his ambitions to speed up the pace of closer ties in Europe. In July 24, 2003, French 
o 
European U
erable” problems that 
remain with the negotiations on farm
The analysis in this section elaborates on the possible causes for this reluctance in the 
French official policy towards the Eastern enlargement. 
rance was more reluctant to expand the membership of the EU, Britain was more 
enthusiastic about this particular EU initiative.  
French policy on Eastern enlargement has shifted several times, depending on the 
French government’s projected calculation of national interest (Moravcsik 1993). 
Initially, the French official policy was ambivalent towards the enlargem
e French elites believed that this would undermine the “deepening” of the Union. 
Just as in the case of the UK, political elites in France perceived “widening” and 
“deepening” as irreconcilable. Craske (2000) suggested that French President Jacques 
Chirac might have been using deeper integration as a way of “opposing enlargement, 
about which [Chirac] and the French electorate [were] distinctly uneasy.”  
French elites gradually came to assume that “deepening” and “widening” were 
compatible goals (De la Serre 2004). For instance, even Chirac admitted he 
d
Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin included both elements, “adapting [France] t
nion enlargement, and greater European integration,” as a part of his newly 
announced governmental program – “Agenda 2006” (Financial Times, “Education, R&D, 
and EU Enlargement Top Raffarin’s ‘Agenda 2006’ for France,” July 25, 2003).  
On February 2002, while maintaining the public commitment to EU enlargement, 
French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine, also pointed to the “innum
 subsidies due to be completed by the end of 2002. 
This symbolized the doubtful approach of France to the issue of Eastern enlargement. 
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The French government had three key concerns regarding the issue of 
enlargement that needed to be satisfied to variou
ession of ten new countries, a limited adjustment of the Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP), and a limitation of budget expenditure after accession (De la Serre 2004).  
First of all, in February 2000, France threatened the EU’s enlargement plan by 
demanding changes in the Amsterdam Treaty that provided the basis for adding new 
members. The French position requesting a reform in institutional structures of the EU 
before accession was based on the argument that institutions that were created for six 
original members in the 1950s are ill-suited to a union of 25 or more members. It 
maintained that for the accession of new members to happen, a thoroug
was required prior to expansion of membership.  
Second, for a long time, EU enlargement was blocked by a conflict between 
France and Germany over agrarian subsidies. According to the European Commission’s 
General Budget for the European Union (2004), around 40% of the EU budget was 
allocated to the CAP. France ranked highest among CAP beneficiaries, receiving 21.6% 
of the CAP budget in 2004.  
France had concerns about a possible CAP reform before the enlargeme
biggest beneficiary of the CAP, and as a country with a powerful farm lobby that 
was championed by Chirac, France expressed its concern that the big farm subsidies it 
received would be at risk from any serious CAP reform to accommodate the new EU 
members. French President Jacques Chirac wanted to keep subsidies in order to satisfy 





esolved when Schroeder gave in 
– much
anco-German alliance to propose a common vision for the 
future o
 changes to EU direct farm payments to facilitate funding the Eastern 
enlargement. 
On the other hand, as the biggest net contributor to the EU budget, Germany was 
worried that the EU enlargement would boost the Community budget. In other words, it
that the enlargement would increase the cost of funding the EU. As such, it 
requested to restrain the spending packages. German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder 
sought cuts for the benefit of German budget. France rejected German proposals made in 
the middle of October 2002 to cut direct payments to farmers in the existing 15 member 
states by an extra 2% each year for a decade to pay for phasing in such payments to new 
EU members’ farmers. 
After long negotiations, the conflict was finally r
 to the anger of the British government, which also wanted to reduce agrarian 
subsidies. France and Germany managed to reach a deal on October 22, 2002 to limit the 
ceiling of the EU’s farm spending from 2007, paving the way for enlargement. 
De la Serre (2004, 517) notes that these difficult negotiations among the EU15 
revealed the failure of the Fr
f Europe. Franco-German alliance was considered a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for a well-functioning EU after enlargement. France and Germany needed to 
convince their EU partners about the merits of further integration (De la Serre 2004). 
The debates on the admission of ten new Member States to the EU, almost all of 
them sympathetic to the US and Britain in terms of their foreign policies, led to questions 
as to whether France’s role in the future might be less central in the aftermath of the 
212 
ic model and had become more about open markets and competitiveness.  
ntries also had strong ties with Germany.  
added that in supporting Washington’s stance on Iraq, the East Europeans had “lost a 
Eastern enlargement of the EU. The sense was that the EU had started to incorporate the 
British econom
French policymakers feared that the Eastern enlargement would create a different 
kind of Union, and that France’s influence and vision of Europe would become diluted in 
a large, loose, and liberal Union. Chirac, for instance, was always wary about EU 
enlargement fearing it would reduce the French influence in the EU.  
French reservations regarding the Eastern enlargement of the EU were also 
centered on a looming German economic and political dominance of Central and Eastern 
Europe and France’s relative marginalization in the EU. The Central and Eastern 
European candidate cou
In addition, there were increasing concerns about declining significance of the 
French language after the enlargement. There were several articles especially in Le 
Figaro attracting attention to the “danger” of increasing dominance of the English 
language in an enlarged Union. 
Finally, the Eastern enlargement of the EU took place against the background of 
growing transatlantic tensions due to debates on a possible US-led military intervention 
in Iraq. The French had always pursued a fiercely independent approach to US foreign 
policy and were the first to distance themselves from a possible US-British intervention 
in Iraq. 
While France was against a military intervention in Iraq, the Central and Eastern 
European candidate countries supported the US position on Iraq. Chirac attacked EU 
candidates as “infantile” and accused them for being “reckless” supporters of the US. He 
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ade it clear that the 
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hapter proceeds with a 
discuss
The Iss
inated the print media coverage of the 
Eastern enlargem
good opportunity to keep quiet.” In the run-up to the war in Iraq, “new” vs. “old” Europe 
rhetoric of the then US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld helped create further 
s between the acceding countries and France.  
In the beginning of the enlargement process, the French government thought of 
enlargement as a way to strengthen the political influence of the EU in the world vis-à-vis 
the US power. However, later on, the debates on Iraq intervention m
 and Eastern European countries would change the internal balance of power of 
the enlarged Union to the disadvantage of France. 
After an overview of the major factors that affected the formation of the French 
government’s official position on the Eastern enlargement; this c
ion of the public opinion-media-policy nexus during the French debates on 
enlargement. The following section focuses on the issue of unemployment in France 
within the context of the enlargement debates. 
 
ue of Unemployment in France 
As in the British case, although to a lesser extent, press outlets in France, 
preferred representations on EU enlargement that were more anxiety driven, more about 
what people would find outrageous and frightening. Concerns about French agriculture, 
job losses and outsourcing of companies dom
ent.  
Consequently, similar to the developments in the British public opinion, French 
people started to worry about an “invasion” of low-paid workers from Eastern Europe 
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 in people’s agenda related to the 
Eastern
ed on the Eastern enlargement, signaling 
possibly negative economic as well as political consequences of enlargement.  
e the public opinion for the way the EU was 
changing. The French people feared that m
ement of the EU. It was first used during the 
run-up to th
“stealing” their jobs and “destroying” their social system. They also became concerned 
that “social dumping” might lead to a decrease in wages in France.  
As such, unemployment became a key issue
 enlargement topic in France. Since the unemployment level surpassed 10%, it 
became a highly salient and contentious issue in the French context. The economic 
situation did not help either. Slow economic growth combined with high unemployment 
was the basic ingredient of public dissatisfaction about EU’s Eastern enlargement 
initiative. 
Opponents of enlargement in France also feared expansion of markets and “les 
délocalisations” – outsourcing of big companies to new EU Member States leading to 
increased levels of unemployment in the country. “Délocalisations” (companies moving 
their production sites abroad) and “mondialisation” (globalization) were two keywords 
frequently seen in newspaper articles publish
The government failed to prepar
ore immigrants would come to France with 
Eastern enlargement and that more French companies would relocate to low-cost Eastern 
European countries. 
“Le plombier polonaise” (the “Polish plumber”) became a prominent motto of 
French opposition to further Eastern enlarg
e European Constitution referendum by Philippe de Villiers, leader of the 
Mouvement pour la France, and the “no” camp.  
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ote that the fears of 
“Polish
 in France, dating back to the pre-enlargement period.   
leviated if 
there w
ricultural reform was another reason why French people were at 
first rel
like Poland and the Czech Republic. 
Agriculture constitutes a very significant part of many newly admitted EU member states. 
Many commentators of the “no” vote to the French referendum on the draft 
European Constitution discuss the issue in terms of “shock” and n
 plumbers” dominated the “no” campaign in 2005. Yet, the reading of French 
newspaper articles on Eastern enlargement indicates that even in 2003 and 2004 there 
was tremendous print media coverage on the impact of Eastern enlargement on 
“délocalisations” and unemployment. As such, the result of the French referendum in 
May 2005 becomes less surprising when it is observed within the context of an expanded 
time frame
Although the majority of old members of the EU, including France, have adopted 
several protective measures – such as, transition periods restricting the free movement of 
labor force from Eastern Europe and benefits eligibility – against possible negative 
economic consequences of the Eastern enlargement; the French people were not informed 
in great detail about these measures. Many French people’s concerns about increased 
unemployment as a result of accession of new members would have been al
ere more information available on the implementation of this transition period.  
As mentioned earlier, the issue of reforming the level of subsidies provided to 
farmers in the new EU Member States under the CAP was unpopular in France. French 
intransigence over ag
uctant about the Eastern enlargement. The CAP reform remained a highly salient 
issue vis-à-vis the Eastern enlargement in France. 
French farmers feared that their agricultural subsidies would be cut with the 
accession of agriculturally oriented countries 
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media have been more interested in the 
econom
imately four million farmers were projected to enter the EU market after the 
enlargement (General Budget for the European Union 2004). This was perceived to be 
threatening by many in France.  
As shown in Chapter 5, the French public was increasingly becoming concerned 
about the costs of accommodating ten new members, the effects of enlargement on 
unemployment, on economic competitiveness of the country, on EU decision-making 
processes, and organized crime and drug trafficking. In contrast, the French media were 
talking about the implications of EU enlargement on the reun
nt, on France’s position within the enlarged EU, on agriculture, and on the 
strength of the EU as a global power.  
Finally, the debates on Iraq also hijacked the debate on the enlargement’s true 
consequences in the French media and public. Almost every enlargement-related article 
published by the French press outlets emphasized the impact of enlargement on the role 
of France in the enlarged Union or the role of the EU vis-à-vis the US. Accordingly, there 
were many concerns among the French public regarding the loss of French political an
ic influence, and national identity.  
Although there was some correspondence between the media and public framings 
of EU enlargement, the elites did not emphasize the aspects that concerned the French 
people the most. While political elites often talk about the effects of EU enlargement on 
the strategic actorness of the EU, for example, the 
ic consequences. Consequently, the findings imply that the policymakers did not 
do their part of the homework in informing the public in France about the actual expected 
consequences of EU enlargement. 
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day approached, the affected publics turned increasingly 
against
 of the first rank, in which growth and investment 
would 
few speeches made by Chirac addressing the 
expecte
Only six months to the enlargement date, the public opposition reached its zenith 
in France, with 55% of the French people against the Eastern enlargement (Please refer to 
Figure 6-2). As the enlargement 
 enlargement. 
Only days before the actual enlargement day, French President Chirac sought to 
reassure the French public concerns about the effects of EU enlargement on employment, 
social welfare and French national identity in a press conference.  
The French President said he realized that the changing nature of the EU was 
giving rise to doubts among many people, but argued that an enlarged Union was 
“asserting itself as an economic power
create a new dynamic environment for employment. It is a process in which 
everyone will be a winner.” Regarding the effect of enlargement on the French national 
identity, he added, “Europe is not a substitute for nations. It brings them together to give 
them greater strength” (Agence France Presse, “EU Enlargement Opportunity for 
France,” April 29, 2004).  
That was unfortunately one of the 
d consequences of the EU enlargement. Furthermore, these public relations efforts 
came very late in the process. Significant numbers of French citizens were already 
alienated from enlargement’s cause. French policy makers should have tried to convince 
their people about the positive implications of the EU enlargement, by making frequent 




itain, the media focused and escalated public attention; through its 
effects 
ruba 2001), and hence 
provide
obalization. At a policymaking level, political leaders have to 
recogni
nalist journalists scaring the people 
about an “avalanche” of immigrants that are desperate to come to Western Europe and 
offer their labor for low wages. A concerted campaign by the media and several 
USION: MEDIA-PUBLIC OPINION-POLICY NEXUS 
The results of this chapter draw attention to the significance of the media 
coverage of European affairs due to the considerable impact the coverage has over the 
public opinion. In Br
on public opinion, it has led to a change in the way the British government reacted 
to the question of immigration vis-à-vis the Eastern enlargement. This only partially 
supports the “electoral connection” argument in EU politics (Car
s some evidence that public preferences influence elites. 
In the French case too, the media effects on public opinion were clearly visible. 
Nevertheless, the effects of coverage on the government’s policies were not so clearly 
discernible. One clear lesson from the French case is that the policymakers should have 
been engaged in public’s concerns if they wanted to have popular support behind the 
government’s policies.  
European citizens often do not distinguish between the effects of the EU 
integration and those of gl
ze this reality and deal with it rather than pretend that the problem is nonexistent. 
Instead of using technical jargon and assuming public knowledge on the European 
affairs, the European policymakers need to educate the masses on the issues that concern 
them the most using the media.  
However, what we have observed during the enlargement debates was populist 
and xenophobic right-wing party leaders and sensatio
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migrant workers who would 
flood in
e results of this analysis 
confirm
in as well as in France. Scare-mongering, sensational headlines 
and di
mmigration and outsourcing of companies to Eastern 
Europe
politicians created public alarm concerning the number of 
to Britain after May 1, 2004 as a consequence of the Eastern expansion of the EU. 
The critics of “tabloidization” maintain that sensation and scandal is a major 
element provoking public mistrust of politics, and as the negation of the kind of 
journalism that is essential to democracy (Esser 1999; Sparks 1998). Since negative 
evaluations tend to attract greater attention to political issues, as do aggression, conflict 
and controversy (i.e. negativity-effectiveness), media coverage is particularly important 
where the central values of society are affected (Schulz 1983). Th
 these suspicions that tabloidization is harmful for a democratic and a healthy 
functioning give-and-take process between the people and the leaders.  
Put more specifically, it was almost impossible get a balanced and thoroughly 
objective view of the immigration and unemployment related implications of the Eastern 
EU enlargement in Brita
storted “facts” were very common practice among the print media in both 
countries.  
Accordingly, public discussion about the Eastern enlargement in Europe was 
fuelled by the “hysteria” rather than “facts.” The political leaders did not provide their 
worried publics with clear facts on the realities of immigration as well as the actual risk 
of unemployment created by i
.  
Consequently, the British and French publics increasingly turned skeptical 
towards the EU enlargement. While the support for EU enlargement hit its highest point 
in autumn 2002, in both France and Britain; from then on, it decreased tremendously in 
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relative
s to their policies 
(as in th
le – in other words, an investment in democracy, security and prosperity in 
the Eur
or instance, Laurent Fabius of the Socialist Party in France argued that some of 
the ec
both countries. There was a 10% decrease in the support level for enlargement among the 
British public from November 2002 to March 2004. The decrease in support was 
ly lower in the French case with a 5% decline. In France too, the controversies 
surrounding enlargement’s impact on already high levels of unemployment in the society 
were highly salient. 
These examples demonstrate that domestic concerns were highly present at the 
time of the enlargement debates. Nevertheless, as the case studies in this chapter indicate, 
the policymakers did not take fundamental or concrete policy decisions to alleviate the 
popular concerns. They have only either addressed the concerns on the surface and 
verbally (as in the case of France) or introduced minor cosmetic change
e case of the United Kingdom). 
As indicated by the results of the public opinion analyses in this project, European 
citizens are interested in practical issues that affect their everyday lives, such as jobs and 
social welfare. The benefits of enlargement for existing members are mostly long-term 
and intangib
opean neighborhood – while the costs are much more immediate and concrete. As 
such, this situation calls for additional efforts by the policymakers to convince people 
about the benefits of European initiatives. 
Some populist political leaders also contributed to the confusion among European 
citizens. F
onomic difficulties French people were experiencing were caused by the 
enlargement. Negative portrayals of EU and its policies in the media and by the 
politicians can succeed easily among the people due to people’s lack of specialized 
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nlargement debates, the cleavage between governmental elites and 
general
 them to attract people’s interest on the positive 
effects 
ed increasingly against enlargement as the 
enlarge
information. It is this lack of information what made it very easy for tabloids and 
politicians to make people believe that the adversities they encountered in their lives were 
due to the EU enlargement. In short, European citizens need more information. And this 
is where the EU’s major failure lies.  
During the e
 public was strikingly manifest. This was probably due to the fact that while 
political elites talked about the effects of EU enlargement, they most often referred to 
abstract terms like the reunification of the European continent, the increased prospects of 
peace and stability in Europe, expansion of markets, and the power of the EU in 
international politics. Unfortunately, the nature of the issues elites have covered 
regarding EU enlargement did not allow
of enlargement in their lives. The arguments made by elites remained too abstract 
and too much related to EU itself to attract the attention of the lay people in Europe to the 
positive consequences of EU enlargement.  
By contrast, the aspects that are covered by the media, such as immigration, 
unemployment, and outsourcing were proven to be perceived as more interesting by 
people. Consequently, due to the increased media attention to the enlargement issue and 
its subtopics, the affected publics turn
ment day approached. 
Since the incorporation of public feedback was limited on the issue of Eastern 
enlargement of the EU, the European publics decided to show their reaction for further 
rounds of EU enlargement in a louder and stronger manner. The negative result of the EU 
Constitutional referendum in France provides the strongest evidence to such 
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e people in Britain and France do not 
support
out. They further need to publicize these 
solution
observations. While the original purpose of the Constitutional Convention was to close 
the “democratic deficit” in the EU, the results of the referendum indicate that it 
contributed to the widening of the already existing deficit.   
This does not, of course, mean that th
 the European ideals. Nevertheless, it is important to not to confuse favorable 
attitudes towards the EU policies with the commitments, interests, and priorities attached 
to them.  
There was a disparity, a breakdown of political communication between the 
political leaders and people. Leaders mostly debated on European enlargement as a 
means of tackling problems whereas the people were eager to hear what political 
solutions were offered by their leaders to several possible problems that would be caused 
by the Eastern enlargement. In order to rebuild support for the EU and its specific 
policies, national political leaders need to focus on delivering visible solutions to the 
problems European citizens care most ab
s through the mass media to their citizens.  
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t. Yet, there is still a relative 
paucity
 pertinent in this geography as well.  
U event is more relevant than often 
considered and demonstrate how it has consequences for European public opinion, media 
outlets, and policymakers. 
This chapter first summarizes my findings. It then draws lessons for both the 
European media outlets and the European policymakers. It finally concludes with a 
discussion of the limitations of the research and avenues of future research suggested by 
the project.  
 
 Chapter 8: Summary and Conclusions 
Political scientists and journalists have engaged in a vigorous and fruitful debate 
over the impact of media on public opinion in the US contex
 of scholarship in the political communication literature in the European context. 
Since the Eastern enlargement of the EU has generated substantial coverage in the media 
outlets across Europe, this topic is deemed appropriate to demonstrate that the media 
effects are
This dissertation aimed to make a contribution to this relatively underdeveloped 
area of the political communication literature. It was a scientific examination of agenda-
setting, framing, and priming functions of the media on public opinion in the European 
political context.  
The findings in this research represent an important theoretical, empirical, and 
methodological contribution to the study of comparative political communication, in 
general and public support for European enlargement, in particular. The results of this 
project suggest that the way the media cover an E
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SUMMARY OF FIND
etting theory.  
parative media effects, it offered an innovative explanation for the gap 
betwee
and explained the relevance of studying this topic. Chapter 2 
present
esented an outline of the research questions and 
ypotheses. Chapter 3 explained various data sources and methods employed in this 
analysis to examine the content and consequence of enlargement-related coverage in 
INGS  
To reiterate, this study is conducted under the theoretical umbrella of agenda 
setting research. It tested the robustness of the agenda-setting, framing, and priming 
hypotheses in the British and French contexts. Within the confines of available data, it 
analyzed if the print media agenda and framings exerted substantial influence on the 
public agenda and attitudes regarding EU enlargement in France and the UK, and found 
ample evidence for the applicability of agenda s
This research studied attitudes towards enlargement as a reflection of the media 
coverage of enlargement following the Laeken Council of December 2001 up until the 
day of Eastern enlargement of the EU – 1st of May 2004. Through an analysis of the 
cross-national com
n European elites and masses on the issue of the Eastern enlargement of the EU. 
Moreover, conducting a cross-national comparative analysis is certainly proven useful in 
detecting several cross-national similarities and differences regarding the media effects 
on public opinion. 
Chapter 1 introduced the puzzle of the gap between the elites and the masses on 
the EU enlargement topic, 
ed a synopsis of the main theories in the existing literature on media effects. It 
then surveyed the political communication scholarship in the European context, as well 
as the “democratic deficit” and “communication deficit” arguments. Finally, based on the 
literature review, Chapter 2 pr
h
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ers 4, 5, and 6 presented the empirical findings. Chapter 7 
delved 
layers during the debates 
surroun
, this evidence on time-order supported agenda-setting’s causal 
assertio
Britain and France. Chapt
into qualitative case studies of the British and French official positions on the 
Eastern enlargement of the EU.  
Empirical analysis in this dissertation left us with some clear and some ambiguous 
answers about the role of the media on public opinion. By integrating survey and content 
analysis methodologies on one hand, and qualitative case studies on the other, this 
research concluded that the print media have become key p
ding the fifth and the biggest round of EU enlargement in both countries.  
The results of the empirical analysis in Chapter 4 clearly pointed to strong first-
level agenda-setting effects in the European context. They effectively demonstrated a 
transfer of issue salience from the print media agenda to the public agenda. Evidence 
suggests that the changing public attention to EU enlargement was in large part reflective 
of media content. 
Since the media agenda examined over the two-year period were prior in time to 
the public agenda
n that the public agenda results, to a considerable degree, from the media agenda. 
Hence, the first-level agenda-setting analysis findings suggested that the public agenda 
not only correlated with the media agenda, but it resulted from the media agenda. This 
serves as a strong evidence for the existence of first-level agenda-setting effects. As such, 
agenda setting theory is confirmed at the first-level in both Britain and France.  
The results of the cross-national first-level agenda-setting analysis forcefully 
demonstrated several similarities and differences between the ways the EU enlargement 
topic is covered in different national contexts. Although the pattern of monthly press 
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f priority orders in a list of enlargement’s subtopics between the media 
and the
coverage of enlargement was similar in both cases; evidence from our content analysis 
demonstrated that the French press covered the issue of EU enlargement more 
extensively than the British pres
 underscored how the media contributed to keep the Eastern enlargement issue low 
on the public agenda. This particular finding highlighted the extent to which media 
effects on public salience vary across borders.  
However, media’s first-level agenda-setting influence was found to be stronger in 
the British context. This is probably due to the fact that the British public salienc
wer than the French salience levels from the beginning on. Therefore, the British 
media outlets probably had better prospects for shaping the British public agenda over 
time. 
The second level of agenda setting analysis in Chapter 5 attempted to identify the 
close association o
 public. This analysis concluded that the print media set the public attribute 
agenda on enlargement, bringing some subtopics to the forefront and minimizing others.  
The second-level agenda-setting analysis in both Britain and France suggested a 
perfect correlation between the media framings and the public framings regarding the 
three main consequences of EU enlargement (i.e. political, economic, and social 
consequences). These results also demonstrated the presence of recognizable nationally 
distinct agendas in newspaper contents and public opinion alike.  
Put more specifically, while the British press covered the enlargement issue with 
an overwhelming emphasis on the economic consequences of EU enlargement, the 
French press covered the issue with a heavy emphasis on the political consequences of 
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stically significant rankings between the 
press f




ement. As such, along 
with an
enlargement. This trend corresponded to the aspects the British and French publics 
thought about enlargement, respectively. In other words, the British people prioritized the 
economic consequences of enlargement when they thought about enlargement. The 
French people prioritized the political consequences of enlargement when they thought 
about enlargement.   
As explained in Chapter 5, these stati
ramings and the public framings not only demonstrated that the press attribute-
agendas and the public attribute-agendas were highly correlated, but also suggested that 
the press framings led to different public framings on enlargement.  
The results of the second-level agenda-setting analysis concerning the 17 
subcat
existence of second-level agenda-setting effects in both countries. Further analysis 
to resolve this inconsistency in the second-level agenda-setting analysis is warranted.  
Nevertheless, when compared with the British case, there was a better rate of 
correspondence between the press and the public agendas in the French case regarding
subcategories of enlargement. Overall, these findings are compatible with findings 
from previous agenda-setting and framing research.  
The findings presented in Chapters 4 and 5 pointed to the existence of significant 
media effects on public opinion. Although the media effects were proven substantial, they 
might not be the only determinants of public attitudes on enlarg
 analysis of the effects of the media exposure, Chapter 6 also analyzed the effects 
of a number of other possible determinants of public support for EU enlargement at the 
individual level.  
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mation in the press coverage of enlargement. 




ment issue, political sophistication, 
persona
EU enlargement. 
The results for the consequences of agenda-setting presented in Chapter 6 are also 
promising. They suggested that the daily newspaper readership in Britain had a strong but 
negative influence on the support for enlargement. The results in Chapter 6 further 
implied that people were more sensitive to the salience of negative information than that 
of non-negative infor
The bivariate analyses between public opinion and different determinants of 
public support for enlargement concluded that people’s considerations about the effects 
of enlargement on their daily lives were important in determining their attitudes towards 
enlargement. These findings further suggested that in both France an
ewspapers to gain information on EU developments tended to support EU 
enlargement much less than those who did not read newspapers. However, these 
relationships were not statistically significant. Moreover, the findings tentatively 
suggested that while TV exposure encouraged support for EU enlargement, pr
re discouraged it.   
The perceptions of media objectivity were also positively correlated with the 
enlargement support in both countries (yet, the results were only statistically significant 
for the French public opinion). Interest in the enlarge
l attachment to the EU, and favorability towards the EU were also found to be 
considerably correlated with the support for enlargement in both countries.  
Following a bivariate analysis of the impact of different independent variables on 
the support for EU enlargement, Chapter 6 conducted an individual-level multivariate 
analysis, to achieve a better sense of the true influence of various independent variables 
on the support for 
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U enlargement, people 
expose
e findings of the bivariate analysis regarding the relationship 
betwee
c attention to 
differen
U enlargement on immigration have been influential 
Most significantly, confirming the trends in the bivariate analysis in Chapter 6, 
exposure to newspaper coverage was found to have a statistically significant but negative 
relationship with the support for EU enlargement in France. Furthermore, the comparison 
between exposure to newspaper and TV coverage supported the previous findings in this 
research. Since TV coverage tended to be more supportive of the E
d to TV coverage were also found to be more supportive of the topic. The 
difference in the effects of different media calls for future studies to conduct content 
analysis on both the TV and the newspaper coverage of different issues.   
Moreover, confirming the results of the bivariate analyses in Chapter 6, people’s 
level of interest in enlargement and favorability levels to EU were found to be positively 
correlated with their likelihood of support for the EU enlargement. Finally, the results of 
the individual-level multivariate analysis suggested a statistically significant but a 
negative relationship between political sophistication and support for EU enlargement. 
This finding challenged th
n political sophistication and public support for enlargement. Accordingly, this 
relationship requires a follow-up analysis. In addition, the public opinion results 
presented in Chapter 6 should be treated with caution, since they are derived from a 
public opinion survey conducted three years before May 2004. 
The findings of the priming analysis in Chapter 6 showed that publi
t consequences of enlargement (as determined by the press attention to these 
subtopics) is influential in determining the weight assigned to these particular 
consequences by people when they form their opinions on EU enlargement. These results 
suggested that the consequences of E
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when th
s supported the 
second
ce of the media coverage 
of the E
e British people formed their opinions on enlargement. Regarding the analysis of 
the French sample for the year 2001, the results of the priming analysis suggested that the 
unemployment-related consequences of enlargement have been assigned a heavy weight 
when French people formed their opinions on EU enlargement. As such, focusing on the 
determinants of public support for EU enlargement enabled this study to comment on the 
gap between the European elites and the masses.  
Chapter 6 concluded with presenting the results of logistic regression analyses on 
both the British and the French samples for the year 2002. These result
-level agenda-setting findings presented in Chapter 5: they suggested that when 
forming their opinions on EU enlargement, the British people emphasized the economic 
consequences of EU enlargement the most, while the French people highlighted the 
political consequences of enlargement the most.   
Although these findings are very important, without contextualization, they would 
not add much clarity to the relationship between the elites, masses and the media. 
Accordingly, Chapter 7 presented the findings from the qualitative case studies and 
mapped the development of the official British and French positions on enlargement vis-
à-vis the public opinion and media coverage on the issue.  
The results of Chapter 7 drew attention to the significan
uropean affairs due to their considerable impact on the public opinion. In Britain, 
the media focused and escalated public attention; through its effects on public opinion, it 
has indirectly caused a change in the way the British government reacted to the question 
of immigration vis-à-vis the Eastern enlargement. In the French case, the effects of 
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s in both countries. European citizens 
were m
nsequences of EU enlargement. They 
have on
ia define the agenda of issues 
that the
newspaper coverage on the government’s policies were not as discernible as they were in 
the British case. 
Nevertheless, in either country, it was almost impossible get a balanced and 
thoroughly objective view of the immigration and unemployment-related implications of 
enlargement from the print media. Scare-mongering, sensational headlines and distorted 
“facts” were very common print media practice
ostly interested in practical issues that affect their everyday lives, such as jobs and 
social welfare.  
However, even in the face of these distorted “facts,” the political leaders did not 
provide their worried publics with clear facts on the realities of immigration as well as 
the actual risk of unemployment. They did not propose fundamental policy changes to 
assuage popular concerns about the negative co
ly either addressed the concerns on the surface and verbally (like in the case of 
France) or introduced minor cosmetic changes to their policies (like in the case of the 
United Kingdom). Chapter 7 called for additional efforts by the policymakers to convince 
their publics about the benefits of important European initiatives. 
Consequently, this analysis concludes that the med
 European citizens and policymakers regard as priorities, and give people the 
perspectives that guide their thinking about European affairs. These findings imply that in 
the democratic process, the media participates as an information broker between the 
public and policymakers. As such, media coverage on EU political and social affairs has 
a significant impact on the building of a sense of community. Through their continuous 
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.   
cial policy on EU enlargement and damaged the future of the creation of 
a true E
alue to more concrete 
issues, 
and the prospects of overcoming it – rather than about the broad ideals of achieving peace 
selection and display of news stories, media coverage influences European citizens’ 
picture of the EU
People’s attitudes towards the Union and its specific policies have significant 
implications on the role of the EU as an international actor. However, the predominantly 
negative press coverage and frequent references to several controversial issues regarding 
the enlargement by the press in Britain and France led to the formation of a skeptical 
public opinion on the issue of the EU enlargement. It created a gap between the public 
opinion and offi
uropean community. 
Furthermore, the results of a comparison of content analysis and public opinion 
data suggest that there were marked discrepancies between the enlargement-related 
coverage of the tabloids and the broadsheets. The quality newspaper coverage on EU 
enlargement emphasized broader European themes, while the tabloid coverage 
concentrated on the bread-and-butter problems of economic consequences of EU 
enlargement.  
People are more likely to remember and attach greater v
in which the problems of daily life are involved. Put differently, problems that are 
critical to people’s domestic well-being are more likely to attract their attention, rather 
than subjects like Europe and international relations. As such, the tabloids were more 
effective in shaping the public attitudes. 
The results of the case study chapter suggest that perhaps European citizens 
expected to hear about themes that interested them most – the economic and social crisis 
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ewspapers. Both the British and French people received mixed 
messag
THE IM
earch, tabloidization provoked public skepticism 
on political issues gene
ber States or increased drug trafficking, 
organized crim
and prosperity in the European continent that were emphasized by the European political 
elites and quality n
es from their political leaders regarding the effects of EU enlargement. 
These findings have two wide-ranging implications on a practical political level. 
First, the journalists need to be more conscious of the important role they play when they 
cover political issues. Second, European elites need to pay special attention to setting the 
media agenda, and providing more easily accessible information to the European masses. 
The following sections discuss these important implications in detail. 
 
PLICATIONS OF FINDINGS FOR THE EUROPEAN MEDIA 
As shown by the consequences of agenda-setting analysis in Chapter 6, increased 
exposure to tabloids meant decreased support for enlargement. Because of their anxiety-
driven coverage on European issues, tabloids tended to create a sense of alarm among the 
public about the detrimental effects of EU developments on people’s daily lives. As 
suggested by various findings in this res
rally, and on European affairs particularly. Hence, tabloidization 
is certainly a hurdle against people’s access to unbiased information. 
To illustrate, the issue of immigration was a central topic of especially the British 
tabloid newspaper coverage on EU enlargement. Consequently, British people feared the 
arrival of cheap labor from the new Mem
e or welfare system abuses in their country, issues that are mainly 
emphasized by The Sun and The Daily Mail. Similar observations were valid for the 
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cess. The nature of 
e EU-related media coverage and its effects on people are central to the operation of 
 
KERS 
enlargement related coverage in the French tabloid Libération. There were frequent 
references to the negative impact of EU enlargement on the French economy and 
agriculture. 
Mass communication has significant consequences for the building of community. 
As illustrated by the empirical results in this project, dissemination of information and 
opinion-formation are great responsibilities of the media in democracies. Consequently, 
the media coverage is an essential vehicle for political socialization – a major learning 
experience for the European citizens about the European political pro
th
democracy in the EU.  
As a result, when a major European issue like the EU enlargement gains the 
spotlight; the media outlets should be especially careful to execute their mission with
thoughtfulness and awareness of their unique ability to set the course of the shared 
European future. In sum, the European media outlets should do a better job of explaining 
the benefits of enlargement to European citizens.  
 
THE IMPLICATIONS OF FINDINGS FOR THE EUROPEAN POLICYMA
The results of this project also shed light on some information relevant to 
policymakers. The first direct popular participation in European Community affairs was 
through the 1972 referenda in Ireland, Denmark, Norway and France. Britain’s 
referendum on continued EC membership in 1975 broadened the public’s role in deciding 
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rtheless, scholars, journalists and news reporters still have plenty of reasons 
to cont
ccession, the importance of convincing the public becomes even 
more v
s noted earlier, the media helps in facilitating the public debate required for 
entral to the 
success o
and France properly did their part of the homework, i.e. informing their respective 
publics about possible consequences of EU enlargement. In the end, the quality of 
the future course of European integration. The direct elections of the European 
Parliament started in 1979 have institutionalized this trend (Dalton and Duval 1986, 119).  
Neve
inue their assault on the democratic nature of the EU. The recent failures of the 
French and the Dutch referenda on the EU Constitutional Treaty effectively illustrated the 
significance of convincing the European public on EU-related issues.  
Furthermore, France and Austria have already announced that they would hold 
public referenda on the prospective Turkish accession to the EU. Now that there are 
increasing signs that popular referenda will be held in several member states of the EU 
for a possible Turkish a
isible.  
Greater insight into the effects of media on public opinion has significant 
implications for the ongoing democratic deficit debate in Europe. The findings of this 
research provided some evidence to the existence of democratic deficit in the European 
context.  
A
effective democracy. The media’s portrayal of European political issues is c
r failure of European elites’ attempts to initiate EU projects.  
Consequently, even though the results of the analysis in this project suggest that 
the media shoulders an important responsibility in shaping the public opinion regarding 





b of explaining the benefits and the costs involved in the enlargement 
process
include low economic growth and high unemployment, illegal immigration, 
welfare
LIMITA
democratic decision-making rests on the quality of information flowing to citizens from 
the media and the political leaders, which makes it imperative that scholars understand 
tors that shape both the content of European news and the policy-public opinion-
media nexus. 
The results of this analysis further suggest that the EU has difficulties in bringing 
itself into the spotlight of the mass media’s attention. Hence, publ
be treated as an integral part of EU policy-making and implementation. Put more 
precisely, decision makers are well-advised to engage in various forms of public relations 
strategies by which they should seek to enhance the image of the EU and related issues in 
their respective news media. Most importantly, governments and political leaders should 
do a better jo
 to the people.  
In order to rebuild support for the EU, national political leaders need to focus on 
delivering visible solutions to the problems European citizens care most about. These 
problems 
 system, organized crime, terrorism, environmental pollution, and global 
warming. 
 
TIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH  
This analysis is an initial foray into the relationship between the media, public 
opinion and policymaking. This study, of course, has limitations. First of all, this project 
did not analyze TV news coverage because of the unavailability of a systematic 
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re is an important variable in the agenda-setting process. Even though 
there is
apers. Thus, the agenda of attributes in the newspapers analyzed 
in this 
by Chapter 6, there are significant differences in the effects of the newspaper 
overage and TV coverage. Nevertheless, as explained by McCombs (2005), there is a 
g that about half the time, 
newspapers have the edge 
However, due to unavailability of these tabloids at the Lexis-Nexis database, other 
collection of TV news transcripts on EU enlargement in Britain and France. As such, we 
should be cautious to not to draw over-precise conclusions from the analysis that mainly 
took into account the newspaper coverage of the EU enlargement debate.  
Exposu
 no guarantee that the media coverage was actually seen and processed by the 
respondents to the Eurobarometer polls, the six newspapers content analyzed in this 
study have the largest circulations of any newspaper in each country. Additionally, the 
results of the consequences of agenda-setting analysis in Chapter 6 confirm our 
expectations that the media outlets utilized in the content analysis were influential in 
determining people’s attitudes towards EU enlargement.  
Finally, previous research also suggests that large newspapers in a region can set 
the agenda of smaller p
research could have been filtered down to smaller papers and other media, making 
the media agenda accessible to all respondents throughout the country. 
Still, it is by no means certain that the analysis of the print media reflects the 
enlargement debate comprehensively as depicted in the whole range of media. In fact, as 
suggested 
c
“rough rule of thumb” in the agenda setting research, suggestin
in setting the public agenda. 
Furthermore, this project initially planned to include The Sun and France-Soir in 
the content analysis to represent the tabloid outlets, due to their large circulation figures.  
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 the Eastern enlargement topic 
(especi
 an issue-specific 
framing
 analysis, future studies need to 
constru
popular news outlets, The Daily Mail and Libération, were used as proxies. Regardless of 
these limitations, this project documented strong evidence of the media’s first-level 
agenda-setting effects on the public in both Britain and France.  
Another methodological issue needs to be addressed here. Due to limitations in 
the public opinion survey data, for measuring public salience, this study employed an 
indirect measure – i.e. name recognition of EU enlargement. However, this is not an 
uncommon indirect measure of salience when other options are unavailable (Kiousis and 
McCombs 2004). 
In addition, the number of cases included in the quantitative analyses was fairly 
small due to the limited amount of newspaper articles on
ally in Britain). The small size of the sample might have entailed various statistical 
problems, although the current study tried to address most of them.  
Moreover, this project studied the second-level of agenda-setting effects 
according to EU enlargement’s subtopics. In other words, it provided
 analysis. As such, it is hard for the researchers to adopt the same frames used by 
a previous study and generalize these frames to other topics. This is one general criticism 
against the media effects studies that employ issue-specific frames. As such, for the sake 
of theory building, future studies should try to adopt more general frames that are 
applicable to other political issues as well.  
Regarding the second level of agenda setting
ct smaller numbers of subtopics on issues than employed in this second-level 
analysis (N=17); to better account for the correspondence in the priorities of the media 
and the people regarding the EU enlargement. Additionally, due to the lack of a Flash EB 
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e media framing helped 
set dete
g so may shed light on some of the inconclusive results presented thus 
far, esp
navailability of such 
informa
survey data conducted shortly before the enlargement date, the research could not 
account for more recent media effects on public opinion. 
Regarding the priming thesis, this research shows that th
rminants in public’s evaluation of the issue of Eastern enlargement. But this is far 
from definitive. The “affective” attributes of press reporting on Eastern enlargement 
could not be quantitatively analyzed in this project due to the low intercoder reliability. 
Future studies should include the tone of the media coverage on the issue of EU 
enlargement. Doin
ecially regarding the consequences of agenda-setting and priming analyses. 
Also, the individual-level multivariate analysis in Chapter 6 could not explore the 
effects of left-right political ideology, education, occupation, and income as independent 
variables on the support for EU enlargement. This was due to the u
tion in the key to the Standard EB 56 dataset. Future studies should try to shed 
light on the effects of these independent variables on the support for EU enlargement.   
Some questions still remain unanswered. One such question is: Do media have 
independent agenda? If not, who sets the media agenda? One may argue that the 
government policy instead of the media coverage drives the public opinion. Another such 
question is: Could the observed media effects on public opinion be due to some real 
world events?  
No single study can be considered totally comprehensive. These unsolved 
questions, however, provide a valuable guideline for future research. Subsequent research 






dings of this research had profound implications for European 
policym
political and public preferences on European affairs. The upshot is that the mass media 
analysis to see how the media coverage and public opinion interact with each other over 
time.  
To provide a full account of the media effects on public opinion, local and 
national television news on EU enlargement will also need to be examined by future 
studies. Moreover, in order to make generalizations about the effect of the media on 
public opinion regarding the EU affairs, future studies in this field need to expand their 
scopes to study the effect of media coverage of several other EU policies on public 
opinion.  
As explained in this section, future research in the European po
nication field is likely to prove fruitful. Many inquiries, both within the bounds of 
the current data and outside, present themselves for future studies. Their findings too will 
hold significant public policy implications.  
Referendums in France and the Netherlands on the European Constitution 
exposed both the gulf between Europe’s elites and masses and the limits to th
tionalist endeavors of the EU. There is an ongoing communications deficit in the 
EU’s policy making process. In other words, the EU is not doing a good job in getting its 
message out; and the national political leaders are not doing a good job of assuaging the 
concerns of their domestic public opinion regarding the EU-related developments. 
The fin
akers regarding actions to be taken on both future referenda concerning the 
adoption of the EU Constitution and possible future referenda on the subsequent rounds 
of EU enlargement. Clearly, the media plays a very important political role in shaping the 
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tions. 
rovided a comprehensive understanding of the complex interrelationship 
betwee
shoulder an important responsibility in filling the gap between the public opinion and the 
elite ac
While there is no doubt that the EU issues get less attention than other topics in 
the European media, the results of this study show that they are hardly absent from the 
news. Overall, this study confirmed the hypothesis that there is a strong statistically 
significant relationship between the media coverage and the public opinion regarding the 
Eastern enlargement of the EU. By combining quantitative and qualitative methods, this 
project p
n the media coverage, public opinion and policymaking on EU enlargement in 
Britain and France.  
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Coding














    
Political Consequences    
    
Economic Consequences    
    
Social Consequences    
    





01 Coder ID 
le ID 
rticle 
uty to Enlarge 




17 Effects on EU Decision-making 
18 Effects on Decision-making (Tone) 
19 Eff ts on EU's Proximity to Citizens 
20 Effects on Proximity to Citizens (Tone) 
21 Historically Natural to Expand 
22 Historically Natural to Expand (Tone) 
23 Effects on Expansion of Markets  
24 Effects on Expansion of Markets (Tone)  
25 Effects on Immigration  
26 Effects on Immigration (Tone) 
27 Effects on Illegal Immigration 
28 Effects on Illegal Immigration (Tone) 
29 Effects on Drug Smuggling and Organized Crime 
30 Effects on Drug Smuggling and Organized Crime (Tone) 
31 Effects on Environment 
32 Effects on Environment (Tone) 
33 Effects on Unemployment 
34 Effects on Unemployment (Tone) 
35 Effects on Social Welfare 
36 Effects on Social Welfare (Tone) 
37 Effects on Culture 
38 Effects on Culture (Tone) 
39 Effects on Agriculture 
40 Effects on Agriculture (Tone) 
Codebook for Content Analysis 
02 Artic





one) 08 Peace (T
09 Moral D
10 Moral Duty (Tone) 
11 Effects of Enlargem
12 Effects on EU power (
13 Cost of EU enlargem
14 Cost of Enlargement (Tone) 
15 Role of the Country ent 
16 Role of the Country (Tone) 
ec
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finition of Categories for Coding 
litical consequences of EU enlargement” frame consisted of six 
s irectly from the Flash Eurobarometer survey questionnaires. 
T (1) “peace” – effect of EU enlargement on peace and stability in the 
European continent; (2) “moral duty” – moral responsibility of Europeans to include new 
m ; (3) “stronger EU” – effect of EU enlargement to boost the power of 
E a; (4) “count less” – effect of EU enlargement on the role 
p nlarged EU; (5) “difficult to take 
d t on EU decision-making processes; and (6) 
“ f EU enlargement as a historically natural 
d
nces of EU enlargement” frame included seven 
s  Flash Eurobarometer survey questionnaires. 
T  effect of EU enlargement on the investment 
o ation” – effect of EU enlargement on 
i  one’s country; (3) “illegal immigration” – 
e migration to one’s country; (4) “environment” – 
i ) “unemployment” – the effect of EU 
e e’s country; (6) “agriculture” – the impact of EU 
e nd (7) “expensive” – the cost of funding of EU 
e
frame consisted of four 
s  the Flash Eurobarometer survey questionnaires. 
T  citizens” – impact of EU enlargement on people’s feeling 
of affinity with the EU; (2) “drugs and organized crime” – the impact of EU enlargement 
o d organized crime in one’s country; (3) “welfare 
s  enlargement on the social welfare system; and (4) “culture” –





embers to the EU
U in the international aren
layed by one’s country (Britain or France) within the e
ecisions” – impact of enlargemen
historically natural” – perceptions o
evelopment. 
The “economic conseque
ubcategories extracted directly from the
hey include: (1) “expansion of markets” –
pportunities in a bigger market; (2) “immigr
mmigration from new EU member states to
ffects of EU enlargement on illegal im
mpact of EU enlargement on environment; (5
nlargement on unemployment in on
nlargement on agriculture and the CAP; a
nlargement. 
The “socio-cultural consequences of EU enlargement” 
ubcategories extracted directly from
hey include: (1) “proximity to
n the fight against drug smuggling an
ystem” – impact of EU





ix C: Information on the Eurobarometer Surveys U
Eurobarometer Surveys Employed 
 
Field Research Dates 
  
Standard Eurobarometer 56.3 * January-February 2002 
  
Standard Eurobarometer 57.1 * March-May 2002 
  
Flash Eurobarometer 132.1 ** September 2002 
  
Standard Eurobarometer 58.1 * October-November 2002 
  




meter 140 ** March 2003 
  
Standard Eurobarometer 59.1 * March-April 2003 
  
Standard Eurobarometer 60.1 * October-November 2003 
  




* Standard Eurobarometer public opinion data are obtained through the Inter-Univer




** Flash Eurobarometer on Enlargement data are gathered through the University of 
Cologn he 
URL: h




Appendix D: Definition of Categories for the Eurobarometer 56 Public 
Opinion Data  
 





40BC02 The risk of armed conflicts on our continent will be lower 
tronger voice
r continent  
4302r: Enlargement secures peace in Europe
p eliminate arme Europe 
ht agains
the EU work 
itself better he
r than the US 




Q40BC03 There will be better economic prospects in a bigger market 
Q40BC04 There will be better employment prospects 
Q40BC08 It will be easier to prevent immigration from outside of the EU 
Q40BC11 Tourism will develop 
Q40BC12 There will be less taxes 
Q40BC13 Your personal financial situation will improve 
Q40BC15 Environment will be better protected 
 





Q40BC09 It will give the EU a s  in the world 
 
Q4301r: Enlargement unites ou
Q  
Q4303r: Enlargement will hel
4304r: Enlargement will help to fig
d conflicts in 
errorism Q t t
Q4312r: Enlargement will make better 
 
Q4403r: Our country will make 
4407r: The EU will be stronge
ard in the world 
Q




Q40CC15: Smaller countries will lose out 
 







Q4306r: Enlargement will help to create more jobs in our country 
Q
Q4311r: Enlargement will help new o reach the EU level of economic 
development 
 
Q4401r: There will 
Q4405r: The environment in our country will be better protected 
t will be easier for citizens of other U member states to settle in our country 
ew members 
too high 
ng for work in our 
s allocated to our country 
 poorer 
 It will be harder to prevent immigration from outside the EU 
 
 
 of enlargement included: 
UM(q40bc01,q40 0cc05r,q40cc06r,
40BC0
 Cultural life will be richer and more varied 
 It will be easier to fight against organized crime 
untry 
om outside the EU 
4310r: Enlargement will make the EU stronger politically 
 member countries t
be a greater variety of products in the shops 
Q4402r: Companies in our country will benefit from enlargement 





40CC01: There will be a risk of unfair competition from nQ
Q40CC02: The costs of funding new members will be 
Q40CC03: The value of euro will fall 
Q40CC04: There will be more unemployment 
states lookiQ40CC07: There will be more people from new member 
country 
40CC12: There will be less European Union’s fundQ
Q40CC13: Prices will rise 
Q40CC14: Taxes will rise 
eQ40CC16: The quality of food products will b







1 There will be more countries to visit and go on holiday to Q
Q40BC05
40BC06Q
Q40BC07 There will be less drug trafficking 
Q40BC10 Easier to travel, no passports needed 
Q40BC14 We will learn more about new countries, about our neighbors 




40CC05: There will be more organized crime Q
Q40CC06: There will be more drug trafficking 
Q40CC08: There will be more illegal immigrants fr
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g too different to get 
ere will be a loss of our national identity and culture 
40CC18: Your statutory entitlements (social welfare, holidays, maternity leave, etc.) 
Q40CC09: There will be problems caused by people in the EU bein
along with each other 
Q40CC10: Our language will be used less and less 
Q40CC11: Th
Q





Quality of Life in Britain  
Q. 40a. After new countries have joined, your life will be … 
Appendix E: Supplementary Cross-tabulation Tables for Chapter 6 
 
Table E-1. Cross-tabulation of Support for EU Enlargement and Enlargement’s Impact 
the 
 Better Worse About the Same Total N 
Opposition to 
Enlargement 3.8% 51.2% 14.7% 115 
Support for 
Enlargement 96.2% 48.8% 85.3% 520 
Total N 78 82 475 635 
Source: Standard Eurobarometer 56 (Cell entries are column percentages) 
 
Table E-2. Cross-tabulation of Support for EU Enlargement and Enlargement’s Impact on 
the Quality of Life in France  
Q. 40a. After new countries have joined, your life will be … 
 Better Worse About the Same Total N 
Opposition to 
Enlargement 6.8% 64.9% 25.8% 230 
Support for 
Enlargement 93.2% 35.1% 74.2% 558 
Total N 59 97 632 788 
Source: Standard Eurobarometer 56 (Cell entries are column percentages) 
 
Table E-3. Cross-tabulation of Support for EU Enlargement and Enlargement’s Impact on 
Illegal Immigration to France  
Q. 40cc. After new countries have joined, there will be more illegal 
immigration to France 
 Disagree Agree Total N 
Opposition to 
Enlargement 55.8% 75.6% 63 
Support for 
Enlargement 44.2% 24.4% 34 
Total N 52 45 97 
Source: Standard Eurobarometer 56 (Cell entries are column percentages) 
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able E-4. Cross-tabulation of Support for EU Enlargement and Enlargement’s Impact on 
Prices in France  
ntries have joined, prices will rise in France 
T
Q. 40cc13. After new cou
 Disagree Agree Total N 
Opposition to 
Enlargement 
 1% 34 
9 97 
56.9% 9% 63 76.
Support for 
Enlargement 43.1% 23.
Total N 58 3
Source: Standard Euro er 56 (Cell are column ges) 
able E-5. Cross-tabulation of Support for EU Enlargement and Gender in Britain  




 Female Total N 
Opposition to 
Enlargement 
Support for 63.5% 
293 390 683 
Male 




Source: Standard Euro ter 56 (C es are col centages) 
rance  
barome ell entri umn per
 
Table E-6. Cross-tabulation of Support for EU Enlargement and Gender in F
      Gender 
 Male Female Total N 
Opposition to 
Enlargement 45.3% 46.6% 369 
Support for 
Enlargem nt 54.7% 53.4% 434 
  
e
Total N 402 401 803




Table E-7. Cross-tabulation of Support for EU Enlargement and Age in Britain  
 
Opposition to 25.3 34.5%  45.5% 3 
 74.7% 65.5% 65.3% 54.5% 430 
95 209 235 683 





Total N 144 
Source: Standard Eurobarometer 56 (Cell entries are column percentages)




Table E-8. Cross-tabulation of Support fo
 18-24 25-35 36-49 50+ Total N 
Opposition to 36.7% 44.3% 50 49.5% 
 63.3% 55.7% 50% 50.5% 434 





Total N 25 4 80
Source: S
 
tandard Eurobaromet tries are c n percentages) 
able E-9. Cross-tabulation of Support for EU Enlargement and Self-Proclaimed Interest 
in Enlargement in Britain   
Interested in EU Enlargement 
er 56 (Cell en olum
T
 No Yes Total N 
Opposition to  
 51.3% 76.9% 412 
355 299 654 
Enlargement 
Support for 
48.7% 23.1% 242 
Enlargement
Total N 
Source: Standard Eurobarome  (Cell entries are co  percentages) ter 56 lumn
252 
oclaimed 
Interest in Enlargement in France   
terested  Enlarge
 
Table E-10. Cross-tabulation of Support for EU Enlargement and Self-Pr
In  in EU ment 
 
Opposition to 
No Yes Total 
 63.1% 32.7% 358 






Total N 333 453 
Source: Standard Eurobarometer 56 (Cell entries are column percentages) 
Table E-11. Cross-tabulation of Support for EU Enlargement and Political Sophistication 
on En ent in B
 of Info  on Enla e
 
largem ritain  




1 2 3 4 Total N 
418 
318 289 50 8 665 
Enlargem 44% 31.5% 30% 12.5% 247 
Support for 
nlargement 56% 68.5% 70% 87.5% E
Total N 
Source: Standard Eurobarometer 56 (Cell entries are column percentages) 
 
Table E-12. Cross-tabulation of Support al Sophistication 
on Enlargement in France  
Level of I ion on Enlargem ery well inform
for EU Enlargement and Politic




1 2 3 4 Total N 
56.8% 39.6% 30.3% 50% 
or 
Total N 324 364 89 10 787 
360 
Support f
Enlargement 43.2% 60.4% 69.7% 50% 427 
Source: Standard Eurobarometer 56 (Cell entries are column percentages) 
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Level of A ed) 
 
Table E-13. Cross-tabulation of Support for EU Enlargement and the Level of 
Attachment to EU in Britain  
ttachment to EU (4-very attach
 1 2 3 4 N 
57.3% 38.8% 15.2% 14.6% 9 
42.7% 61.2% 84.8% 85.4% 3 






Total N  66
Source: Standard Eurobarometer 56 (Cell entries are co n percentages) 
Table E-14. Cross-tabulation of Support for EU Enlargement and the Level of 
Level of Attachment to EU (4-very attached) 
lum
 
Attachment to EU in France  
 l N 
78.9% 52.5% 31.4% 19% 357 
 21.1% 47.5% 68.6% 81% 425 
156 238 283 105 782 






Source: Standard Eurobarometer 56 l entries ar lumn percen es) 
 
 (Cel e co tag
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